Farias v. Hicks

Decision Date27 October 2015
Docket NumberCase No. 1:14-cv-01950-SKO (PC)
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesMARTIN FARIAS, Plaintiff, v. Y. HICKS, et al., Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND DISMISSING ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1983

Screening Order
I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Martin Farias, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 8, 2014. On January 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint and on May 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Discussion
A. Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison in Crescent City, brings this action against Accounting Office Supervisor Y. Hicks; Associate Warden of Business Services T. Broussard; Chief Deputy Warden R. A. Groves; Captain and Appeals Coordinator J. Knight; Inmate Appeals Branch Staff Services Coordinator C. Hammond; Appeals Coordinators I. Alomari and T. Jackson; and Health Care Appeals Coordinator L. Ledford for violating for violating his rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff's claims arise from the "illegal"assessment of fees against his prison trust account in 2013 and 2014 while he was at California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi. (Doc. 11, 2nd Amend. Comp., p. 6.)

1. $5.00 Fee for Health Care Visits

Pursuant to Title 15 state prison regulations, "[i]nmates shall be charged and inmates shall pay a fee of five dollars ($5.00) for each inmate-initiated health care visit." Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §3354.2(c). This fee is "charged to the trust account of the inmate," but "[w]hen the inmate is without sufficient funds at the time for the charge, and remains without sufficient funds for 30 days after this time, the inmate shall not be charged for any remaining balance of the fee." Tit. 15, § 3354.2(c)(3). On October 3, 2013, Plaintiff was charged $0.06 for a dental copayment, which brought his trust account balance from $0.06 to $0.00. The charge was noted "10-3-13 DCP 9-5-13." (2nd Amend. Comp., p. 17.) On November 9, 2013, Plaintiff's trust account was charged $5.00 for a dental copay, which was noted "10/24/13 DCP 10/3/13." (Id.)

It is the second charge which is in dispute. Plaintiff had a dental filling on October 3, 2013, when he was indigent. (Id., p. 31.) On November 9, 2013, a $100.00 deposit was made to Plaintiff's trust account. Plaintiff alleges that the subsequent $5.00 deduction made on November 9, 2013, occurred more than thirty days after his October 3, 2013, dental visit and pursuant to section 3354.2, he should not have been charged. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a health care inmate appeal disputing the charge on January 14, 2014, after he received his trust account statement and discovered the charge. (Id., p. 19.) The appeal was cancelled on January 15, 2014, by Defendant Ledford, who informed Plaintiff that trust account issues, including indigent status, are custody issues. (Id., p. 21.) Plaintiff submitted an "Inmate Request for Interview" form to Defendant Ledford on January 16, 2014, stating that because the dental department charged him $5.00 in error, he was told to file a health care appeal. (Id., p. 23.) Plaintiff was again told that his issue was his indigent status and he needed to file a non-health care appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted another "Request for Interview" form on January 22, 2014, to Defendants Jackson and Alomari, non-health care appeals coordinators, and explained that his appeal had been rejected twice by the health care appeals office on the ground that he was appealing a custody issue so he was submitting it to them for processing. (Id., p. 25.) Plaintiffbelieves that his appeal was then forwarded to the health care appeals office by Defendants Jackson and Alomari because he received notice from the health care appeals office that his appeal had been assigned for a first-level review. (Id., p. 27.)

Plaintiff was interviewed by Dr. Nakayama on January 31, 2014. (Id., p. 29.) Dr. Nakayama assumed the $5.00 fee was charged for Plaintiff's October 3, 2013, visit and he denied Plaintiff's appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that the charge was assessed more than thirty days after his October 3, 2013, appointment and was therefore "illegal" under the regulations. Plaintiff submitted his appeal for a second-level review on February 7, 2014, but it was again rejected by Defendant Ledford on the basis that it was a custody issue. On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff forwarded the appeal to Defendants Jackson and Alomari, and explained that it had been rejected by the health care appeals office. (Id., p. 33.)

After some back-and-forth which Plaintiff alleges was harassing and an attempt to dissuade him from pursuing his appeal, Plaintiff was told to submit a new appeal, which he did. (Id., pp. 38, 40.) On May 9, 2014, J. Wupperfeld interviewed Plaintiff and denied the appeal at the first level of review. (Id., p. 45.) Wupperfeld stated that a copay obligation expires thirty days from the transaction date, not the appointment date, and the obligation for Plaintiff's dental visit was created on November 9, 2013, when Plaintiff had $45.00 in his trust account. (Id.) Plaintiff pursued the appeal to the second level of review, where it was addressed by Defendant Hicks. (Id., p. 48-9.) Hicks denied the appeal and stated that an obligation was created on November 9, 2013, for an October 24, 2013, visit, which Plaintiff alleges was a lie. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Broussard and Groves had the opportunity to remedy the harm done to Plaintiff but they failed to do so and signed off on Hicks' appeal response. (Id.) The appeal was subsequently denied by Defendant J. Knight on September 22, 2014, in a decision which restated Hicks' decision from the second level. (Id., pp. 53-4.)

2. Fees for Law Library Services

Plaintiff also disputes charges assessed against his trust account for law library services. During March 2014, Plaintiff had no funds in his trust account; and he made photocopies on March 5, 2014, and obtained legal mail services on March 10, 2014, and March 17, 2014. (Id., p.56.) On April 1, 2014, a $100.00 deposit was made to Plaintiff's trust account. On April 4, 2014, he was charged $1.50 for the copies made on March 5, 2014; and on April 7, 2014, he was charged $7.00 for legal mail expenses incurred on March 10, 2014, and $4.60 for legal mail expenses incurred on March 17, 2014 -- for a grand total of $13.10. (Id.)

Title 15 state prison regulations provide that "[a] charge shall not be placed against future deposits to the inmate's trust account to recover the cost of materials, copying and postage provide, while the inmate was indigent." Tit. 15, § 3138(h)(3). Plaintiff alleges that because he was indigent in March 2014 when he obtained copy and legal mail services, it was illegal to later charge him $13.10 against his future trust account deposit. Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal on April 17, 2014, and he was interviewed by Defendants Hicks on June 13, 2014. Plaintiff's appeal was "partially granted" but only in that "no illegal deductions were found." (2nd Amend. Comp., pp. 66-7.) Plaintiff was informed that "indigent status is measured upon the receipt and processing of Inmate Trust Account Withdrawal Form CDC 193's [sic] (ITAWO), for legal copies or legal mail, by the Inmate Trust Accounting Office. The Trust Restitution Accounting Computer System (TRACS) will not allow a transaction to post for legal copy or...

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