Farmers' Mut. Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Crowley, No. 39606.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: Van Osdol
• Citation: 190 S.W.2d 250
• Decision Date: 05 November 1945
• Docket Number: No. 39606.
• Parties: FARMERS' MUTUAL FIRE and LIGHTNING INSURANCE COMPANY of Andrew County, Missouri, v. J.O. CROWLEY (Interpleader) and DALE HARVEY, SARAH MINER, BEATRICE HARVEY BEELER, RAYMOND A. HARVEY, GENEVA HARVEY SLADE, DOROTHY HARVEY, CATHERINE SMITH, RACHEL SCHENK, FOREST W. HARVEY (Interpleaders), Appellants.

190 S.W.2d 250 FARMERS' MUTUAL FIRE and LIGHTNING INSURANCE COMPANY of Andrew County, Missouri,
v.
J.O. CROWLEY (Interpleader) and DALE HARVEY, SARAH MINER, BEATRICE HARVEY BEELER, RAYMOND A. HARVEY, GENEVA HARVEY SLADE, DOROTHY HARVEY, CATHERINE SMITH, RACHEL SCHENK, FOREST W. HARVEY (Interpleaders), Appellants. No. 39606. Supreme Court of Missouri. Division One, November 5, 1945.

[190 S.W.2d 251]

Appeal from Andrew Circuit Court. — Hon. R.B. Bridgeman, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

J. Harry Latham and Breit & Roberts for appellants.

(1) Respondent has an estate limited to the term of his life, or so long as he remains unmarried, in the insured property, and the appellants own a vested remainder in fee therein. Last Will and Testament of Mary H. Crowley, deceased. (2) The rider attached to the policy after the death of the insured, at the instance of the respondent, did not constitute a new contract. Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S.W. 547. (3) Respondent did not insure his interest in the building by procuring the rider attached to the original policy. Fitterling v. Johnson County Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W. (2d) 347. (4) The insurance involved herein was taken out on the building by the devisor, Mary H. Crowley, now deceased, and the loss occurred after her death. Since the insurance was taken out prior to the creation of the limited estate of respondent, he is entitled only to the income from the proceeds of the insurance policy, for the duration of his limited estate, and the remaindermen appellants are entitled to the proceeds after the termination of the respondent's limited estate. Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S.W. 547; Fitterling v. Johnson County Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W. (2d) 347; 232 Mo. App. 805; 17 R.C.L., p. 642, sec. 32; 21 C.J. 955, sec 92; 126 A.L.R., p. 354, sec. 3; Graham v. Roberts, 43 N.C. 99; Haxall's Exrs. v. Shippen, 10 Leight, 536, 34 Am. Dec. 745; Cope v. Ricketts, 130 Kan 823, 288 Pac. 591. (5) The respondent, having but a limited estate in the insured building was not entitled to the whole proceeds of the insurance policy, but only to the income therefrom during the duration of his limited estate therein, and at the expiration of his estate, the appellants, as owners of the remainder in fee will be entitled to the immediate possession of said proceeds. Fitterling v. Johnson County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112 S.W. (2d) 347; Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S.W. 547; Farmers Mut. Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Crowley, 187 S.W. (2d) 346; Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 387, 126 S.E. 258; Clyburn v. Reynolds, 31 S.C. 91, 9 S.E. 973; Green v. Green, 50 S.C. 514, 27 S.E. 952; Sampson v. Grogan, 21 R.I. 174, 44 L.R.A. 711; 26 C.J. 436.

Lloyd W. Booher for respondent.

(1) This contract of insurance is not against public policy. Underwood v. Fortune, 9 S.W. (2d) 845; Spalding v. Miller, 45 S.W. 462. (2) One having only a life interest in property but insuring that interest in his own right and at his own expense is entitled to the proceeds, and remaindermen have no claim on proceeds. 26 C.J. p. 436, sec. 584, and cases cited; Saunders v. Armstrong, 61 S.W. 700. (3) An insurance contract is one personal to the party who makes it, and inures to the benefit only of those who are embraced in its provisions. Bennett v. Featherstone, 71 S.W. 589; Underwood v. Fortune, 9 S.W. (2d) 845; Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S.W. 845; Spalding v. Miller, 45 S.W. 462; Grant v. Buchanan, 81 S.W. 820.

VAN OSDOL, C.

This case has been transferred to this court by the Kansas City Court of Appeals (187 S.W. 2d 346), that court deeming its decision in conflict with that of the Springfield Court of Appeals in the case of Underwood v. Fortune, Mo. App., 9 S.W. 2d 845.

A fire insurance policy was issued to Mary H. Crowley insuring a dwelling on her land. Insured died during the term of the policy, having devised a life estate to her husband, respondent; remainder to appellants, her nieces and nephews. After insured's death, the insurer at respondent's request attached a "rider" to the policy recognizing that the insurable interest of Mary H. Crowley "ceases, and the title of the property insured ... is now vested in the name of J.O. Crowley (respondent) and the insurance subject to all conditions of the said policy to continue in force ..." During Mary H. Crowley's lifetime, assessments were paid by respondent from a "common fund" derived from income on lands owned by Mary H. Crowley and other lands owned by respondent which were operated as one enterprise. After the death of Mary H. Crowley, the assessments were paid by respondent.

Plaintiff insurance company filed and sustained its bill of interpleader and the trial court, examining the claims of the adversary claimants, respondent and appellants, found and adjudged respondent to be entitled to receive the entire proceeds of the policy.

Should respondent (a life tenant) be entitled to receive and use as his own the entire proceeds of the policy?

If a building has been insured prior to the creation of a life tenancy and is afterwards destroyed, the property is in effect converted into personalty and the life tenant is entitled only to a life estate in the proceeds of the insurance contract. Millard v. Beaumont, 194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S.W. 547; 17 R.C.L.,...