Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. D054087.,D054087.
• Citation: Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist., 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 900 (Cal. App. 2009)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: SAM H. FARAHANI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

175 Cal.App.4th 1486

96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 900

SAM H. FARAHANI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. D054087.

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One.

July 28, 2009.

Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz, Ray J. Artiano and Richard E. Romero for Defendants and Appellants.

Grady and Associates, Dennis M. Grady, Kenneth W. Baisch and Bradley K. Moores for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

McINTYRE, J.—

In this casewe hold that Education Code section 87485(undesignated statutory references are to the Education Code) renders "null and void" the "last chance agreement"(Agreement) under which community college faculty member Sam H. Farahani waived his statutory due process rights relating to faculty discipline.The San Diego Community College District(District) terminated Farahani after he allegedly violated his Agreement with the District.The trial court granted Farahani's petition for writ of mandate(Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), ruling that the Agreement violated the Education Code and Farahani's due process rights.The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 directing the District to (1) reinstate Farahani with full backpay, interest and benefits and (2) require its governing board to determine whether Farahani should be terminated, "all in compliance with the requirements of the Education Code, including appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard."The District appeals.

In addition to concluding that Farahani's purported waiver of the right to a hearing in the Agreement and attached general and special release and settlement agreement (Release) were unenforceable under section 87485, we also reject the District's claim that Farahani's petition was barred by laches, unclean hands, and the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Farahani was a tenured professor of international relations and public policy at Mesa College.He had worked for the District for 18 years prior to his termination in June 2006.

Beginning in 1994, the District received complaints from female students and staff about what they described as unwanted sexual and social advances.In October 2000, after investigating some of these complaints, the District gave Farahani a written reprimand advising him that continued misconduct would result in discipline up to and including termination.

On September 20, 2004, the District sent Farahani written "Notice of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing: Suspension."The notice cited the basis for the recommended one-year suspension without pay as "a continuing pattern of inappropriate behavior toward students and employees over several years."The notice informed Farahani that he had "the right to respond to the proposed discipline either orally or in writing or both."

The matter did not proceed to the hearing stage.In November 2004, the attorney for the American Federation of Teachers Guild, California Federation of Teachers Local 1931(Union) presented Farahani with the Agreement, and told him that the District would suspend him for a year without pay unless he signed it.Among other things, the Agreement and Release provided that Farahani (1) accept a reduction of pay equivalent to one month's salary and (2) for a period of 18 months agree to refrain from conduct that constituted sexual harassment, "including any verbal, physical or visual conduct" on campus, and from "personal contacts and/or communications" with students off campus.The Agreement stated that if Farahani failed to comply with its provisions, he could be "terminated at the Chancellor's discretion, without the issuance of charges under the Education Code or District policies and without right of appeal ...."The Release included the following provision: "Farahani waives any and all appeal rights he may otherwise have to challenge the discipline or otherwise pursue any appeal relating to the pre-disciplinary notice."

District faculty members are covered by the collective bargaining agreement between the District's trustees and the Union.Article XIV, section 14.2 of the collective bargaining agreement provides that "All faculty are eligible for a hearing prior to any disciplinary action involving loss of pay."When encouraging Farahani to sign the Agreement, the Union attorney told Farahani that although the Agreement was "probably ... not legal," it would be best to "[g]ive your 18 months and get it over with."Although Farahani believed that the charges were baseless, he stated he was "compelled" to sign "by two bad options."

While the Agreement was in effect, the District received new complaints about Farahani from female employees.Constance M. Carroll, the chancellor, concluded that Farahani's conduct towards these women "constituted unwanted social advances which could create an uncomfortable work environment and/or conduct which could be considered sexual harassment."She terminated Farahani effective June 9, 2006, pursuant to the Agreement.The termination letter stated, "Since you are being terminated from employment because of a violation of the [Agreement], you do not have a right of appeal."

Farahani wrote members of the District's governing board, requesting reinstatement and an opportunity to meet.He received no response.Farahani's attorney wrote Carroll on July 14, 2006, demanding Farahani's reinstatement plus backpay and benefits.The District's response reiterated that "Mr. Farahani was not entitled to the issuance of formal charges or right to appeal his termination under the provisions of the [Agreement]."

Farahani filed his petition for writ of mandate on March 7, 2007.

DISCUSSION

I.Standard of Review

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a), the trial court may issue a writ of mandate "to any ... board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by such ... board, or person."In reviewing a judgment granting a peremptory writ of traditional mandate under this section, we apply the substantial evidence test to the court's factual findings, but independently review its findings on legal issues.(Stryker v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist.(2002)100 Cal.App.4th 324, 329[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 489](Stryker).)The interpretation of a statute is a legal issue subject to de novo review.(People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co.(2000)24 Cal.4th 415, 432[101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956].)

II.The Agreement

The District argues that the Agreement and Release included all the elements of a valid contract, Farahani signed them voluntarily on advice of counsel, and neither document was unlawful or against public policy.We begin with the dispositive question whether the Agreement and Release were invalid and unenforceable, as found by the trial court.

(1) The Education Code sets forth due process rights granted to community college faculty members in disciplinary matters, including the right to notice, opportunity to object, a hearing before an arbitrator or administrative law judge, and a decision by the governing board.(§§ 87669,87672-87674,87678-87680.)The first paragraph of section 87485 expressly provides: "Except as provided in Section 87744, any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this chapter or any part thereof is null and void."The District contends that section 87485 is inapplicable to the Agreement and Release signed by Farahani, which it describes as a waiver in response to discipline.We conclude that the District interprets section 87485 too narrowly and there was no error in the trial court's ruling.

(2) The rules of statutory construction are well established.Their aim is to ascertain legislative intent in order to effectuate the purpose of the law.(Burden v. Snowden(1992)2 Cal.4th 556, 562[7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672].)Courts generally adopt a literal interpretation of the words of a statute unless the words are ambiguous or the language is inconsistent with the statute's purpose.(White v. Ultramar, Inc.(1999)21 Cal.4th 563, 572[88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944];Lungren v. Deukmejian(1988)45 Cal.3d 727, 735[248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].)"If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of legislative intent."(Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center(1998)19 Cal.4th 851, 861[80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803, 968 P.2d 514].)Moreover, courts should not read the statutory language in isolation, "but rather in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute."(Covino v. Governing Board(1977)76 Cal.App.3d 314, 318[142 Cal.Rptr. 812](Covino).)"A corollary to this rule is that the various parts of the statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular phrase, clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole [citations]."(Ibid.)We apply these rules to determine the scope of section 87485.

(3)Title 3,division 7, part 51, chapter 3 of the Education Code governs the employment rights of community college faculty.(Stryker, supra,100 Cal.App.4th at p. 329;§ 87400 et seq.)It is significant that section 87485 appears under article 1, "General Provisions."By its terms, section 87485 renders null and void any agreement to waive the benefits of chapter 3, "Employment."(§ 87485.)The only exception is an agreement pertaining to reductions in force under section 87744, which appears in the more specific article 6.5, "Reduction in Services."Courts have applied section 87485 and its predecessor, former section 13338.1...