Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Schiller, 49410

Decision Date14 July 1979
Docket NumberNo. 49410,49410
Citation226 Kan. 155,597 P.2d 238
PartiesFARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Appellee, v. John R. SCHILLER, Appellant, and Robert V. Moore, J. F. Haile, Center Director of Veterans Administration Hospital, Bay Pines, Florida, Defendants.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Allegations made in the pleadings and briefs will not sustain a genuine issue of fact when opposed by uncontradicted affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment.

2. The purpose of K.S.A. 8-135 is to require the issuance of a certificate of title for every vehicle required to be registered under the act, and to provide a means by which one may readily ascertain who is the owner of a motor vehicle, thus protecting the public from the evils arising from the unregulated use, transfer, and sale of such a vehicle.

3. It is the general rule that a second permittee using a car solely for his own purpose is not entitled to protection under the omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy where the named insured has expressly prohibited the first permittee from allowing other persons to use or operate the car.

4. In event of theft or nonpermissive use of a vehicle a guest passenger of the unauthorized user, which passenger does not fall within the definition of "insured" contained in the policy, is not within the coverage mandated by the uninsured motorist statute, K.S.A. 40-284.

Harold S. Youngentob, of Goodell, Cogswell, Stratton, Edmonds, Palmer & Wright, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

J. H. Eschmann, of Ascough, Bausch & Eschmann, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.

FROMME, Justice:

The case comes to this court on a Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment entered by the district court in favor of the plaintiff Farmers Insurance Company and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Schiller, 3 Kan.App.2d 87, 589 P.2d 641 (1979). We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the summary judgment entered by the district court in favor of plaintiff.

This action was filed by the insurance company for a declaratory judgment to determine possible liability exposure under the permissive user provision of the omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy issued to Robert L. Hester. The policy provided coverage for personal injuries with respect to Hester's truck to the named insured or a relative and to "any other person while using such automobile and any other person or organization legally responsible for its use, provided the actual use of such automobile is by the named insured or with his permission."

The insurance company by petition in the declaratory judgment action alleged it had issued a policy of automobile liability insurance insuring Robert Hester and covering his 1959 Ford truck; that Hester sold the truck on August 31, 1974, to David Bayless and delivered the certificate of title to him; and by reason of said completed sale it was no longer responsible for claims arising thereafter out of the operation and use of the truck by Bayless or others. The company alleged that its assured, Hester, at no time thereafter permitted John R. Schiller or Robert V. Moore to use or drive the truck. The company further alleged that Schiller had made claim against the company for personal injury protection benefits, that no coverage was provided under the Hester policy to Schiller, and that the court should determine that no liability exists as to Schiller as a result of the accident which was alleged to have occurred on September 4, 1974, wherein either Schiller or Moore was allegedly driving said vehicle.

Schiller answered alleging no knowledge of the whereabouts of Moore, admitting the existence of the policy of insurance, admitting that the ownership of the truck was in Hester, and alleging that the policy was in effect and that coverage existed for Schiller on September 4, 1974. This answer was filed April 15, 1976.

On November 9, 1976, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment alleging no genuine issue as to any material fact as shown by an affidavit and memorandum attached to the motion.

The affidavit was by Hester and stated that he sold the 1959 Ford pickup truck to Dave Bayless on August 30, 1974, for $150.00. Bayless paid $100.00 down and agreed to pay the balance the following week. Hester signed the certificate of title transferring ownership but since it was after 9:00 p. m. no notary public was immediately available. Bayless then advised Hester that he would get the title notarized and bring the title back in the morning. Bayless wanted to drive the pickup home since he had no other transportation. Hester, allowed his license tag to remain on the vehicle and permitted Bayless to drive the vehicle home but with the understanding and promise from Bayless that he would return the pickup and title the next morning. Hester stated in his affidavit that he did not authorize Bayless to drive the pickup except to his house and back. He further stated under oath that he did not authorize Bayless to permit any other person to drive the pickup.

In this affidavit filed in support of the motion for summary judgment Hester further stated that Bayless failed to return on the following morning, that plaintiff attempted and was unable to locate Bayless or the pickup on September 2 and 3, that Bayless came to Hester's house on September 5, 1974, and advised Hester the vehicle had been involved in an accident. Bayless advised Hester that Bayless was not driving nor was he a passenger in the pickup at the time of the accident.

On November 15, 1976, the deposition of Hester was taken on behalf of Schiller. No material change in the facts set forth in Hester's affidavit appears in the deposition testimony.

On February 8, 1977, the district judge advised the attorneys for both parties by letter that he had considered plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and was overruling the motion since discovery had not been completed. The judge further advised the attorneys that upon completion of discovery, if the uncontroverted facts remained the same as set forth in the motion and affidavit on file, the motion could then be renewed and it would be sustained.

No further discovery was undertaken by defendant Schiller and no affidavits in opposition to the request for summary judgment were filed. On February 22, 1977, plaintiff renewed its motion for summary judgment and filed an additional affidavit in support thereof. The additional affidavit was executed by Larry D. King who stated under oath that he was present and witnessed the sale of the pickup by Hester to Bayless. King further stated under oath that Bayless agreed to get the title notarized by his uncle that same evening; that after repeated demands were made by Bayless, Hester allowed Bayless to drive the pickup home "upon the stated fact that Mr. Bayless would drive the pickup home only and to park it." King in his affidavit further stated that the pickup did not have a battery in it; that Hester removed a battery from his car and put it in the pickup; and that Hester told Bayless to return the battery and vehicle tag the following day.

In response to this motion and affidavit Schiller filed a motion for additional time to submit "a brief and affidavits if necessary on the issue of coverage." The motion stated: "It is anticipated that the question of whether there is coverage under the policy can be decided as a question of law." Thereafter defendant Schiller filed a brief but filed no affidavits or discovery depositions in opposition to the facts set forth in the plaintiff's affidavits and deposition. Schiller had previously requested additional time "to complete discovery as to whether the driver of the car at the time of the collision was a permittee covered under the usual omnibus clause of plaintiff's insurance policy." Additional time had been afforded yet Schiller failed to furnish anything which might bear upon the question of who was driving and riding in the car, and whether the occupants had obtained permission to use the vehicle.

Under the above circumstances the trial court was justified in ruling on the motion for summary judgment based on the uncontroverted facts set forth in plaintiff's affidavits and deposition. Allegations made in the pleadings and briefs will not sustain a genuine issue of fact when opposed by uncontradicted affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment. Ebert v. Mussett, 214 Kan. 62, Syl. P 3, 519 P.2d 687 (1974). Summary judgment may be granted when the record before the court shows conclusively there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact after the party against whom the motion was filed has failed to controvert a showing by affidavit, deposition, or otherwise that the moving party is entitled to judgment. Ebert v. Mussett, 214 Kan. 62, 519 P.2d 687; Miller v. Sirloin Stockade, 224 Kan. 32, 36, 578 P.2d 247 (1978).

The first legal issue confronting this court is whether there was a completed sale of the pickup from Hester to Bayless which would relieve Hester's insurance company from exposure under the policy. The Court of Appeals and the trial court determined the sale had not been completed, and that Hester's insurance company was not relieved from exposure under the policy. We agree. However, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that the lack of a notarization on the title rendered the sale fraudulent and void. The statute then in effect, K.S.A.1974 Supp. 8-135(C )(2), did require the assignment of title to be executed by the owner before a notary public. However, K.S.A.1974 Supp. 8-135(C )(6) further provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to buy or sell in this state any vehicle required to be registered hereunder, unless, at the time of delivery thereof or at a time agreed upon by the parties, not to...

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