Farina v. Compuware Corp.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-98-722-PHX-ROS.,CV-98-722-PHX-ROS. |
| Citation | 256 F.Supp.2d 1033 |
| Parties | Jocelyn FARINA, Plaintiff, v. COMPUWARE CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Susan Joan Martin, Daniel Lee Bonnett, William Karl Hylen, Jennifer Lynn Kroll, Martin & Bonnett PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
William W. Drury, Jr., James Lawrence Blair, Renaud Cook & Drury PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court are three summary judgment motions and one motion for leave to file an amended complaint. On February 8, 2002, Defendant Compuware Corporation ("Defendant" or "Compuware") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Title VII Claims (Doc. # 143). On May 17, 2002, the parties each filed motions on Plaintiff Jocelyn Farina's ("Plaintiff or "Farina") claims under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"): Plaintiff filed Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on Count VII of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 167) and Defendant filed Supplemental and Superceding Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs FMLA Claims (Doc. # 165). In addition, Plaintiff on May 17 filed Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. # 168). For reasons explained below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII claims, grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs FMLA Claims, and deny Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint.
The following facts are stated in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.1 On July 8, 1996, Plaintiff began work for Defendant, in the position of Regional Manager for the newly-created Phoenix office. DSOF ¶ 1. At that time, the Phoenix office was one of 22 regional offices in North America. DSOF ¶ 3. Also, all the regional managers were men, except for Plaintiff and Susan Domenici, who was Regional Manager of the Toronto office. PC SOF ¶ 10 Plaintiffs immediate supervisor was Robert Lemley ("Lemley"), who was Director of Western Operations. DSOF ¶ 3.
Plaintiff and Lemley engaged in a series of negotiations regarding Plaintiffs compensation prior to her accepting the position, though each have different characterizations of the understandings reached at that time. PCSOF ¶ 5, 6. In September of 1996, Plaintiff received her fiscal year 1997 ("FY97") compensation plan, which covered the period from April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997. PCSOF ¶ 6. Plaintiffs compensation package included generous provisions for "milestone bonuses," paid to employees when the year's cumulative qualifying sales exceed the regional quota. Under the FY97 compensation plan, these bonuses were not capped, so that each increment of sales above the quota yielded a corresponding bonus. Pl's Opposition at 6.
In March 1997, Plaintiff participated in the successful closing of a transaction involving the sale of certain licenses to American Express (the "Amex transaction" or "Amex deal"), worth about $5.2 million to Defendant. The closing of the transaction came at the end of Defendant's FY97, and was uniquely structured as a so-called "bucket deal," whereby American Express prepaid for the products earlier than actually selecting and receiving the products. PCSOF ¶ 15. As a result of the American Express deal, Plaintiff stood to exceed the FY97 quota for the Phoenix Regional Office handily, resulting in substantial additional compensation for Plaintiff in the form of milestone bonuses. Farina Second Aff. ¶ 16.
Plaintiff, however, never received full credit for the American Express transaction towards the calculation of her overquota milestone bonuses in FY97. Instead, Defendant, in a decision made at least in part by Ron Sleiter ("Sleiter"), then Defendant's Vice-President of its North American Sales Division,2 decided that the American Express transaction did not qualify for determining milestone bonuses under the terms of the FY97 comp plan. PCSOF ¶ 13, 15. That classification proved costly to Plaintiff; she calculated that she was due 21 milestone bonuses for a total of $420,000, while Defendant awarded her only 9 milestone bonuses for a total of $180,000, a difference of $240,000. Farina Second Aff. ¶ 16.
On June 27,1997, Plaintiffs counsel sent Defendant a letter outlining Plaintiffs opinion that she was owed additional money from her bonuses, and suggesting that Defendant's actions were motivated by sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Exh. 8 to DSOF. Defendant sent a response letter explaining its position on her bonus compensation, and denying any form of sex discrimination, on July 15, 1997. Exh. 9 to DSOF. On July 22, 1997, Plaintiff went on part-time short-term disability leave due to her pregnancy anticipating triplets. PCSOF ¶ 23. Around this time, Plaintiff asserts that she began being "excommunicated" from contact with the office. Pl's Opposition at 25. In particular, on July 24, 1997, Lemley sent an email to the Phoenix office employees advising them not to contact Plaintiff at home, and informing them that he would run the office long distance from San Francisco.4 Exh. E to Farina's Second Aff.
On November 19, 1997, Plaintiff filed her first complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("first EEOC complaint"). Exh. 3 to DSOF. Sometime in November, Lemley had a conversation with Terri Trainor Clark ("Clark") about replacing Plaintiff as Phoenix Regional Manager. This conversation may have taken place a short time after Lemley received notice of the EEOC complaint. PCSOF ¶ 77-79. Over the next two months, Lemley recruited and hired Mark Otlweski ("Otlewski") as Phoenix Regional Manager. PCSOF ¶ 86, 89.
On February 12, 1998, the EEOC sent Plaintiff a right to sue letter. DSOF ¶ 41. On April 23, 1998, Sleiter sent Plaintiff a letter that confirmed that the Phoenix Regional Manager position had been filled "out of business necessity" and offered her a newly-created position as Sales Manager at a number of locations, none of them in Phoenix. Exh. 16 to PCSOF. On April 24, 1998, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against Defendant, alleging disparate treatment under Title VII. DSOF ¶ 44. Around this time, Plaintiff and Lemley had a series of disputes about whether she received adequate information on the Sales Manager position to make a decision whether to take the job. PCSOF ¶ 45-51. On May 15, 1998, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter indicating both that "I can not [sic] accept the position of Sales Manager" and that "[a]fter [15 days], I will consider myself constructively discharged and will submit my written letter of resignation at that time." Exh. 20 to DSOF. Defendant did not wait for Plaintiffs letter of resignation. On May 19, 1998, Lemley sent Plaintiff a letter, stating that "since you elected to decline our placement offer as a Sales Manager .... your employment with Compuware ended effective May 15, 1998." Exh. 21 to DSOF.
On August 14, 1998, Plaintiff filed a second complaint with the EEOC and received a right to sue letter on September 15, 1998. DSOF ¶ 54. On November 3, 1998, she filed her Second Amended Complaint alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. DSOF ¶ 58
A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. In addition, the dispute must be genuine, that is, "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, All U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.1995). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party; if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, All U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, because "[credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, ... [t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor" at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)); see Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995).
The analysis of a disparate treatment claim under Title VII is governed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist, 238 F.3d...
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