Farmers' Bank of Md. v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 29 January 1873
• Citation: 37 Md. 246
• Parties: THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY OF THE FARMERS' BANK OF MARYLAND v. ELIZABETH THOMAS, Richard H. Miles and William A. Lyon, Terre-Tenants of Henry W. Thomas.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

37 Md. 246

THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTORS AND COMPANY OF THE FARMERS' BANK OF MARYLAND v. ELIZABETH THOMAS, Richard H. Miles and William A. Lyon, Terre-Tenants of Henry W. Thomas.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 29, 1873

Appeal from the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County.

At March Term, 1864, of the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County, the appellants recovered a judgment for $1,250, with interest from the 27th of August, 1861, against Henry W Thomas and others. To revive this judgment, the appellants on the 3rd of March, 1870, sued out a scire facias which was made known to the appellees as terre tenants of the said Henry W. Thomas. A further statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, BOWIE, ALVEY and ROBINSON, JJ.

Alexander Randall, for the appellants, argued that the judgment should be reversed,

First.--Because the facts admitted by the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiffs' replication to the second plea of the defendants show, that the plaintiffs, in their original judgment against Henry W. Thomas, had thereby a lien on a portion of his real estate, and were proceeding to revive this judgment against the defendants as the terre-tenants of said Thomas, by this """" scire facias," who were claiming to hold this real estate by a purchase under a subsequent decree of a Court of Equity against said Henry passed to sell other real estate of said Henry, on which the complainant had a vendor's lien, and to which decree, etc., the plaintiffs were not made parties and that therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to a "fiat" against these terre-tenants or some of them, in respect to so much of this real estate on which the plaintiffs' judgment was a lien, and on which the complainant in the Equity suit had no vendor's lien, and which she had no right to sell under this decree.

Second.--Because the facts admitted by the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiffs' replication to the third plea of the defendants show, that though the defendants were purchasers of portions of the real estate of the defendant Henry W. Thomas, in the original judgment, under a decree in equity against him to enforce the payment to the complainant therein of a vendor's lien on part of the real estate of said Thomas, yet, all his real estate not being subject thereto, and particularly a portion thereof on which the plaintiffs' original judgment was a lien, that therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to a " fiat" against these " terre-tenants," the defendants, in respect to this part of the real estate of Henry W. Thomas, on which the plaintiffs' judgment was a lien, and on which there was no vendor's lien.

Third.--Because the general judgment of the court below for the defendants, is contradictory of and inconsistent with the judgment of the court for the plaintiffs, (and to which the defendants submitted--not having objected thereto:)--first, with that judgment of the court below on the first plea of """" nul tiel record," thereby reviving the plaintiffs' original judgment against Henry W. Thomas, which existed before the decree in the equity suit; second, with the other judgment of the court below sustaining the plaintiffs' demurrer to the third plea of Miles, and to the fourth plea of Elizabeth Thomas and Lyon, which thereby decided, that though the plaintiffs had notice of the proceedings in the equity suit, and had become a party thereto after the decree and sale therein, by appearing and filing their claim as a creditor of Henry W. Thomas upon the judgment recited in the " scire facias," and seeking payment thereof out of these proceeds of sale, and that although the defendants have no other land which ever was possessed by the said Henry, except those as aforesaid purchased and paid for by them--yet, that the lien of the said original judgment of the plaintiffs on the said real estate was not wholly cleared or extinguished thereby.

The bill filed by Elizabeth Thomas against Henry W. Thomas, referred to in this cause, being simply to enforce her vendor's lien, and having no common interest with the other creditors of Henry the debtor, will not be treated as a creditor's suit, and does not implicate the rights of other creditors. Ellicott v. Welch, 2 Bland, 242; Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 306.

In the case of a creditor's bill, all creditors and others interested may be made parties--all the estate of the debtor is sold, the proceeds brought into court and paid off to all creditors, and the estate finally settled up as to all interested; but not so on such a bill as this, by vendor against vendee. So in the case of mortgagee against mortgagor, prior incumbrancers need not be made parties--their titles are not sold. Brooks v. Brooke, 12 G. & J. 318.

None but parties are bound by such a decree as this, between vendor and vendee, and the appellant, standing in no such relation, cannot be bound thereby. Tongue v. Morton, 6 H. & J. 24; Brooks v. Brooke, 12 G. & J. 307.

A Court of Equity sells only the interests of the parties to the cause, (by the express words of all the forms of such decrees,) and the rule " caveat emptor" applies to all such sales, and they are made subject to the incumbrances on the land sold. Farmers Bank v. Martin, 7 Md. 342; Bolgiano v. Cooke, 19 Md. 375; Duvall v. Speed, 1 Md. Ch. 229; Cockey v. Milne, 16 Md. 207; Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368.

Henry W. Thomas being seized of one-fourth of the real estate descended to him and his brothers and sister, purchased from his sister one-third of her one-fourth, thereby holding one-third of the entire land descended; on this one-third of one-fourth--that is, one-twelfth of the entire estate, Elizabeth Thomas had a vendor's lien when the plaintiffs' judgment was recovered against Henry W. Thomas, which became a lien on his entire one-fourth which descended to him--and this lien has never in any manner been released, nor has the judgment been paid. The proceeding instituted by Elizabeth Thomas, was to enforce her vendor's lien by the sale of the land she sold to Henry--nothing else. She could, therefore, obtain a decree for only what she sold him--that was, one-fourth of the land; any other land he held, on which the plaintiffs had a lien, could not be sold; the court had no jurisdiction to sell more than that on which the vendor had a lien, and any such sale would be void and be set aside. Johnson v. Robertson, 34 Md. 175.

The Court of Equity did not and could not sell the whole of the land of Henry W. Thomas. The facts, as they stand admitted by the pleadings, show, that only a part of this land, one-fourth thereof, was sold, and there is no evidence to show that the court, by its decree, ever intended to allow more to be sold. But if such had been the decree, it would have been inoperative as against these plaintiffs.

J. Shaaff Stockett and Frederick Stone, for the appellees.

The judgments or decrees of a court of competent jurisdiction, coming incidentally or collaterally in question, are conclusive, and cannot be impeached upon the ground of informality in the proceedings, or of mistakes by the court in the matter adjudicated. The decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a matter properly within the scope of its jurisdiction, whether correct or not, is, until reversed, binding upon the court rendering it and every other court, and can never be attacked or impeached collaterally. If errors be committed, they must be corrected by appeal, bill of review or some other direct proceeding. The Circuit Court for St. Mary's County, in Equity, a court of competent jurisdiction, having decided that the vendor's lien of Elizabeth Thomas covered the whole land of Henry W. Thomas, the correctness of that decision cannot be inquired into in this proceeding. Powles v. Dilley, 9 Gill, 222, 241; Ranoul v. Griffie, 3 Md. 54, 60; Clark v. Bryan, 16 Md. 171, 176; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 340; Cockey v. Cole, 28 Md. 284.

The judgment of the plaintiffs having been rendered subsequently to the attachment of the vendor's lien, it was not necessary that the plaintiffs should be made parties to the proceedings to enforce the lien. They were bound to seek payment out of the surplus of the proceeds of sale in the hands of the trustees, if any such existed; and they cannot follow the land into the hands of the purchasers. As at law, the sale by the sheriff, under the elder judgment, conveys the title, and the holders of the junior judgments must look to the fund, so in equity the sale to enforce the elder lien conveys the title, and the holders of the junior liens must look to the fund in the hands of the trustees. Courts of Justice guard with jealous vigilance the rights of purchasers under judicial sales. Murphy v. Cord, 12 G. & J. 182; Elliott v. Knott, 14 Md. 134, 135; Brawner v. Watkins, 28 Md. 217.

Bills to enforce a vendor's lien are in the nature of bills for the specific performance of a contract, and only the parties to the contract are necessary parties to the proceeding. Barroll's Ch. Pr. 78, 80; Crook v. Brown, 11 Md. 158; Elysville Manf. Co. v. Okisko Co. 5 Md. 152.

Admitting that the judgment of the appellants was a lien on the real estate of Henry W. Thomas, that lien was subordinate to the vendor's lien which had existed and attached long before and which the Circuit Court by its decree decided attached to the whole of the estate. And any proceeding which the appellants might have seen fit to institute to enforce their judgment lien, could only have been prosecuted in subordination to the senior lien of the vendor. The appellants do not present the case in its proper light when they assert the priority of their judgment lien--their judgment may be older than the decree under which the...