Farmer v. Decker

Decision Date07 November 2018
Docket NumberNo. 1:16-cv-00653,1:16-cv-00653
Citation353 F.Supp.3d 342
Parties Lance H. FARMER, Plaintiff v. Matthew T. DECKER, Defendant
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Devon M. Jacob, Jacob Litigation, Mechanicsburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

Jessica S. Davis, Kenneth L. Joel, Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

(Judge Kane )

Before the Court is Defendant Matthew T. Decker ("Defendant")'s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 28.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background

This action finds its origins in the April 4, 2015 Easter egg hunt at the Wesley United Methodist Church in Marysville, Pennsylvania. A report of Plaintiff Lance H. Farmer ("Plaintiff")'s verbal confrontation with a woman at that event was made to the Pennsylvania State Police. Defendant Decker, a Pennsylvania State Trooper, investigated the complaint and cited Plaintiff for disorderly conduct. On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Trooper Decker alleging First Amendment "Retaliation for Protected Speech" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1), and claims for Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process under Pennsylvania law (Counts 2 and 3). (Doc. No. 1.) On August 15, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's complaint, arguing that the state law claims should be dismissed by operation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth and its employees. (Doc. Nos. 8, 11.) On March 9, 2017, the Court issued an Order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, noting that Defendant did not fully address the relevant legal issues in his brief in support of his motion, and finding that while it was a "close call," the Court could not conclude that Plaintiff "failed to allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that Defendant's actions were motivated solely by personal concerns," that would potentially remove him from the scope of sovereign immunity's protection. (Doc. No. 15 at 3-4.) The Court's Order denied the motion without prejudice to Defendant's ability to renew this issue in connection with a properly-supported motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 4.)

After the close of discovery, on October 17, 2017, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to all three counts of Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. No. 28), with a statement of material facts (Doc. No. 29), and supporting brief (Doc. No. 30). After receiving an extension of time to respond to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition to Defendant's motion on November 17, 2017 (Doc. No. 34), as well as an "Answer to Defendant's Statement of Facts and Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts" (Doc. No. 33). After the Court granted an additional extension of time, Defendant filed his reply brief on December 15, 2017 (Doc. No. 38), as well as a response to Plaintiff's additional facts (Doc. No. 37). Accordingly, the motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

B. Plaintiff's Evidentiary Challenges

Before setting forth the material facts as presented by Defendant in connection with his motion, the Court addresses two challenges made by Plaintiff to the evidence proffered by Defendant in support of his motion for summary judgment. First, Plaintiff challenges Defendant's Declaration (Doc. No. 29-2), in support of his motion as a self-serving declaration that is insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment, citing State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Philly Family Practice, Inc., 525 F.Supp.2d 718, 726 (E.D. Pa. 2007). In response, Defendant notes that declarations in support of motions for summary judgment are expressly permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), and that Defendant's Declaration simply recounts his investigation of the incident that forms the basis of this action and is fully consistent with his deposition testimony. (Doc. No. 38 at 7 n.2.) In addition, Defendant points out that the case cited by Plaintiff is clearly distinguishable from the instant case, as the declaration at issue in State Farm sought to advance a self-serving interpretation of a potentially ambiguous contract provision, rather than recount events within the declarant's personal knowledge. (Id. ) The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's challenge to Defendant's Declaration is unavailing.

Second, in responding to the statements offered by Defendant by way of his Declaration, Plaintiff raises a hearsay objection to such evidence, arguing that the statements set forth in Defendant's Declaration, recounting information reported to him by the individual involved in the incident with Plaintiff, as well as witnesses to it, are offered for the truth of the matter asserted and therefore, should be disregarded by the Court as inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. (Doc. No. 34 at 2-3.) In response, Defendant notes that the claims asserted against him depend on the circumstances surrounding the actions he took in response to the incident and the information reported to him, and as a result, the relevant legal inquiry focuses on what information Defendant possessed at the time he issued the Citation/Summons for Disorderly Conduct ("Citation/Summons"). (Doc. No. 38 at 9.) Accordingly, Defendant maintains that the statements challenged by Plaintiff as inadmissible hearsay are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather, are offered to demonstrate the universe of information upon which Defendant based his issuance of the Citation/Summons to Plaintiff. (Id. at 9-10.) In addition, Defendant maintains that, assuming arguendo that the relevant statements constitute inadmissible hearsay, they fall within Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1)'s present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule and are potentially admissible on that basis. (Id. )

The Court finds Plaintiff's hearsay objection to the statements at issue (which, as noted above, consist of Defendant's description of information provided to him by the individual involved in the incident with Plaintiff, as well as witnesses to it), to be unavailing. As Defendant correctly notes, even assuming that the statements constitute hearsay, they can be properly considered on a motion for summary judgment if such evidence is capable of admission at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Therefore, the party proffering such evidence "must demonstrate that it could satisfy the applicable admissibility requirements at trial before the evidence may be used on summary judgment." Bender v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 994 F.Supp.2d 593, 599 (M.D. Pa. 2014). The Court is persuaded that Defendant has demonstrated that the statements at issue could be admissible at trial for two potential reasons. One, the Court is persuaded that the statements are not offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, to shed light on the basis for Defendant's issuance of a Citation/Summons to Plaintiff. Second, as the Declaration reveals that Defendant's conversation with the individual involved in the incident with Plaintiff took place shortly after the incident occurred, even assuming that information provided by her constitutes hearsay, such evidence potentially falls within Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1)'s present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Court turns to a recitation of the relevant material facts.

C. Factual Background1

While on duty on April 4, 2015, Defendant received a call from police dispatch informing him that a complaint had been lodged by a Chief Aaron Richards on behalf of Mrs. Richards. (Doc. No. 29 ¶ 2.) Subsequently, while on duty, Defendant called Mrs. Richards and spoke with her regarding the complaint. (Id. ¶ 3.) During the interview, Mrs. Richards reported to Defendant that she had attended a church Easter egg hunt that day, also attended by approximately 50 other people. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Defendant was not present at the Easter egg hunt. (Id. ¶ 5.) Mrs. Richards told Defendant that Plaintiff approached her while at the event, which she attended with her children. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.)2 Mrs. Richards told Defendant that Plaintiff spoke to her in a loud voice and called her children liars and "little assholes." (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) Mrs. Richards reported to Defendant that others attending the Easter egg hunt witnessed the interchange, and provided him with contact information for three to five individuals who she believed had been witnesses. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Defendant contacted these individuals, who confirmed to him that a confrontation occurred between Plaintiff and Mrs. Richards and also generally confirmed Mrs. Richards' description of the events. (Id. ¶¶ 13-16.)3

Defendant attempted to contact Plaintiff, whom he had never met, to discuss the incident, but was ultimately unable to make contact with him to hear his version of the events at the Easter egg hunt. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 17.) Plaintiff was not present for Defendant's interviews with Mrs. Richards or any witnesses. (Id. ¶ 18.) After consultation with his supervisor, Defendant drafted a Citation/Summons for disorderly conduct to be issued to Plaintiff, and submitted it for the approval of his supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) The Citation/Summons was approved and forwarded to a magisterial district judge for processing. (Id. ¶ 21.)4 After processing by the magisterial district judge,5 the Citation/Summons for disorderly conduct was mailed to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 22.) The Citation/Summons notes that Plaintiff's conduct occurred at a church Easter egg hunt and that "Plaintiff's tone was loud and alarmed the children's parents." (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendant maintains that he did not provide Plaintiff's name to any news outlet regarding the Citation/Summons. (Id. ¶ 24.)6 Ultimately, after a hearing on June 16, 2015, Plaintiff was found not guilty of disorderly conduct. (Doc. No. 33 ¶ 25.) At the hearing, the magisterial district judge stated that Plaintiff's conduct at the Easter egg hunt was "totally...

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