Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co. v. Samperi

Decision Date15 March 2017
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16–cv–00157 (VAB)
Citation242 F.Supp.3d 83
Parties FARM FAMILY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Gary SAMPERI and April Cretella, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

Jack G. Steigelfest, Howard, Kohn, Sprague & Fitzgerald, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Sean E. Donlan, Law Firm of Sean E. Donlan, Old Saybrook, CT, George H. Romania, Hamden, CT, for Defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VICTOR A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This declaratory judgment action arises out of an insurance policy ("the Policy" or "the insurance policy") issued by Plaintiff Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company ("Farm Family") to Gary Samperi.

Under the Policy, Farm Family agreed to defend and indemnify Mr. Samperi for any liability adjudged against him in certain suits. Farm Family's obligations under the insurance policy were subject to specific policy exclusions. On March 25, 2015, Defendant April Cretella sued Defendant Samperi in the Superior Court of Connecticut. Superior Court Complaint, Ex. B, Pl.'s Stmt., ECF No. 13–5 ("Underlying Complaint").

Farm Family seeks a "declaration that the claims made in [Ms. Cretella's] Complaint do not give rise to a duty on the part of Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company to defend or indemnify Mr. Samperi" under his insurance policy or an endorsement to the policy that provided coverage for personal injury. See Compl., ECF 1. On May 2, 2016, Farm Family moved for summary judgment. See Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 13. For the reasons that follow, this motion is GRANTED.

I. Relevant Factual Background1

On March 25, 2015, April Cretella instituted a civil action in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut against Gary Samperi. Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 1 (citing Docket Sheet, Ex. A, Def.'s Stmt., ECF No. 13–4 (docket no. MMX–CV–15–6013323–S)). In her complaint, Ms. Cretella alleged that Mr. Samperi, who was her step-father, "physically, psychologically and emotionally abused" her for a period of around nine years. Underlying Complaint, ¶ 7. Ms. Cretella claimed that Mr. Samperi's conduct, which included "repeated" physical and sexual abuse, as well as supplying Ms. Cretella with narcotics and alcohol in exchange for sexual favors, caused significant "emotional, developmental, physiological and psychological injuries." Id. at ¶ 10. Ms. Cretella's Underlying Complaint raised six claims: First Count (Assault and Battery), Second Count (Negligence), Third Count (False Imprisonment), Fourth Count (Recklessness), Fifth Count (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), and Sixth Count (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress). Pl.'s Stmt., ¶ 4.

Farm Family thus far has provided for Mr. Samperi's legal defense to the Underlying Action, subject to a reservation of its right to deny coverage under the Policy. Def.'s Stmt., ¶ 11. It now, however, seeks a declaratory judgment to establish that it has no duty to defend Mr. Samperi. See Compl., ECF No. 1.

A. Mr. Samperi's Insurance Policy

From August 16, 2006 through August 16, 2009, Plaintiff Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company insured Gary Samperi using "Special Farm Package 10." Pl.'s Stmt., ¶ 5. Division V of that package covered "Liability." Id. at ¶ 6; see also Policy Statement, Def.'s Stmt., Ex. C, ECF No. 13–6 (hereinafter "Policy Statement"). From 20062008, Section A of Division V included "Bodily Injury and Property Damage with a total limit of liability of $300,000." See Policy Statement, at 3 (2006); 71 (2007), and 88 (2008). In 2009, Section A of Division V changed to include "Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Personal Injury, Advertising Injury," with the same total limit as the years before. Id. at 99.

Under Section A, Farm Family agreed to cover "claims made or suits brought against an insured for damages" when the claim or suit was caused by an "occurrence" falling under Section A. Policy Statement, 51. The Policy defined an occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, that results in bodily injury or property damage. All bodily injury and property damage resulting from a common cause shall be considered the result of one occurrence." Pl.'s Stmt., ¶ 8. The Policy also listed exclusions applicable to Sections A and B. Id. Specifically, Division V stated that Sections A and B did not apply to bodily injury/property damage

20. Arising out of actual, alleged or threatened sexual harassment or molestation, corporal punishment, or physical or mental abuse.

Id.

B. The Personal Injury Endorsement

Between 2006 through 2008, Samperi's policy also included a separate endorsement titled "SFP ‘10’ Amendatory Endorsement," which provided optional liability coverage for personal injury. Pl.'s Stmt., ¶ 9; see also Personal Injury Endorsement 0506 0195, Policy Statement, 58 ("Personal Injury Endorsement"). The Endorsement was optional, but Mr. Samperi had paid for this optional coverage. Pl.'s Stmt., ¶ 9. "In return for the additional premium charged," Farm Family agreed to pay all damages that the insured became obligated to pay because of "personal injury." The Endorsement defined "Personal Injury" as:

1. false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution;
2. publication or utterance of libel or slander, of other defamatory or disparaging material, or in violation of an individual's right to privacy, except in the course of or related to advertising, broadcasting or telecasting activities conducted by or on behalf of the INSURED; or
3. wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy. However, the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of POLLUTANTS into or upon land, water or air does not constitute an invasion of the right of private occupancy.

See Policy Statement, 3, 58, 71, 88, 96. The Endorsement did not apply to the following:

1. to liability assumed by the INSURED under any contract or agreement;
2. to personal injury resulting from violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any INSURED;
3. if the injurious publication or utterance described above was made prior to the effective date of this insurance;
4. to a publication or utterance described above, concerning any BUSINESS or organization or its products or services made by or at the direction of an INSURED with knowledge or its falsity; or
5. to personal injury sustained by any person as a result of an offense directly or indirectly related to the employment of said person by the INSURED.

Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 10. The Endorsement also stated that "all other provisions of the policy remain unchanged." Id.

In 2009, Mr. Samperi's policy changed. The Personal Injury Endorsement that applied from 20062008 was replaced by a Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Liability Coverage Endorsement. See Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Liability Coverage Endorsement 0574 0208, Policy Statement, 112 ("2009 Endorsement"). In the 2009 Endorsement, Farm Family indicated that "personal injury" still included "false arrest," but also added fifteen exclusions applicable to the Personal Injury coverage. See Policy Statement, 112–114; Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 19. The list of exclusions included "personal injury arising out of actual, alleged or threatened sexual harassment or molestation, corporal punishment, or physical or mental abuse." Policy Statement, 114. In addition, the 2009 Endorsement revised the Policy itself, so that Section A of Division V included "Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Personal Injury, Advertising Injury," with the same total limit as the years before. Id. at 99.

Because Mr. Samperi's 20092011 policies included "Personal Injury" within Division V, Defendants' response to Farm Family's motion focuses on Mr. Samperi's 20062008 policies. Def.'s Opp., 2 ("Therefore, because the exclusions argued by the Plaintiff do not apply to the Personal Injury coverage, the Plaintiff has a duty to defend and indemnify the insured for the false imprisonment claims for the policy periods 2006 through 2008."). Defendants argue that the 20062008 Endorsement would trigger Farm Family's duty to defend against Ms. Cretella's complaint.

II. Standard of Review

In Connecticut, the law of the state with the "most significant relationship" to the transaction and parties ought to be applied absent a choice of law provision in the insurance contract. Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. , 252 Conn. 774, 781n.4, 750 A.2d 1051 (2000) ; see also Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 188. "In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the law of the state where the principal insured risk is located will apply." Reichhold Chems., Inc. , 252 Conn. at 782, 750 A.2d 1051 (noting that Connecticut law specifically recognizes "a rebuttable presumption in favor of the state where the insured risk is located."). In this case, the insured—Mr. Samperi and his property—are located in Connecticut. Compl., ¶ 2. Ms. Cretella is a Connecticut citizen and brought her case against Mr. Samperi in Connecticut state court. Id. at ¶ 3. Finally, both parties cite to Connecticut law in their briefs. The Court will use Connecticut law to resolve this dispute.

A. Declaratory Judgments

Plaintiff Farm Family seeks a declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, under which, in "a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction," a federal court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 ; Compl., ¶ 4. An action under the Declaratory Judgment Act "must be sufficiently real and immediate" to allow for "specific and conclusive relief," as well as be "ripe for adjudication." Colony Ins. Co. v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc. 2012 WL 2859085, at *6 (D. Conn. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Connecticut law has made clear that "[t]here is no...

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