Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 04 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 30469.,30469.
• Citation: 576 S.E.2d 261,213 W.Va. 16
• Parties: FARMERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a West Virginia corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Hubert Junior TUCKER, Defendant Below, Appellant. Hubert Junior Tucker, Third-Party Plaintiff Below, Appellant v. Darrell Lee Taylor, Leonard Locie Taylor, and Other Individuals Presently Unknown, Third-Party Defendants Below, Appellees.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

576 S.E.2d 261

213 W.Va. 16

FARMERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a West Virginia corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Hubert Junior TUCKER, Defendant Below, Appellant.

Hubert Junior Tucker, Third-Party Plaintiff Below, Appellant v. Darrell Lee Taylor, Leonard Locie Taylor, and Other Individuals Presently Unknown, Third-Party Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 30469.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted October 9, 2002.

Decided December 4, 2002.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Davis December 6, 2002.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maynard December 9, 2002.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Albright December 12, 2002.

William V. DePaulo, Ross & DePaulo, P.L.L.C., Hurricane, for Appellant.

David A. Sims, Gregory R. Tingler, Law Office of David Aaron Sims, Elkins, for Appellee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. STARCHER, Justice:

In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Putnam County, we are asked to review a circuit court order granting summary judgment to an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action. The circuit court was asked to interpret language in a liability insurance policy that defined persons insured as including "your relatives if residents of your household." In its order, the circuit court ruled that a tortfeasor, who lived on his father's farm in a mobile home separate from his father's insured residence, was not a relative who was "residing" in his father's "household." The circuit court therefore concluded that the tortfeasor was not insured by the liability insurance policy.

As set forth below, we reverse the circuit court's order.

I. Facts & Background

On July 25, 1996, appellant Hubert Junior Tucker drove to a farm owned by appellee Locie Taylor. The Taylor farm raised and sold pigs commercially, and Mr. Tucker came intending to buy a pig. Locie lived in a mobile home on the farm, and had purchased a second mobile home on the farm in which his son, thirty-eight-year-old appellee Darrell Lee Taylor, lived. The two mobile homes are between 50 and 100 yards apart. Darrell Lee worked on the farm for his father.¹

Mr. Tucker drove to Darrell Lee's mobile home. After knocking on the door, Mr. Tucker noticed smoke coming from the mobile home, and believing that Darrell Lee was inside, began beating on the side of the mobile home. When he received no response, Mr. Tucker kicked in the front door of the mobile home in an attempt to rescue Darrell Lee.

It appears from the record that Darrell Lee was a chronic alcoholic,² and had apparently passed out inside his mobile home while rendering lard or cooking sausage in a skillet on the stove. Darrell Lee woke up to find his mobile home filling with smoke, and grabbed the burning skillet from the stove. Darrell Lee then carried the skillet to the front door, intending to throw it out so that his mobile home did not catch on fire.

Mr. Tucker, who had just kicked in the door to the mobile home, was severely burned when the skillet of flaming grease was thrown through the doorway by Darrell Lee. Mr. Tucker subsequently brought suit against Darrell Lee and his father, Locie, for negligence, and Darrell Lee has since admitted he was at fault for Mr. Tucker's injuries.³ Locie and Darrell Lee sought coverage from Locie's property insurance company, appellee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company ("Farmers Mutual"), to defend against the lawsuit. The property insurance policy provided liability coverage for any of Locie's "relatives if residents of [Locie's] household." At issue in this litigation is whether Locie's son, Darrell Lee, is a relative covered by the Farmers Mutual policy.

Farmers Mutual initiated the instant declaratory judgment action against Mr. Tucker, contending that Darrell Lee was not an "insured" covered by the liability insurance policy purchased by Locie. Specifically, Farmers Mutual asserted that Darrell Lee was not a resident of Locie's household.⁴ After conducting discovery, each party filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 27, 2001, the circuit court entered an order granting Farmers Mutual's motion and denying Mr. Tucker's motion. In its order, the circuit court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that Darrell Lee was clearly not a member of his father's household. The circuit court determined, on the record presented to the court, that as a matter of law Darrell Lee was not entitled to liability insurance coverage under Locie's homeowner's insurance policy.

Mr. Tucker now appeals the circuit court's August 27, 2001 order.

II. Standard of Review

We review a circuit court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

In reviewing summary judgment, this Court will apply the same test that the circuit court should have used initially, and must determine whether "it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). As with the circuit court, we "must draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion," that is, the appellant. Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. at 192, 451 S.E.2d at 758.

III. Discussion

The appellant, Mr. Tucker, argues that the insurance policy at issue provided liability coverage for relatives such as Darrell Lee who "resided" in Locie's "household." Mr. Tucker argues that the term "household" is an ambiguous, flexible, family-oriented concept. He takes the position that, because the term is ambiguous, it may be construed broadly to allow an extensive factual inquiry by a jury to determine whether someone is residing in a particular household. Mr. Tucker contends that because Darrell Lee lived on his father's land, in a mobile home purchased by his father, he was residing on the property as a member of his father's "household."

The appellee, Farmers Mutual, argues that the term "household" is a clear, well-defined term, and is not subject to a broad construction. The insurance company argues that "household" means a collection of persons who live together under the same roof, not those living in separate abodes.

The parties agree that the homeowners' insurance policy at issue listed only Locie Taylor on the declarations page as the "named insured." The policy provided liability coverage, stating that the insurance company would pay for "all sums for which an insured is liable by law because of bodily injury[.]" (Emphasis added.) The policy defines "insured" to include "you," meaning "the person ... named on the Declarations"—that is, Locie—and to include "your relatives if residents of your household."

Farmers Mutual argues that the policy language at issue is not ambiguous, and has previously been applied by this Court to deny coverage. In Spangler v. Armstrong, 201 W.Va. 643, 499 S.E.2d 865 (1997) (per curiam), we addressed a question regarding whether relatives of an insured were "residents of [the insured's] household." The relatives lived in a house owned by the insured. However, the relatives paid the mortgage, taxes and utilities on the house. Furthermore, the house was separate from the property on which the insured lived, and the insured visited his relatives only once or twice a month. On these facts, we concluded that the word "household" in the disputed insurance policy was clear and unambiguous, and held that the relatives were not members of the insured's household. In Spangler, we stated that "liability policies providing coverage for members of an insured's `household' generally include persons who live under the same roof, but not those who live in separate houses." 201 W.Va. at 646,499 S.E.2d at 868 (emphasis added). In the instant case, the facts are substantially different, and we must revisit our holding in Spangler to consider those circumstances where a person does not live under the same roof as an insured, but contends he or she is a member or resident of the insured's household. In sum, we are asked by the appellant to again consider whether the phrase "residents of your household" is ambiguous and subject to interpretation.

We begin by noting several axioms of insurance law. We held in the Syllabus of Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 153 W.Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970) that, on the one hand, "[w]here the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended." On the other hand, "[i]t is well settled law in West Virginia that ambiguous terms in insurance contracts are to be strictly construed against the insurance company and in favor of the insured." Syllabus Point 4, National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 177 W.Va. 734, 356 S.E.2d 488 (1987). Under West Virginia's law, an insurance policy is considered to be ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood in two different ways or if it is of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. Hamric v. Doe, 201 W.Va. 615, 499 S.E.2d 619 (1997); Prete v. Merchants Property Insurance Company of Indiana, 159 W.Va. 508, 223 S.E.2d 441 (1976). When the words of an insurance policy are, without violence, susceptible of two or more interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must be adopted. See Raffel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 141 Conn. 389, 392, 106 A.2d 716, 718 (1954) ("When the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of two interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted.").

Courts considering whether a person has met the residence requirements of an insurance policy have usually concluded that the question is one...