Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 30 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-92-02902-C,05-92-02902-C |
| Citation | 868 S.W.2d 861 |
| Parties | FARMERS TEXAS COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Cindy GRIFFIN, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Charles T. Frazier, Jr., William F. Allred, Dallas, for appellant.
Frank G. Guinta, Dallas, for appellees.
Before BAKER, BURNETT and MORRIS, JJ.
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Company (Farmers) appeals the summary judgment granted to Cindy Griffin, individually and as next friend of Tony Dwane Griffin, Christi Nicole Griffin, and Ashley Dawn Griffin (the Griffins). Farmers, in four points of error, contends that the trial court's summary judgment and award of attorney's fees to the Griffins were improper. Farmers asserts that the Griffins were not entitled to uninsured/underinsured proceeds and did not present competent summary judgment evidence to support their claim for attorney's fees and guardian ad litem fees.
This suit arises from an insurance coverage dispute concerning underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits. Farmers had denied the Griffins UIM proceeds based on the policy's definition of an uninsured/underinsured vehicle. Because the policy's definition of an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle is neither ambiguous nor violative of public policy, we sustain Farmers's first and second points of error.
We reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the Griffins and render judgment that the Griffins take nothing on their claims for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits and attorney's fees. We affirm that part of the trial court's judgment assessing guardian ad litem fees against Farmers.
This suit arises from an automobile accident in which Cindy Griffin and her minor children were passengers in a 1978 Thunderbird driven by Griffin's husband, Danny Dwane Griffin. Mr. Griffin carried a Farmers's "family" automobile-insurance policy on the 1978 Thunderbird. The policy provided liability insurance, personal injury protection, and uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage. Farmers paid the Griffins, who suffered injuries as a result of Mr. Griffin's negligence, the maximum amount of bodily-injury liability available per person per accident under the liability portion of the policy.
Because their injuries exceeded the liability policy limits, the Griffins also made claims against the same policy for UIM benefits. The Griffins, insureds under the family policy and passengers in the covered auto, are defined as "covered persons" under the UIM part of the policy. Farmers denied coverage because the policy specifically excluded the Thunderbird, a vehicle owned by the insured (and covered under the family policy), from the definition of an uninsured/underinsured vehicle. The Griffins sued Farmers for the recovery of UIM proceeds, seeking a declaration that the limited definition of an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle contravenes the purpose and intent of article 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code. See TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1981 & Supp.1993) (the uninsured/underinsured motorists statute).
Farmers and the Griffins moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Griffins, awarding the Griffins $40,000 in UIM benefits plus attorney's fees and guardian ad litem fees. The trial court specifically denied the Griffins's claims for declaratory relief and Farmers's claim for attorney's fees.
A trial court may render summary judgment only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits show that no genuine issue exists regarding any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c); Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex.1990). Summary judgment is designed to eliminate unmerited claims or untenable defenses; it is not intended to deprive litigants of their right to a full hearing on fact issues. Compton v. Calabria, 811 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, no writ) (citing Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952)).
Under rule 166a, both plaintiff and defendant may simultaneously move for summary judgment. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a. A movant must expressly present, in the summary judgment motion, the specific grounds for summary judgment. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993). Each party must carry its own burden, and neither can prevail due to the other's failure to meet its burden. See Cove Inv., Inc. v. Manges, 602 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex.1980).
When a trial court's order granting summary judgment for one movant and denying summary judgment for the other does not specify the grounds upon which it rests, this Court may affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds raised in the prevailing movant's motion are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1989). This Court may also reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment for the other movant based on any meritorious grounds raised in its motion. See id.; Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.1988).
On appeal, this Court considers all evidence accompanying both motions in determining whether to grant either party's motion. Edinburg Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 783 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). In reviewing the summary judgment evidence, we apply the following standards:
1. The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;
2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant is taken as true; and
3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor.
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985).
The facts are undisputed. In their motions for summary judgment, Farmers and the Griffins presented the trial court with two issues of law: (1) whether the policy's express terms exclude the Thunderbird from the definition of an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle, thereby precluding the Griffins's recovery of UIM benefits; and (2) whether this exclusion contravenes the public policy embodied in article 5.06-1 of the insurance code, thereby rendering the exclusion invalid and allowing recovery of UIM proceeds. We now consider each issue to determine whether the Griffin's summary judgment was warranted.
Farmers contends that the Thunderbird is not an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle under the express terms of the standard automobile-insurance policy. The policy stipulates that only injuries resulting from the ownership or operation of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles are covered. The policy specifies that an "uninsured motor vehicle" does not include "any vehicle or equipment owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member." 1
The parties stipulated that the Thunderbird was a vehicle owned by or available for the regular use of Mr. Griffin, a policy holder and a Griffin family member. The Thunderbird, as a matter of law, did not qualify as an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle under the terms of the automobile-insurance policy. See Phillips v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 812 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, no writ) (if policy's language is plain, we enforce it as written). The Griffins cannot recover UIM benefits under the policy as written.
However, the trial court found that the policy's definitional exclusion of certain uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles violates public policy.
Farmers contends that the unambiguous exclusion does not contravene the intent and purpose of the UIM statute. The Griffins assert that the trial court correctly concluded that the definitional exclusion places an invalid limitation on an insured's right to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles.
The legislature and the State Board of Insurance determine the public policy of Texas as it relates to automobile insurance coverage. Boon v. Premier Ins. Co., 519 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1975, no writ). The Texas Legislature enacted the UIM statute to protect conscientious motorists from "financial loss caused by negligent financially irresponsible motorists." Act of Oct. 1, 1967, ch. 202, § 3, 1967 Tex.Gen.Laws 448, 449. The purpose of the UIM statute is to provide for "the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles." TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Vernon 1981).
By enacting the UIM statute, the legislature empowered the Board to promulgate forms regarding uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage. TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(2)(c) (Vernon Supp.1993). These official forms become part of the standard Texas automobile-insurance policy. The legislature specifically authorized the Board to exclude certain motor vehicles from the standard policy's definition of an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle although the operators may in fact be uninsured. TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(2)(c) (Vernon Supp.1993). Pursuant to this authority, the Board excluded "any vehicle or equipment owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of the insured or any family member."
The Board's role, however, is ministerial. Hamaker v. American States Ins., 493 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Board implements policy as determined by the legislature. Segal v. Southern County Mut. Ins. Co., 832 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, no writ). Consequently, clauses in automobile-insurance policies which are not consistent with and do not further the purpose of...
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