Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holeman

Decision Date28 May 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-425,95-425
Citation53 St.Rep. 904,924 P.2d 1315,278 Mont. 274
PartiesFARMERS ALLIANCE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Kansas Insurance corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Kristi HOLEMAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent. . Heard
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Robert Savage (argued), Habedank, Cumming, Best & Savage, Sidney, for Farmers Alliance.

Donald D. Sommerfeld (argued), Towe, Ball, Enright, Mackey & Sommerfeld, Billings, for Kristi Holeman, Personal Representative.

Peter F. Habein (argued), Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, for amicus curiae, Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.

Susan P. Roy (argued), Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, for amicus curiae, Alliance of American Insurers.

Gene R. Jarussi (argued), Jarussi & Bishop, Billings, for amicus curiae, Montana Trial Lawyers Association.

LEAPHART, Justice.

The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division, has certified the following question to this Court pursuant to Rule 44, M.R.App.P. We answer the certified question "no."

The certified question is:

Section 33-23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of the uninsured motorist coverage available under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance. Does Section 33-23-203, MCA, prohibit the stacking of the medical payment coverage and the underinsured motorist coverage available under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance where a premium is charged for coverage of each motor vehicle listed within that policy?

In the insurance policy at issue, a premium is charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy for medical payment coverage and a premium is charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy for underinsurance coverage. The premium for the underinsured motorist coverage is included as part of the premium for the uninsured motorist coverage.

In its Order Certifying Question to the Supreme Court of Montana, the District Court submitted a statement of agreed facts. The facts that this Court finds dispositive of the question are as follows:

4. That, at approximately 0450 hours, on November 9, 1991, a vehicle insured by the Plaintiff under the policy issued to Wade and Diana Brown, namely a 1971 Ford pickup with VIN F10GKL66406, being driven by Lori Watson, in which Scott Hankel and Gary Lee Leonard were passengers, was involved in a one-vehicle accident in Jefferson County, Montana, on Interstate 90 at milepost 233.4, 15.6 miles west of Whitehall, Montana.

5. Subsequent thereto, at approximately 0510 hours, at [sic] 1983 Ford pickup truck, VIN 1FTHF26L5DPA15458, owned by Darrel M. Storey and driven by Darrel Maynard Storey, Jr., was traveling east on Interstate 90 when the driver lost control of the vehicle as he attempted to slow for the accident scene and went into a sideskid. The Storey vehicle struck the right rear corner of the trailer attached to the subject 1971 Ford pickup, VIN F10GKL66406. Such contact pushed the trailer into the ditch and onto its left side. The Storey vehicle then rapidly rotated. Mr. Leonard's coat became entangled on the hitch of the Storey pickup which caused Mr. Leonard to be dragged under the Storey vehicle until after it went backwards into the ditch on the south side of the road. Mr. Leonard died as a result of the injuries sustained.

6. The Storey vehicle was insured by State Farm Auto Insurance Company under Policy No. 138 6224-405-226 and State Farm subsequently paid out its policy limits under the liability portion of its policy limits in the amount of $25,000.

7. Prior to signing a Release, the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard made demand upon Plaintiff for the uninsured (underinsured) motorist coverage and auto medical payment coverage provided for in the Business Auto Policy of Wade and Diana Brown.

8. Plaintiff has refused to make any payments of uninsured (underinsured) motorist coverage and auto medical payment coverage to the heirs and/or Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, deceased ....

Answering the question certified by the United States District Court requires this Court to construe § 33-23-203, MCA. In construing a statute, "the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. The rules of statutory construction require the language to be construed according to its plain meaning. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (1996), 276 Mont. 67, 72, 915 P.2d 175, 178, (citing Clarke v. Massey (1995), 271 Mont. 412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088). If the language is clear and unambiguous, then no further interpretation is required; we will resort to legislative history only if the intent cannot be determined from the plain wording of the statute. Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088. Where the intention of the legislature can be determined from the plain meaning of the words used in a statute, the courts may not go further and apply other means of interpretation. Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088 (citing Tongue River Elec. Coop. v. Montana Power Co. (1981), 195 Mont. 511, 515, 636 P.2d 862, 864).

The question certified is a narrow one. We are asked only to determine whether § 33-23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of "optional" coverages--here, the medical payments and underinsurance coverages. We do not consider whether the terms of the insurance contract prohibit stacking. Rather, our analysis is confined to an interpretation of § 33-23-203, MCA. Accordingly, this Court's recent decision in Chilberg v. Rose (1995), 273 Mont. 414, 903 P.2d 1377, is not controlling in this case as Chilberg is a multiple policy case and does not interpret § 33-23-203, MCA. In addition, we note that Sayers v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (1981), 192 Mont. 336, 628 P.2d 659, cited with approval in Chilberg, is contrary to § 33-23-203, MCA, as Sayers approved the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage under a single policy. Thus, under § 33-23-203, MCA, Sayers is no longer good law because under the terms of § 33-23-203, MCA, stacking of uninsured motorist coverage for multiple vehicles insured under a single policy is expressly prohibited unless the policy specifically provides otherwise. Section 33-23-203, MCA, provides:

(1) Unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise, the limits of insurance coverage available under any such policy, including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage, must be determined as follows, regardless of the number of motor vehicles insured under the policy:

(a) the limit of insurance coverage available for any one accident is the limit specified for the motor vehicle involved in the accident;

(b) if no motor vehicle insured under the policy is involved in the accident, the limit of insurance coverage available for any one accident is the highest limit of coverage specified for any one motor vehicle insured under the policy; and

(c) the limits of coverage specified for each motor vehicle insured under the policy may not be added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available under the policy for any one accident.

(2) A motor vehicle liability policy may also provide for other reasonable limitations, exclusions, or reductions of coverage which are designed to prevent duplicate payments for the same element of loss.

From the language of the statute, it is clear that "stacking" is not allowed "unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise." It is equally clear that the "anti-stacking" provisions of the statute apply to a "motor vehicle liability policy" (MVLP). The term MVLP is defined in § 33-23-204(2), MCA, as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance against liability now or hereafter required under Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3." (Emphasis added.)

The dissenters argue that § 33-23-204(2), MCA, refers to required "policies" rather than required "coverages." It makes no sense, however, to discuss "policies" in a vacuum. A policy of insurance is nothing more than the coverages which are provided within the policy. In § 33-23-204(2), MCA, the legislature was obviously correlating the anti-stacking statutes with the fact that policies with specific types of coverage are required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. In particular, the per person, per vehicle and property damage coverages mandated by § 61-6-103(2), MCA.

In interpreting § 33-23-204(2), MCA, three points are apparent; it is directed at insurance against liability. Secondly, it is directed at insurance coverage which is "required" by law; and finally, it is concerned with liability insurance which is not only required, but is required by both part 1 and part 3. There are only three variations of insurance coverage which meet the above criteria; that is, liability coverage which is required by both the MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act. Those three coverages are the per person, per vehicle and property damage coverages which are required by § 61-6-103(2), MCA, and which are incorporated into the Motor Vehicle Liability Act by § 61-6-301, MCA. Unlike the third-party coverage mandated by MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, underinsurance and medical payment do not qualify as insurance against liability. Rather, underinsurance and medical pay coverage are designed to protect the first party insured. Furthermore, there is nothing in MVSRA, the Motor Vehicle Liability Act or Title 33, chapter 23, MCA, which would "require" underinsurance and medical pay coverage. To the contrary, the MVSRA specifically excludes coverages which are in excess of the required per person, per vehicle and property damage coverage.

The MVSRA, § 61-6-103(8), provides as follows:

Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle...

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