Farmer v. Colvin, 2:15-CV-0073-MKD

• Decision Date: 30 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2:15-CV-0073-MKD,2:15-CV-0073-MKD
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Washington
• Parties: ANGELA ROCHELLE FARMER, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

ANGELA ROCHELLE FARMER, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 2:15-CV-0073-MKD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

March 30, 2016

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ECF Nos. 14, 24

BEFORE THE COURT are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 14, 24. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. ECF No. 7. The Court, having reviewed the administrative record and the parties' briefing, is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 14) and grants Defendant's motion (ECF No. 24).

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g)

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is limited; the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed "only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). "Substantial evidence" means relevant evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to "more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. Id.

In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. If the evidence in the record "is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a district court "may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless." Id. An error is harmless "where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determination." Id. at 1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ's decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shineski v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-410 (2009).

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FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant's impairment must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant's work activity. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity," the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 416.920(b).

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the analysis proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant's impairment. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from "any

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impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," the analysis proceeds to step three. Id. § 416.920(c). If the claimant's impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id.

At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant's impairment to severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe, or more severe, than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award benefits. Id. § 416.920(d).

If the severity of the claimant's impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant's "residual functional capacity." Residual functional capacity ("RFC"), defined generally as the claimant's ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, id. § 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.

At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past ("past relevant work"). Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable

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of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 416.920(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.

At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant's age, education and past work experience. Id. If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits. Id.

The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Lockwood v. Comm'r, of Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work "exists in significant numbers in the national economy." 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

Plaintiff protectively applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on July 25, 2011, alleging amended onset

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beginning July 1, 2011. Tr. 79. The applications were denied initially, Tr. 77-100, and upon reconsideration, Tr. 101-130. Plaintiff appeared for a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on April 30, 2013. Tr. 39-76. The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim for SSI and DIB on June 26, 2013. Tr. 18-38.

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date (as amended) of July 1, 2011. Tr. 23. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: status post-right radial head fracture; mild lumbosacral degenerative changes; obesity; left-wrist tenosynovitis status post-surgical release; mood disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; personality disorder with anti-social features; and substance-dependence disorder. Tr. 23. At step three, the ALJ found her impairments did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 25. The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff was able to perform light work with some restrictions. Tr. 25-30. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. Tr. 30. At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as assembly production worker, production inspector, and hand packager. Tr. 31.

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision on July 15, 2013. Tr. 15. Three months later, Plaintiff submitted new evidence, which consisted of psychological

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evaluations from Dennis R. Pollack, Ph.D., conducted on August 8 and September 9, 2013. ECF No. 14-1. The Appeals Council denied her request for review on January 28, 2015, Tr. 1-5, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1481, 422.210.

ISSUES

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her disability benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff raises the following issues for this Court's review:

1. Whether the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff's symptom claim;

2. Whether the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence; and

3. Whether this Court should consider new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly discredited (1) her complaints about the severity of her functional limitations; and (2) the medical opinions of her treating and examining doctors. She maintains that these errors led the ALJ to include only some of her limitations in her RFC assessment. In determining whether the ALJ erred, Plaintiff also asks this Court to consider evidence she submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council.

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A. Adverse Credibility Finding

Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to provide specific findings with clear and convincing reasons for discrediting her symptom claims. ECF No. 14 at 13-17.

An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. "First, the ALJ must determine whether...