Farmer v. Shake Shack Enters., LLC

• Decision Date: 21 July 2020
• Docket Number: 19 Civ. 9425 (PAE)
• Citation: 473 F.Supp.3d 309
• Parties: Dawashia FARMER, Plaintiff, v. SHAKE SHACK ENTERPRISES, LLC, Shake Shack 152 E 86 LLC, and Damon Cordova, individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

473 F.Supp.3d 309

Dawashia FARMER, Plaintiff,

v.SHAKE SHACK ENTERPRISES, LLC, Shake Shack 152 E 86 LLC, and Damon Cordova, individually, Defendants.

19 Civ. 9425 (PAE)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed July 21, 2020

Gregory Calliste, Jr., Yusha D. Hiraman, Phillips and Associates, Parisis G. Filippatos, Wigdor LLP, New York, NY, Erica Sanders, Phillips & Associates, PLLC, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.

Alexander William Bogdan, Carolyn Diane Richmond, Fox Rothschild, LLP, New York, NY, Jordan Elliot Pace, Sills Cummis & Gross P.C., Newark, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:

This case involves alleged violations by an employer of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); the New York State Human Rights Law, New York State Executive Law § 296 et seq. ("NYSHRL"); and the New York City Human Rights Law, New York City Administrative Code § 8-502(a) et seq. ("NYCHRL"). Plaintiff Dawashia Farmer asserts that she was employed by defendants Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC, and Shake Shack 152 E 86 LLC (together, the "Shake Shack Defendants"), beginning in November 2018. In late November of that year, Farmer informed her manager, defendant Damon Cordova, that she was pregnant. Over the next month, Farmer alleges that she was discriminated against based on her pregnancy and race, resulting in her termination around January 5, 2019. Farmer brings federal and state-law claims of race- and sex-based discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, along with state-law claims of aiding and abetting discrimination and retaliation.

Before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss Farmer's Amended Complaint ("AC"). For the following reasons, the Court grants that motion in part and denies it in part. Specifically, the Court sustains Farmer's sex discrimination and retaliation claims (and associated aiding and abetting claims against Cordova), but otherwise grants the motion to dismiss.

I. Background

A. Factual Background¹

1. The Parties

Farmer is an African American woman who resides in Bronx County, New York. AC ¶¶ 8, 32. She was employed by the Shake Shack Defendants as a "team member." Id. ¶ 20.

Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC ("Shake Shack Enterprises"), is a domestic limited liability company with its principal place of business located at 24 Union Square East, New York, New York. Id. ¶ 9. Shake Shack 152 E 86 LLC ("Shake Shack UES") is a domestic limited liability company with its principal place of business also located at 24 Union Square East, New York, New York, on the same floor as Shake Shack Enterprises. Id. ¶ 11. The AC alleges that the Shake Shack Defendants are joint employers, sharing "commonalities of hiring, firing, discipline, pay, insurance, records, and supervision." Id. ¶ 14. The two have the same chief executive officer, general counsel, and registered agent. Id. ¶¶ 17–19. Together, the Shake Shack Defendants own and operate a restaurant location at 154/156 E 86th Street, New York, New York (the "Restaurant"), on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. See id. ¶ 13.

Cordova, a white male, was and is employed by the Shake Shack Defendants as a "general manager." Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. Cordova interviewed and hired Farmer. Id. ¶ 25. He was Farmer's supervisor and had the power to "hire, fire or affect the terms and conditions of [her] employment." Id. ¶ 22.

2. Farmer's Employment and Defendants’ Alleged Discrimination

In early November 2018, Cordova interviewed Farmer and hired her for the role of "team member" at the Restaurant. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28. The AC alleges that, on the basis of her hiring, Farmer was qualified for her job. See id. ¶ 26. The Shake Shack Defendants initially paid Farmer at a rate of $13.50 an hour. Id. ¶ 28. Around the start of 2019, they raised her pay to $15 per hour. Id. ¶ 29. She worked approximately 40 hours per week, with an expected annual income of $31,200. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.

In late November 2018, Farmer informed Cordova, her shift manager, and other team members that she was pregnant. See id. ¶¶ 33–35. Some responded positively. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Cordova, along with a regional manager, reprimanded Farmer for not disclosing her pregnancy earlier, as Farmer was three months pregnant at the time; he said that he needed to know about such things so he could "take care of [her]." See id. ¶¶ 36–38 (alteration in original). Cordova, who had noticed Farmer acting sluggishly, "excoriate[d]" her for moving slowly and asked if the pregnancy would interfere with her work. Id. ¶¶ 35, 38. Farmer was "humiliated, threatened and fear[ed] for her job," but replied that the pregnancy would not interfere with her ability to work, and assured Cordova that she would inform him if anything changed. See id. ¶ 39. The regional manager suggested that, if Farmer's performance was lacking, "it would not be best for business." Id. ¶ 40.

After this meeting, Cordova gave Farmer paperwork to claim a short-term disability, and suggested she complete the forms. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. On approximately December 17, 2018, after a follow-up from Cordova, Farmer submitted the disability claim. Id. ¶¶ 44, 48.

In or around late November 2018, a different manager, Leon, told Farmer that management did not believe that she was pregnant, and that she should speak to Cordova about it. Id. ¶ 45. Soon after, however, Leon "reversed course" and told Farmer that she did not need to talk with Cordova. Id. ¶ 47.

In mid-December 2018, Farmer complained several times to two managers—Jeffrey #1 and Jeffrey #2—that "she was overheated in the back of the house," and asked if "she could work in the front of the house." Id. ¶ 49. Jeffrey #1 accommodated Farmer by moving her to the front, but Jeffrey #2 continually commented that Farmer was needed in the back. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. Farmer then complained to Leon that she felt Jeffrey #2 was treating her differently due to her pregnancy. Id. ¶ 52. The AC alleges that the negative treatment increased after that complaint. Id. ¶ 53.

On approximately January 1, 2019, Farmer was brought into Cordova's office and told that her performance had been declining, due to her inability to lift and restock her workstation. Id. ¶ 54. Farmer noted that she was unable to lift because of her pregnancy, but Cordova stated that he did not believe Farmer was pregnant and that she needed to bring in paperwork to confirm her pregnancy. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. When Farmer told Cordova that she could provide a doctor's note after a medical appointment on January 11, 2019, he responded that that would be too late: She had to bring in paperwork by the next day, January 2, 2019, or risk termination. See id. ¶¶ 58–59. On January 4, 2019, Farmer brought in documentation confirming her pregnancy. Id. ¶ 60.

On approximately January 5, 2019, Farmer asked her crew trainer if she could use the restroom because she was not feeling well; the crew trainer allowed her to do so. Id. ¶ 63. Cordova then called Farmer into his office and told Farmer, "in a very dismissive tone," that she had not asked a manager whether she could use the restroom. Id. ¶¶ 64–67. Cordova then told Farmer that the letter confirming her pregnancy "did not count for anything" and—despite Farmer's assertions to the contrary—that she could not keep up with the work. Id. ¶¶ 67–70. Cordova then fired Farmer. Id. ¶ 70. The AC alleges that Farmer was fired because she was an African American pregnant woman. See id. ¶ 71.

Shortly before Farmer was fired, Cordova told employees that he had hired 15 people but only needed 10, so they "needed to do the math." Id. ¶ 72. Soon after, Cordova fired three more employees—two African American employees and one African American and Hispanic employee. Id. ¶¶ 72–73. A month later, Cordova accused Leon, the only African American manager at the Restaurant, of "shorting a register." Id. ¶ 78. Leon stopped working at the Restaurant soon thereafter. Id.

B. Procedural History

On October 11, 2019, Farmer filed her initial complaint. Dkt. 1. On December 10, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 13. The Court ordered Farmer either to amend her complaint or to oppose the motion by January 7, 2020. Dkt. 16. On January 7, 2020, Farmer filed the AC. Dkt. 19. On February 14, 2020, defendants filed a second motion to dismiss, Dkt. 20, along with a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 21 ("Def. Mem."). On February 28, 2020, Farmer filed an opposing memorandum. Dkt. 22 ("Pl. Mem."). On March 6, 2020, defendants filed a reply. Dkt. 23 ("Def. Reply").

II. Applicable Legal Principles

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will only have "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint is properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, "the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

For the purpose of resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all well-pled facts to be true, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Koch , 699 F.3d at 145. That tenet, however, "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A pleading that offers only "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

III. Discussion

The AC brings the following claims: (1) sex and gender discrimination under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL; (2) race discrimination under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and...