Farlow v. Connecticut Co.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1960
• Citation: 166 A.2d 202,147 Conn. 644
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Margaret R. D. FARLOW, Executrix (ESTATE of Harry FARLOW), v. CONNECTICUT COMPANY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 202

166 A.2d 202

147 Conn. 644

Margaret R. D. FARLOW, Executrix (ESTATE of Harry FARLOW), v. CONNECTICUT COMPANY et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 8, 1960.

Robert B. Cohen, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Morton E. Cole and Cyril Cole, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Bradley B. Bates, Hartford, with whom was J. Brooks Johnson, Jr., Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Bebore BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, JJ.

MELLITZ, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for the death of her decedent, alleged to have resulted from the negligent operation of a bus owned by the named defendant and operated by the other defendant. The case was tried to the jury. The plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that the decedent, a pedestrian, was struck by the bus when he was crossing a street at or near a crosswalk and the bus was making a left turn into the street he was crossing. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and upon the refusal of the court to set the verdict aside the plaintiff appealed.

Among the negligent acts charged were that the operator drove the bus at an excessive rate of speed and that he failed to grant the decedent the right of way. The court instructed the jury upon the statutes relating to speed and the right of way of pedestrians crossing at an intersection. General Statutes §§ 14-219, 14-300. The single question presented on this appeal is whether the court committed reversible error in failing to repeat to the jury, in discussing the statute relating to right of way, an instruction that a violation would be negligence per se. Such an instruction had been given immediately before in connection with the discussion of the statute relating to speed.

After explaining the statute relating to speed, the charge proceeded as follows: 'That statute provides a legislative standard of conduct for motor vehicle operators and contains within its own terms the elements for you to consider, and the violation of that statute by an operator would be negligence in itself. If that violation were also a substantial factor in causing injury, then it would be a basis for liability, but if there were a violation without it being a substantial factor in causing injury, then, of course, no liability would attach. There is another statute governing this situation here which provides in substance that [at] any intersection where traffic is controlled by control signals such as those which existed here pedestrians shall not cross at any place not a marked or unmarked crosswalk. A pedestrian at any such crosswalk on a green or go signal shall have the right of way over all vehicles, including those making turns until such pedestrian has reached the opposite curb or safety zone.' The charge then proceeded to explain the area of the crosswalk and the respective rights and duties of the pedestrian and the driver. At the conclusion of the charge, an exception taken by the plaintiff was expressed as follows: 'If Your Honor Please, I don't remember Your Honor saying that if there is a violation of these statutes, motor vehicle statutes, that that violation would be negligence per se or negligence in and of itself.' The court responded: 'I said exactly that.' Obviously, the attentiveness of the plaintiff's counsel to the charge or his recollection of its contents was faulty, as appears from his failure to note or remember that the court had, in fact, charged, when discussing the statute relating to speed, that a violation of it would be negligence in itself; and the court was of the belief that its charge as to the effect of a violation was expressed with...