Farinholt v. State, 71
Decision Date | 15 March 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 71,71 |
Parties | Robert Louis FARINHOLT v. STATE of Maryland. Sept. Term 1983. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Diane G. Goldsmith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.
This is another case involving the application of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746.
The petitioner, Robert Louis Farinholt, and a co-defendant, Paul Edward Hammond, were indicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for armed robbery and related offenses. The indictment was based on allegations that Farinholt and Hammond had together committed armed robbery at a fast food restaurant located in a Prince George's County shopping center.
Farinholt was arraigned on May 6, 1981; thus the 180-day period for trying the case, prescribed by § 591 and Rule 746, would expire on November 2, 1981. The appearance of Farinholt's attorney was entered on May 12, 1981, and at that time Farinholt elected a jury trial. In addition, Farinholt and Hammond were granted separate trials pursuant to Rule 745 c. Farinholt's trial was scheduled for August 10 1981. On August 10th, however, the trial was postponed by order of Judge Chasanow. 1 The next day the Assignment Office set a new trial date of September 23, 1981.
When the case was called for trial on September 23, 1981, Farinholt's attorney orally moved that the trial judge (Chasanow, J.) grant a postponement, and the prosecuting attorney indicated that a postponement was agreeable to the State. The reason for the postponement request was that the defendant's attorney desired to call as a witness the co-defendant Hammond, that Hammond would not testify until he had been sentenced, and that Hammond's sentencing was scheduled for the near future. In addition, the defendant's attorney, as well as the defendant himself, indicated their consent to a trial date beyond the 180-day deadline under § 591 and Rule 746. The transcript of the proceedings on September 23rd reads in pertinent part as follows:
The third trial date scheduled by the Assignment Office was October 27, 1981, which was still six days before the expiration of the 180-day period. The case was called for trial on October 27, 1981, and again the defendant's attorney made an oral motion to the trial judge (Taylor, J.) for a postponement. The basis for the motion was the continued unavailability of the co-defendant Hammond as a witness for the defense. The defendant's attorney explained that, although Hammond had finally been sentenced, there had been insufficient time after his sentencing to arrange for his presence on October 27th. The defendant's attorney also referred to the fact "that previously we waived Hicks and speedy trial," indicated that the new trial date would probably be in February 1982, and requested a reduction in the amount of required bail so that the defendant would not be incarcerated until the new trial date. Judge Taylor granted the motion for a postponement, reduced the amount of bail required, and directed the attorneys to obtain a new trial date from the Assignment Office.
Following an October 30th hearing before Judge Taylor concerning the selection of a new trial date, a fourth trial date of November 18, 1981, was agreed upon by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant's attorney and was assigned by the Assignment Office. On November 13, 1981, however, the State filed a written motion to postpone the November 18th trial date on the ground that "the victim, Kenneth Warne, is now in Florida on a prescheduled vacation and will not be present on the trial date." The State went on to assert that the victim was an essential witness, that this was the first postponement requested by the State, and that the case had been postponed "at the request of the defense several times previously." The defense objected to postponing the November 18th trial date. Nevertheless Judge Melbourne signed an order granting the State's motion for postponement. 2
Thereafter the Assignment Office re-scheduled the trial for January 8, 1982. On January 8th, the defendant's attorney moved to dismiss, asserting a violation of § 591 and Rule 746, as well as a violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial. The trial judge (Blackwell, J.), confining his ruling to the § 591 and Rule 746 issue, granted the motion to dismiss.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that § 591 and Rule 746 were not violated. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md.App. 124, 458 A.2d 442 (1983). The Court of Special Appeals held that the dismissal sanction for a violation of § 591 and Rule 746 applies only when a trial is improperly postponed to a date beyond the 180-day limit, but that once a case is properly postponed beyond the 180-day deadline, the dismissal sanction is inapplicable to subsequent postponements. 54 Md.App. at 132-133, 135, 458 A.2d 442. The appellate court pointed out that the October 27, 1981, order by Judge Taylor was the order having the effect of postponing the trial beyond November 2, 1981, which was the end of the 180-day period. Id. at 133, 458 A.2d 442. The court concluded that the October 27, 1981, postponement fully complied with § 591 and Rule 746. Id. at 133-135, 458 A.2d 442. In light of this conclusion, the court stated that "[i]t would be meaningless, therefore, to attempt to decide whether the November 13, 1981, postponement complied with" § 591 and Rule 746. Id. at 135, 458 A.2d 442. Finally, the Court of Special Appeals stated that, upon remand, the trial court should rule upon the defendant's contention that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. at 135-136, 458 A.2d 442.
We then granted the defendant's petition and the State's conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. Farinholt v. State, 296 Md. 654 (1983). The defendant's principal argument is that § 591 and Rule 746, including the dismissal sanction for violation, are fully applicable to subsequent postponements even though an earlier order postponing the trial beyond the 180-day deadline was in compliance with the statute and rule. Consequently, according to the defendant, if the postponement of the November 18, 1981, trial date was in violation of § 591 and Rule 746, the dismissal sanction is applicable. The defendant contends that the postponement of the November 18th trial date violated the statute and the rule because there was insufficient cause for any postponement and insufficient cause for the length of the delay from November 18th to January 8th. As an apparent alternate argument, the defendant asserts that the postponement on October 27th also violated the statute and rule. The State, in addition to disputing the defendant's contentions, alternatively argues that the defendant's waiver on September 23, 1981, of § 591's and Rule 746's requirements "should ... preclude review of any alleged violation of Rule 746." (State's brief, p. 7.)
We need not decide whether the postponement on October 27, 1981, complied with § 591 and Rule 746. If it be assumed arguendo that the October 27th postponement violated the statute and rule, either on the theory that the postponement was not effected by the administrative judge or his designee, or on the theory that good cause was lacking, the defendant could gain no advantage from such violation. As explained in State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 403 A.2d 368 (1979):
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