Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., A-434E

• Decision Date: 03 March 1976
• Docket Number: A-434E
• Citation: 341 So.2d 144
• Parties: FARMERS AND GINEERS COTTON OIL CO., a corporation v. RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corp., et al. Civ. 434
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 144

341 So.2d 144

FARMERS AND GINEERS COTTON OIL CO., a corporation v. RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corp., et al.

Civ. 434A-434E.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 3, 1976.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1976.

Whitmire, Morton & Coleman, Birmingham, for appellant.

C. William Gladden, Jr., Birmingham, for appellees.

BRADLEY, Judge.

On November 15, 1971 the W. C. Griffith Gin, Hanceville, Alabama, was totally destroyed by fire. Defendants are insurance companies which had in force on that date policies covering the gin equipment and the building. The mortgage clause of those policies provided that plaintiff, as the gin's mortgagee, was entitled to the proceeds from the insurance to the extent of its mortgage interest.

Plaintiff filed suit to recover on these policies on February 15, 1973. A jury trial was held, and at the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff moved for directed verdict against each defendant. Denied. Interrogatories were then submitted to the jury. In answer to the interrogatories, the jury found that plaintiff was entitled to recover under the policies; that plaintiff had sustained damages as a result of the gin fire; and that the amount of damages was $2,000 for the building and $7,000 for the machinery. The trial court prorated the $9,000 award plus six percent interest among the several insurers.

On March 25, 1974 plaintiff filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. or alternatively for new trial. The ground cited for this motion was that the jury's answer to the interrogatory assessing the amount of damages was inadequate and not supported by the evidence. On June 7, 1974 this motion was overruled. Hence this appeal.

Plaintiff argues that the jury's award of $9,000 in damages is contrary to the unrebutted expert testimony of a much greater loss, and that it is the manifest product of bias, prejudice, or other improper motive. For this reason, plaintiff states that its motion of June 7 should have been granted.

Neither party disputes that the measure or recovery in the present case is the market value of the destroyed property, Sussex Fire Ins. Co. v. Barton, 225 Ala. 570, 144 So. 439. The only evidence in the record as to this value is the testimony at trial of Mr. Jack Wells Kidd, plaintiff's president, and the deposed testimony of Mr. Talmadge Smith, a field representative for plaintiff. In Mr. Kidd's opinion the building had a value of $12,000 to $15,000, and the machinery of $31,000 to $33,000. However, on Voir dire Mr. Kidd testified that he was not sure of the names of parts of the equipment, their original cost, or date of purchase. Mr. Smith stated that in his opinion the building was worth $15,000 and the machinery $30,000 to $35,000, but also admitted he could not itemize his estimate.

It is apparent that plaintiff's appeal is not based on any indication of jury bias or misconduct other than the discrepancy between the award of damages and the valuation testimony of these two witnesses.

The jury has no right to capriciously or arbitrarily disregard competent opinion testimony as to market value, O'Neill v. City of Birmingham, 221 Ala. 580, 130 So. 87. However, opinion evidence, even of experts, is not conclusive; it cannot substitute for the jury's own determination, Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Mobile Drug Co., 208 Ala. 618, 95 So. 13. The jury has the duty to reach its own conclusion, giving...