Farley v. Ventresco

• Decision Date: 09 May 1932
• Docket Number: 183
• Parties: Farley, Appellant, v. Ventresco
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

161 A. 534

307 Pa. 441

Farley, Appellant, v. Ventresco

No. 183

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 9, 1932

Argued April 18, 1932

Appeal, No. 183, Jan. T., 1932, by plaintiff, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1931, No. 69, reversing judgment for plaintiff of C.P. No. 2, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1929, No 4360, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of John Farley v Ernest Ventresco. Reversed.

Appeal from judgment of Superior Court.

The facts appear by opinion of Supreme Court.

Judgment of common pleas reversed.

Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned was judgment of Superior Court.

The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and that of the court of common pleas is reinstated and affirmed.

N. S. Winnet, with him B. I. deYoung, for appellant. -- Plaintiff's negligence in driving for a period of two seconds while blinded by the lights of automobiles coming in the opposite direction was for the jury: Galliano v. Electric Co., 303 Pa. 498; Mountain v. Glass Co., 263 Pa. 181; Weiss v. Ry., 301 Pa. 539; Wilson v. Beef Co., 295 Pa. 168; Kuntz v. Waldameer Co., 68 Pa.Super. 73.

We content ourselves by citing the following cases from other jurisdictions, all involving the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence, because of his failure to stop when blinded by lights of automobiles coming in the opposite direction. In every one of these cases the court held that a plaintiff cannot be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law: Rice v. Foley, 98 Conn. 372; Treftz v. Kirby, 146 A. (N.J.) 688; Willis v. Lumber Co., 82 Cal.App. 751; Powell v. Schofield, 223 Mo.App. 1041; Forster v. Consumers Wholesale Co., 174 Minn. 105; Coco-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 174 Ark. 130.

Langdon W. Harris, Jr. of Herman & Harris, for appellee. -- Plaintiff, who drives his automobile while blinded by approaching headlights at a speed of 25 to 30 miles an hour a distance of 150 feet or more, is guilty of contributory negligence: Wilhelm v. Ry., 281 Pa. 69, 70; Robinson v. Twp., 90 Pa.Super. 139.

Plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Act in regard to the adjustment of his headlights convicts him of contributory negligence.

In any event, plaintiff should have had headlights on his automobile that would enable him to see in advance any obstacles in his path, and to be able to stop before coming in contact with them: Serfas v. R.R., 270 Pa. 306.

Plaintiff's failure to stop or turn out when the crane intercepted his path shows lack of control: Brink v. Scranton, 85 Pa.Super. 342; Filer v. Filer, 301 Pa. 461; Mason v. Lavine, 302 Pa. 472; Simrell v. Eschenbach, 303 Pa. 156; O'Rourke v. Washington City, 304 Pa. 78.

Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY and DREW, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON:

Plaintiff, the owner of an automobile, recovered a verdict and judgment in an action of trespass for negligence, against defendant, who had parked his crane on a public street. The Superior Court decided that defendant was guilty of negligence, but, reversing the judgment of the court below on this point, entered judgment in defendant's favor non obstante veredicto, on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, as a matter of law. On this appeal, which we specially allowed, the single point we are asked to determine is that set forth in plaintiff's statement of the question involved: "Is a plaintiff necessarily guilty of contributory negligence if, though blinded by lights of automobiles coming in the opposite direction, he continues to drive for a period of two seconds, striking a crane parked without lights on a dark street?"

In considering the point, all the facts and proper inferences of fact, which tend to sustain plaintiff's contention, must be accepted as true, and all those to the contrary, if depending solely upon testimony, must be rejected: Donovan v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 152; Connors v. Dempsey, 303 Pa. 128. Thus viewed, they are as follows: Plaintiff, on a night when the moon was not shining, was driving his automobile on Frankford Avenue in the City of Philadelphia. The avenue runs southwestwardly and is upgrade to and slightly beyond Cheltenham Avenue, after which it turns towards the south and thereafter runs down a slight grade. Along the westward side of Frankford Avenue, south of Cheltenham Avenue, was a bank supporting the land of the adjoining property, near which bank, in the bed of the street and about 80 or 100 feet south of Cheltenham Avenue, defendant had placed his unlighted crane. Its neutral color caused it to blend into that of the bank, so that it was difficult for the drivers of approaching automobiles to see it; and it was so placed that the headlights of such automobiles would not disclose the crane until they had passed over the brow of the hill, and had entered the straight part of the avenue. While ascending the hill, the lights would shine over the top of the crane, and, until the road became straight, they would shine to the west of it.

Upon the night of the accident, plaintiff was driving his car at a speed of about twenty-five miles an hour. As he drove over the hill and rounded the curve, a number of automobiles coming from the opposite direction, and traveling so near to or over the center line of the avenue as to crowd plaintiff's car towards the bank on the right side of the road, with their headlights shining full in his face, temporarily blinded him, so that, for the instant, he could not see at all. The effect of this was that he did not learn of the presence of the unlighted crane until it was too late to stop his own car in time to wholly escape a collision, although he had moved far enough to the left to avoid the body of the crane, striking, however, one of its projecting caterpillar wheels. As appellee admits, plaintiff had but two seconds in which to...