Farmer v. State

• Decision Date: 07 July 1964
• Docket Number: No. A--149,A--149
• Citation: 42 N.J. 579,202 A.2d 173
• Parties: Charles FARMER, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. STATE of New Jersey, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 579

42 N.J. 579

202 A.2d 173

Charles FARMER, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. STATE of New Jersey, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--149.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued June 2, 1964.

Decided July 7, 1964.

Milton Diamond, Livingston, for plaintiff-petitioner (Christian J. Jorgensen, Edison, attorney).

Edward J. Dolan, Pros. of Middlesex County, for defendant-respondent (Richard S. Cohen, New Brunswick, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was indicted for the murder of his wife. The homicide occurred on September 18, 1963. On January 22, 1964 the trial court conducted a hearing as to defendant's capacity to stand trial and accepted the unanimous view of psychiatrists who testified for the defense and the State that defendant was unable to defend. The trial court refused, however, to try the question whether defendant was legally insane at the time of the homicide. The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in so refusing. We are satisfied it did not.

N.J.S. 2A:163--2, N.J.S.A., authorizes a trial of the issue of insanity at the time of the homicide in a proceeding other than the trial of the criminal charge. It provides:

'* * * It shall be competent for the judge if sitting without a jury, or the jury, if one is impanelled, to determine not only the sanity of the accused at the time of the hearing, but as well the sanity of the accused at the time the offense charged against him is alleged to have been committed.'

In Aponte v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 455, 153 A.2d 665, (1959), we said of the statute:

'N.J.S. 2A:163--2 and 3 N.J.S.A. were not intended to permit an accused to by-pass the criminal trial if he is able to defend, or to entitle him to a trial run of his defense of insanity by the expedient of asserting incapacity to defend. Rather the purpose was to permit a termination of the criminal proceeding If the accused is unfit for trial. Nor does the statute require a trial of the defense of insanity at the time of the inquiry into ability to stand trial. See State v. Stern, 40 N.J.Super. 291, 123 A.2d 43 (App.Div.1956). For that matter, the court need not order a trial of the defense at all. And if the accused is found to be fit for trial, the issue of insanity at the time of the crime should not be adjudged, and if both issues are tried together with a jury, the jury should be so instructed. This is especially true since, as pointed out in Gibson, supra (State v. Gibson) (15 N.J. (384), at pages 388--389, 105 A.2d 1,) (42 A.L.R.2d 1461), the proceeding under N.J.S. 2A:163--2 N.J.S.A. is deemed to be civil and determinable by the vote of ten jurors.

Hence, a court should not deal with the defense of insanity until after the incapacity of the accused to stand trial has been established, unless from the facts on hand it is virtually certain that incapacity to defend will be found. Rather, it should first try the issue of capacity for trial, and although both by our case law and the statute it may sit with a jury, we think it ordinarily more appropriate that the issue be tried by the court alone. If incapacity is found, then, in its discretion, the court may, alone or with a jury, inquire into the defense of insanity.' (Emphasis added.)

Counsel for defendant reads this excerpt to mean that if incapacity to stand trial is found, the trial court is thereupon obliged to try the substantive issue of insanity at the time of the killing. That problem was not before us in Aponte, but in any event the thrust of Aponte is the other way. We there recognized that the two issues were not so related that a finding of incapacity to stand trial would necessarily require or even justify a trial of the substantive issue. Hence we emphasized the discretion in the trial court,...