Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions

• Decision Date: 28 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 13119,13119
• Citation: 607 P.2d 422,100 Idaho 914
• Parties: FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael B. SESSIONS and Geoffrey McIntosh, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 422

607 P.2d 422

100 Idaho 914

FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael B. SESSIONS and Geoffrey McIntosh, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 13119.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 28, 1980.

Curtis H. Eaton of Stephan, Slavin, Eaton & Stephan, Twin Falls, for defendants-appellants.

John A. Doerr and Kevin F. Trainor, Twin Falls, for plaintiff-respondent.

McFADDEN, Justice.

On March 12, 1976 defendant-appellant Michael B. Sessions was involved in an altercation at the Outlaw Inn in Twin Falls, as a result of which defendant-appellant Geoffrey McIntosh was allegedly injured and brought suit against Sessions in a separate action.

At the time of the altercation Sessions was insured by plaintiff-respondent Farmers Insurance Group against liability for personal injury. Farmers brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that language of exclusion in the policy relieves it of any liability for Sessions' actions in injuring McIntosh.

The policy obligates Farmers

"To pay all damages which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury to any person . . . caused by an occurrence to which this insurance applies."

The pertinent exclusion relieves Farmers of liability for

"bodily injury or property damages caused wilfully, intentionally or maliciously by or at the direction of the insured, or for which any insured may be held legally liable because of the wilful, intentional or malicious acts of any other persons."

Farmers argues that because Sessions acted intentionally in injuring McIntosh it must be relieved of liability under this exclusion. After filing its complaint Farmers moved for summary judgment. Defendant McIntosh moved to dismiss and submitted affidavits. The trial court held that Sessions acted intentionally, and that the policy excluded liability for intentional acts. It therefore found no material issue of fact outstanding and granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment.

There is only one issue in this case: whether the trial court properly granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment. ¹ The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is stated in I.R.C.P. 56(c). The court must grant judgment to the moving party

"if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).

In determining whether there were unresolved material issues of fact the trial court had three documents before it: Farmers' complaint, and the affidavits of Sessions and McIntosh.

The complaint, in count V, states that Sessions committed an assault upon McIntosh "by throwing a barstool at him; that the defendant Sessions wilfully and intentionally threw the barstool at defendant McIntosh, intending thereby to injure him . . .." (Emphasis added.) Sessions' affidavit, dated August 14, 1978, reads as follows:

"Michael B. Sessions, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am one of the defendants in the above-entitled action.

On March 12, 1976, I, along with some friends, was a patron of the Outlaw Inn in Twin Falls, Idaho. During the course of the evening, problems developed over the dinner service provided by the Outlaw Inn. A verbal confrontation took place between myself and the manager of the Outlaw Inn. As we were leaving the premises, the manager made an abusive gesture in the presence of my wife. As I walked by the bar I pushed a tray of glasses at him and then picked up a bar stool, threw it at him and left. I fully intended to throw the bar stool at him and it was no accident.

I later pleaded guilty to the assault and battery and paid a fine and made restitution for the damages I caused to the premises of the Outlaw Inn.

/s/ Michael B. Sessions"

McIntosh's affidavit dated August 23, 1978 states:

"GEOFFREY McINTOSH, after being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:

1. That he is one of the Defendants in the above entitled case; and Plaintiff in Case no. 28900, entitled Geoffrey McIntosh v. Michael Sessions.

2. That on March 12, 1976, he was injured by the negligent, wanton, and reckless conduct of Defendant, Michael B. Sessions.

3. That he has read the Affidavit of Michael B. Sessions filed in Case No. 29958 and dated the 14th day of August, 1978, and concurs with the statements therein only as follows:

(a) On said date Michael Sessions was a patron of the Outlaw Inn.

(b) Problems developed over the service provided by the Outlaw Inn.

(c) A verbal confrontation took place between Michael Sessions and the Assistant Manager of the Outlaw Inn.

(d) Michael Sessions did knock off some glasses and then threw a bar stool in the direction of the Assistant Manager.

4. That he was an employee of the Outlaw Inn on said date but was neither the Manager nor the Assistant Manager of the Outlaw Inn; that he has never spoken to or with Michael Sessions nor had a 'verbal confrontation' with him; neither is he the person who made the alleged abusive gesture. 5. That the Assistant Manager of the Outlaw Inn on said date was Alan nelson.

6. The Manager of the Outlaw Inn on said date was Mark Phillips.

/s/ Geoffrey McIntosh

GEOFFREY McINTOSH"

It is thus alleged and admitted that Sessions acted intentionally toward someone, although it is not clear toward whom his actions were directed. The determination of whether this "genuine issue" of fact is also "material," I.R.C.P. 56(c), requires an interpretation of law. The trial court apparently believed that any intentional act relieved the insurance company of liability. If we accept the trial court's view of the law, because it is uncontradicted that Sessions' act was intentional, it clearly was correct to grant Farmers' motion for summary judgment.

Appellants, however, argue that insurance policies must be strictly construed against the insurer, and that other courts have construed exclusionary language such as that involved in this case to require more than an intentional act. What is required for the exclusionary clause to operate, say appellants, is that the insured must have intended not only to act, but also to injure. That is, it is insufficient to bring the exclusionary provision into operation if admitting there was an intentional act, the injury itself was not intentional but was merely negligent or an inadvertent result of the original intentional act. Thus if Sessions acted intentionally toward another person and secondarily injured McIntosh, or if he intended only to throw the barstool and the glasses at, but not specifically to injure McIntosh, the insurance company remains liable under the terms of the policy. Under this view of the law the unresolved questions of precisely what Sessions intended, and toward whom he intended it, become material, and granting the motion for summary judgment would be improper.

A number of other courts have addressed this question. In doing so, however, most were interpreting exclusionary language exempting the insurance company from liability for injury caused "intentionally" by the insured. Because the exclusion in the instant case refers to "injury . . . caused willfully, intentionally, or maliciously by . . . the insured" (emphasis added), the respondent argues that the exclusion is broader than those exclusions which use only the term "intentional." The term "willful" is not significantly different from "intentional"; and the term "malicious" presumes intention, adding an element of wrongfulness. Thus, to claim an exclusion based on malicious conduct would apparently require a stronger showing than one based on only intentional conduct. But the issue in this case is not so much how we denominate the conduct required, whether intentional or otherwise, but whether, for the policy exclusion to operate, the malicious, intentional or willful act must have been performed for the purpose of causing injury. Thus we inquire whether the insurance company need only show a willful, intentional or malicious act; or whether they must show a willfully, intentionally or maliciously caused injury. The addition of the words, "willfully" and "maliciously" does not materially alter this inquiry.

The language of this exclusion is certainly "ambiguous," in that it lends itself to at least three possible interpretations. We must resolve any doubt in favor of the insured, strictly construing the contract against the drafter. Abbie Uriguen Olds., Buick, Inc., v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Stephens v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 537, 447 P.2d 14 (1968). The three possible interpretations were explained as follows, by a court considering a policy exclusion which used the term "intentional":

"(1) Intentional refers to the volitional act which produces injury. If the insured intentionally did the act, the resulting injury is intentional and not accidental for purposes regarding the policy.

(2) Intentional refers to the result achieved. Only where the insured intended to inflict the precise injury or degree of injury which in fact resulted should the injury be considered as not accidental. (3) Intentional is more demanding than (1) but not so difficult of proof as (2). It refers instead to the volitional performance of an act with an intent to cause injury, although not necessarily the...