Farina Bros. Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Civ. A. No. 56-614-A.

• Citation: 152 F. Supp. 423
• Decision Date: 15 May 1957
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 56-614-A.
• Parties: FARINA BROTHERS COMPANY, Inc., v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA CARPENTERS LOCAL, NO. 107.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

152 F. Supp. 423

FARINA BROTHERS COMPANY, Inc., v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA CARPENTERS LOCAL, NO. 107.

Civ. A. No. 56-614-A.

United States District Court D. Massachusetts.

May 15, 1957.

Edward U. Lee, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Saul A. Seder, Worcester, Mass., for defendant.

ALDRICH, District Judge.

Defendant's motion to dismiss the substitute complaint raises a single question. Defendant, a labor union representing employees in an industry affecting commerce, is alleged to have called a strike of its members employed by the plaintiff in violation of a contract between the plaintiff and itself. A copy of the contract is attached to the complaint as Exhibit A, and it being apparent that its name is not mentioned, plaintiff makes a number of subsidiary allegations in support of its statement that it is a party. The union moves to dismiss on ground that plaintiff is not a party.

Exhibit A was initially an agreement entered into between Worcester General Builders Association, hereinafter called Association, and the union. In a number of instances, particularly with relation to wage scales, etc., the language of the agreement indicates that there were but two parties—Association and the union. However, there are some conspicious exceptions. Thus Article I, in listing the Objects, includes "peaceable adjustment * * * of * * * differences that may arise between any of the parties to this agreement." Article IV, No. 2, reads, "Each employer agrees to pay eight (8) cents per hour, for each hour worked, by each of his Carpenters * * *" Article IX reads in part, "The employers agree that in the employment of workmen * * *" (there shall be preferential shop). The document continues, under date of May 9, 1956, with the following: "Signed for the Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, whose members hereby become a party to the agreement negotiated between Worcester General Building Contractors Association and Carpenters Local Union No. 107, the latter two groups being the negotiating committees." There is appended signatures for Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc., hereinafter called Associated, and the union.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff, since some time prior to May 9, 1956, has constantly been "a member of and associated with" Associated, and that on May 9, 1956, acting by and through Associated it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the defendant (Exhibit A); that the defendant at all times knew the plaintiff was a member of Associated and had dealings and negotiations with the plaintiff with respect to and for the aforesaid bargaining agreement, but on June 22, 1956 it called a strike of, and caused a stoppage of work by, all union members employed by plaintiff who were covered by and subject to the terms of the said agreement. The complaint seeks damages under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185.

The union contends that the aforesaid allegations that plaintiff was a party to the agreement are conclusions of law contrary to its terms; that the agreement shows that the sole parties were Association (perhaps), Associated and itself, and that if plaintiff is an undisclosed principal, "quaere as to whether such an activity, on the part of an employer, could possibly have been intended, not alone tolerated, as a procedure between management and labor, or * * * was it intended that undisclosed principals were entitled to the use of this procedure?"

I discard any question of undisclosed principals. If an individual employer, as a matter of construction, could be an individual party to this agreement, the complaint adequately alleges disclosure. The real question is whether an individual employer, for whom there has been joint bargaining authorized, and an overall agreement, is to be regarded as "an employer" who can sue under § 301(a), which permits "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce * * * without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."

It is to be noted that the strike is not against all members of Associated, but only against the plaintiff. Nor is it alleged to be a whipsaw device aimed indirectly at other members. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 77 S.Ct. 643, 1 L.Ed. 2d 676.

The union asserts that to permit the present suit would be to "open the doors of the federal courts to a potential flood of grievances * * * relating to * * * terms peculiar to the individual benefit." This unidentified quotation comes apparently from ...