Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 25
Decision Date | 07 March 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 75-804,75-804 |
Citation | 51 L.Ed.2d 338,97 S.Ct. 1056,430 U.S. 290 |
Parties | Joy A. FARMER, Special Administrator, Petitioner, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 25, et al |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
A member and officer (petitioner's decedent) of respondent local carpenters' union brought a tort action for damages in California state court against respondent Unions and Union officials, alleging in count two of the complaint that, because of a sharp disagreement between him and union officials over various internal Union Policies, respondents had intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct, threats, and intimidation, and had thereby caused him to suffer emotional distress resulting in bodily injury; and alleging in other counts that respondent local Union had discriminated against him in referrals for employment in its hiring hall because of his dissendent intra-union political activities, that the Union had breached the hiring hall provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement with a contractors association by failing to refer him on a nondiscriminatory basis, and that such failure to comply with the collective-bargaining agreement also breached his membership contract with the Union. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the allegations of discrimination and breach of contract on the ground that federal law pre-empted state jurisdiction over them, but allowed the case to go to trial on count two. The jury returned a verdict of actual and punitive damages for the plaintiff, and the trial court entered a judgment on the verdict. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that state courts had no jurisdiction over the complaint since the 'crux' of the action concerned employment relations and involved conduct arguably subject to the National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction. Held:
1. The National Labor Relations Act does not pre-empt the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pp. 295-306.
(a) No provision of the NLRA protects the 'outrageous conduct' complained of in count two, and regardless of whether the operation of the hiring hall was lawful or unlawful under federal statutes, there is no federal protection for union officers' conduct that is so outrageous that 'no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.' Hence, permitting the state courts to exercise jurisdiction over such complaints does not result in state regulation of federally protected conduct. Pp. 301-302.
(b) The State, on the other hand, has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which the plaintiff complained, and that interest is no less worthy of recognition because it concerns protection from emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct, rather than protection from physical injury or damage to reputation. Pp. 302-303.
(c) Viewed in light of the discrete concerns of the federal scheme of labor regulation and the state tort law, the potential for interference with the federal scheme by the state cause of action is insufficient to counterbalance the legitimate and substantial interest of the State in protecting its citizens, since the state tort action can be resolved without reference to any accommodation of the special interests of unions and members in the hiring hall context. Pp. 304-305.
(d) To permit concurrent state-court jurisdiction it is essential that the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened rather than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination itself. P. 305.
2. It is clear from the record that the trial of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not meet the above standards, since the evidence supporting the verdict for the plaintiff focuses less on the alleged 'outrageous conduct' complained of than on employment discrimination; hence the consequent risk that the verdict represented damages for employment discrimination rather than for instances of intentional infliction of emotional distress precludes reinstatement of the trial court's judgment. P. 306.
49 Cal.App.3d 614, 122 Cal.Rptr. 722, vacated and remanded.
G. Dana Hobart, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.
Leo Geffner, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents.
Norton J. Come, Washington, D. C., for N. L. R. B., as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
The issue in this case is whether the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, pre-empts a tort action brought in state court by a union member against the Union and its officials to recover damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Petitioner Richard T. Hill1 was a carpenter and a member of Local 25 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Local 25 (Union) operates an exclusive hiring hall for employment referral of carpenters in the Los Angeles area. In 1965, Hill was elected to a three-year term as vice president of the Union. Shortly thereafter sharp disagreement developed between Hill and the Union Business Agent, Earl Daley, and other Union officials over various internal Union policies. According to Hill, the Union then began to discriminate against him in referrals to employers, prompting him to complain about the hiring hall operation within the Union and to the District Council and the International Union. Hill claims that as a result of these complaints he was subjected to a campaign of personal abuse and harassment in addition to continued discrimination in referrals from the hiring hall.2
In April 1969 petitioner filed in Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles an action for damages against the Union, the District Council and the International with which the Union was affiliated, and certain officials of the Union, including Business Agent Daley. In count two of his amended complaint, Hill alleged that the defendants had intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct, threats, and intimidation, and had thereby caused him to suffer grievous emotional distress resulting in bodily injury. In three other counts, he alleged that the Union had discriminated against him in referrals for employment because of his dissident intra-Union political activities, that the Union had breached the hiring hall provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement between it and a contractors association by failing to refer him on a nondiscriminatory basis, and that the failure to comply with the collective-bargaining agreement also constituted a breach of his membership contract with the Union. He sought $500,000 in actual, and $500,000 in punitive, damages.
The Superior Court sustained a demurrer to the allegations of discrimination and breach of contract on the ground that federal law pre-empted state jurisdiction over them, but allowed the case to go to trial on the allegations in count two.3 Hill attempted to prove that the Union's campaign against him included 'frequent public ridicule,' 'incessant verbal abuse,' and refusals to refer him to jobs in accordance with the rules of the hiring hall. The defendants countered with evidence that the hiring hall was operated in a nondiscriminatory manner. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to recover damages Hill had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants intentionally and by outrageous conduct had caused him to suffer severe emotional distress. The court defined severe emotional distress as 'any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, or worr(y).' The injury had to be 'severe,' which in this context meant
The court also instructed that the National Labor Relations Board would not have jurisdiction to compensate petitioner for injuries such as emotional distress, pain and suffering, and medical expenses, nor would it have authority to award punitive damages. The court refused to give a requested instruction to the effect that the jury could not consider any evidence regarding discrimination with respect to employment opportunities or hiring procedures.
The jury returned a verdict of $7,500 actual damages and $175,000 punitive damages against the Union, the District Council, and Business Agent Daley, and the trial court entered a judgment on the verdict.4
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 49 Cal.App.3d 614, 122 Cal.Rptr. 722. Relying on this Court's decisions in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971); Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 83 S.Ct. 1429, 10 L.Ed.2d 646 (1963); and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), the Court of Appeal held that the state courts had no jurisdiction over the complaint since the 'crux' of the action concerned employment relations and involved conduct arguably subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The Court remanded 'with instructions to render judgment for the defendants and dismiss the action.' 49 Cal.App.3d, at 631, 122 Cal.Rptr., at 732. The California Supreme Court denied review.
We granted certiorari to consider the applicability of the pre-emption doctrine to cases of this nature, 423 U.S. 1086, 96 S.Ct. 876, 47 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976). For the reasons set forth below we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings.
The doctrine of pre-emption in labor law has been...
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