Farley v. Hawkes

• Docket Number: 24-ICA-460
• Decision Date: 06 June 2025
• Citation: Farley v. Hawkes, 24-ICA-460 (W. Va. ICA Jun 06, 2025)
• Parties: THOMAS L. FARLEY and MARIE J. FARLEY, Defendants Below, Petitioners v. DAVID T. HAWKES and SYLVIA I. HAWKES, Plaintiffs Below, Respondents
• Court: West Virginia Intermediate Court of Appeals

1

THOMAS L. FARLEY and MARIE J. FARLEY, Defendants Below, Petitioners v. DAVID T. HAWKES and SYLVIA I. HAWKES, Plaintiffs Below, Respondents

No. 24-ICA-460

West Virginia Intermediate Court of Appeals

June 6, 2025

(Cir Ct. of Monroe Cnty. CaseNo. CC-32-2021-C-15)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PetitionersThomas L. Farley and Marie J. Farley appeal the October 23 2024, order from the Circuit Court of Monroe County, which granted a motion by RespondentsDavid T. Hawkes and Sylvia I Hawkes for the circuit court to determine certain outstanding issues regarding an easement.Respondents filed a summary response in support of the circuit court's order.^[1]Petitioners filed a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(2024).After considering the record on appeal and the applicable law, we find that deficiencies in the record prevent this Court from engaging in a meaningful appellate review to determine whether there is a substantial question of law or prejudicial error.As explained below, a memorandum decision vacating the order on appeal and remanding this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The underlying facts of this case are sparse.However, based upon what can be gleaned from the record, on June 23, 2021respondents filed an amended complaint in circuit court, alleging that they have a prescriptive easement over a roadway located on petitioners' property.The roadway leads to respondents' residence, associated acreage, and a turnaround area at the end of the roadway.On July 7, 2021, petitioners filed their answer, which included the response: "[Petitioners] have never contested the right-of-way, nor do they contest the right-of-way held by [respondents] to use the roadway that is the subject of this matter."

On August 19, 2024, the circuit court entered an order ("August Order") memorializing a hearing from June 4, 2024, wherein the parties represented to the court that they had resolved all issues in the case except for the metes and bounds of the right of way and turnaround area, and its maintenance.The August Order set forth the parties' agreement as follows:

1.[Respondents] have a prescriptive easement over [petitioners'] property on the existing roadway to [respondents'] property.

2.That the turn-around area located on the right side of the roadway and just before crossing the bridge over Dropping Lick Creek shall be a turnaround area for trucks or vehicles using [respondents'] property or delivering items to [respondents].

3.The parties agree to take no action or cause any action to block or impede the other parties to this action from the full use and enjoyment of their property (more specifically the Dropping Lick area at the confluence of Indian Creek), or the roadway in question.

4.Further, the parties acknowledge the need to implement a Road Maintenance Agreement which the parties agreed was ancillary to the Agreement set for the hereinabove.

5.That the parties also acknowledge that they need to place the exact location, width and length of the roadway and turnaround area on a map.

6.Both parties agreed and testified, on the record, that this was, in fact, their agreement.

On October 17, 2024, respondents filed a motion for the circuit court to "set the width and length of the right of way and turnaround area and maintenance of same."In that motion, respondents stated that the parties had not been able to come to an agreement regarding the road's maintenance or the metes and bounds of the right of way and turnaround as set forth by the August Order.As relief, respondents sought an order:

1.That [respondents'] prescriptive easement is the width and length of the David Holz survey, including turnaround area, as previously submitted to this Court.

2.That the [c]ourt find and rule that [respondents] have been maintaining this subject prescriptive easement since the time they first purchased their property in 1972, and they may continue maintaining said easement as necessary in order to maintain its width, length and turnaround area.

3.That the [c]ourt find and rule that [petitioners] purchased their property in 1998, at least 25 years after [respondents] purchased their property, and the record shows there was no dispute over any right of way until 2018, at which time the [petitioners] first complained of any right of way issues, including maintenance of said right of way by [respondents].

4.The [c]ourt rule [petitioners] or their grantees, cease and desist from interfering or impeding any maintenance [respondents] undertake on the subject prescriptive easement to maintain its length, width, and turnaround area, including replenishing gravel when and where needed.

5.The [c]ourt rule [that][petitioners] cease and desist from any actions that hinder or interrupt the [respondents'] use of said prescriptive easement.

On October 23, 2024, the circuit court entered the order presently on appeal, which was prepared by respondents' counsel and states in its entirety:

WHEREFORE, after reviewing the Plaintiffs' Motion in this matter, the Court hereby GRANTS the Plaintiffs' Motion and ORDERS as follows:

1.[Respondents'] prescriptive easement shall be the width and length, including the turnaround area, of the David Holz survey as previously submitted to this Court.See Exhibits 1 and 2.

2.[Petitioners] or their grantees shall cease and desist from interfering or impeding any maintenance [respondents] undertake on the subject prescriptive easement to maintain its length and width, including replenishing gravel when and where needed, and will provide [petitioners] at least 48 hours notice of graveling by posting a notice at the entrance of the right of way on an at least 18" x 18" sign.

3.[Respondents'] prescriptive easement extends to the turnaround area, and [petitioners] or their grantees shall cease and desist from interfering or impeding any maintenance [respondents] undertake on the subject turnaround, including replacing gravel as needed.[Respondents], per their agreement, shall absorb the cost of gravel maintenance by [respondents].

This appeal followed^[2] to which we apply the following standard of review:

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, we apply a two-prong deferential standard of review.We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard.Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. Pt. 2, Walker v. W.Va. Ethics Comm'n, 201 W.Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167(1997).

On appeal, petitioners argue that the circuit court's October 23, 2024, order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.We agree.

With respect to the sufficiency of the circuit court's order petitioners contend that the order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.They argue that while it is undisputed that an easement exists, the August Order plainly states that the parties agreed that there are still outstanding questions regarding the metes and bounds and width of the easement.On this issue, petitioners maintain that there are competing expert surveys which created unresolved genuine issues of material fact.Conversely, respondents assert that the August Order established the existence of the easement, and that when the circuit court ruled upon respondents' motion, it had previously viewed the property in person, had knowledge of the frequent flooding in the area, as well as the benefit of the competing surveys.Respondents maintain that their expert survey was clearly the controlling survey in the case, and that petitioners failed to overcome summary judgment.However, we find that respondents' arguments are subjective, in that they postulate factual determinations for disputed matters, which by virtue of the August Order detailing the parties' partial settlement agreement,...