Farmiloe v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 17 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:98 CV 2903.,1:98 CV 2903. |
| Citation | 277 F.Supp.2d 778 |
| Parties | John A. FARMILOE Plaintiff v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
James M. Lyons, Lyons & O'Donnell, Painesville, OH, for Plaintiff.
Joy M. Evans, Kristin J. Jakiel, Thomas A. King, Jr., Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant.
On 19 November 1999, defendant Ford Motor Company ("Ford") filed a motion for summary judgment. This Court referred the case to United States Magistrate Judge Nancy Vecchiarelli for a report and recommendation ("R & R") on the motion for summary judgment. On 23 March 2001, the Magistrate Judge in her R & R recommended that the motion for summary judgment be denied. Ford timely filed objections to the R & R. For the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge's R & R will be adopted, and Ford's motion for summary judgment will be denied.
This matter involves whether Ford may request as a prerequisite to employment, the complete medical record of a former employee who was retired due to disability and who is seeking to return to work after his disability ceases.
Mr. John A. Farmiloe brought this case under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA").
Mr. Farmiloe was an hourly production employee at the Walton Hills Stamping Plant of Ford from approximately 1964 to January 1988. (Pl.Aff.¶ 4.) During his employment with Ford, he took medical leaves due to "nerves" in 1974 (Pl.Dep.110) and medical leaves due to valium addiction, anxiety and depression in 1983 (Rollins 1st Aff. ¶ 6 & 7). In January 1988, Ford granted Mr. Farmiloe a disability retirement due to his back and neck conditions and ulcerative colitis. (Rollins 1st Aff. ¶ 9.)
Mr. Farmiloe was and is a member of the United Auto Workers Union (the "UAW") that represents the manufacturing employees working for Ford. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 6.) The collective bargaining agreement between the UAW and Ford includes provisions for a disabled employee who is no longer disabled to return to work. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 6.) An interoffice memorandum from Ford on 26 July 1990 established certain procedures to govern the application process for a disabled retiree seeking to return to work ("Ford Interoffice Memorandum"). (Pl. Resp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1.)
Mr. Farmiloe has made several attempts to go back to work since 1991. In October 1991, Mr. Farmiloe presented the Ford plant doctor, Dr. Arlen Rollins, with a return to work form from his physician, Dr. Papa. Dr. Papa stated in the release that Mr. Farmiloe had chronic injuries which could be aggravated by working. (Rollins 1st Aff. ¶ 10 & 11.) In November 1991, Mr. Farmiloe again met with Dr. Rollins regarding his return to work. At that meeting, Dr. Rollins learned that Mr. Farmiloe had been to some Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. (Rollins 1st Aff. ¶ 13.) Dr. Rollins requested Mr. Farmiloe fill out a medical form authorizing the release of his complete medical records, including psychiatric records from Kaiser Permanente, Mr. Farmiloe's medical provider. Mr. Farmiloe initially complied with the request, but eventually revoked his consent before Dr. Rollins obtained the medical records. (Rollins 1st Aff. ¶ 14-17.) In January 1992, Mr. Farmiloe presented another release to return to work from Dr. Saran, a psychiatrist with Kaiser Permanente. (Rollins 1st Aff. ¶ 18.)
In March 1997, Ms. Marie Stauffer-Rossi, a chiropractor, examined Mr. Farmiloe and diagnosed him with lumbar segmental dysfunction and treated him accordingly. She concluded that Mr. Farmiloe had responded favorably to treatment and could return to work without restrictions. (Def.Mot.Summ. J. Ex. I.) In April 1997, Mr. Farmiloe's attorney, Mr. James Lyons wrote letters to the Walton Hills Labor Relations and the local union president on behalf of Mr. Farmiloe. In the letters, Mr. Lyons tried to establish that Mr. Farmiloe had followed the procedures laid out in the Ford Interoffice Memorandum. (Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. K & L.)
In November 1997, Dr. Alan Kravitz, a physician associated with John Hancock, Ford's disability insurance administrator, examined Mr. Farmiloe. Dr. Kravitz opined that Mr. Farmiloe was no longer disabled and could return to work. (Def.Mot.Summ. J. Ex. M.) John Hancock notified Mr. Farmiloe that his disability benefits were terminated on 18 November 1997. (Def.Mot.Summ. J. Ex. N.)
On 4 December 1997, Ms. Barbara Eady, a psychiatric social worker employed by Kaiser Permanente, evaluated Mr. Farmiloe for a psychiatric intake assessment. Ms. Eady stated in her report that Mr. Farmiloe presented no behavior during her examination that would interfere with working. Ms. Eady advised Mr. Farmiloe not to release his psychiatric records. ( Mr. Farmiloe informed Dr. Rollins that he believed that, under the ADA, he did not have to release his medical and psychiatric records as requested by Dr. Rollins. Mr. Farmiloe again refused to release his medical and psychiatric files. (Rollins 1st Aff. ¶ 30.)
On 17 March 1998, Mr. Farmiloe filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"), claiming age discrimination (he was 55 years old in 1998) and violation of ADA by Ford. (Pl. Resp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 15.) The EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Mr. Farmiloe on 11 August 1998. (Compl. Ex. A.)
On 15 December 1998, Mr. Farmiloe brought the instant lawsuit, which he amended on 2 July 1999, claiming violation of ADA (count I), violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (count II), and breach of the agreement between Ford and the United Auto Workers Union (count III). (Docket no. 1, 11.) Mr. Farmiloe dismissed Count II and III on 13 January 2000, after Ford filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on 19 November 1999. (Docket no. 17, 32.) On the remaining Count, Mr. Farmiloe claims that Ford violated the ADA by refusing to rehire him, and, as a precondition to rehiring him or returning him to work, requiring that he give Ford all of his medical records.
Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli, in her R & R, finds that Mr. Farmiloe is not an employee of Ford because he is not on Ford's payroll, nor is he an employee under traditional agency principles. According to the Magistrate Judge, Mr. Farmiloe is a post-offer pre-employment applicant who has certain rights under the agreement between UAW and Ford that non-disability retirees do not enjoy, namely the right to return to work when his disability ceases and a position becomes available.
Treating Mr. Farmiloe as a post-offer pre-employment applicant, Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli recommends Ford's motion for summary judgment be denied for the following reasons: that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support Mr. Farmiloe's alleged history of mental problems; that Ford's request for Mr. Farmiloe's medical and psychiatric records far exceeds the scope of Ford's legitimate concern over Mr. Farmiloe's problems; and that Ford fails to demonstrate that "all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of disability ...."
Ford filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli's R & R, arguing that Mr. Farmiloe is analogous to an employee returning to work from medical leave; that Ford's request for Mr. Farmiloe's entire mental health record is based upon Ford's review of Mr. Farmiloe's past medical file with Ford; that such a request is reasonable under the ADA; and that Ford reviews all of the returning disability retirees' medical files and regularly requests non-disability retirement related medical records.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court reviews de novo the portion of the Magistrate Judge's R & R to which specific objection was made. This Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli that Mr. Farmiloe's status is analogous to a post-offer pre-employment applicant, and that the record does not support a summary judgment in favor of Ford.
Summary judgment is proper if the court finds that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
In this case, Ford claims that its request for Farmiloe's complete medical records was job-related and consistent with business necessity, which is a defense on which Ford bears the burden of proof. Because Ford is the movant and Ford also has the burden of proof on this issue, Ford must establish that there are no genuine disputes on any material facts relating to this defense, and that Ford prevails as a matter of law. Ford does not contend that Mr. Farmiloe has not established his prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA,1 therefore the prima facie case is not an issue for the purpose of deciding this summary judgment motion.
The ADA treats persons at different stages of the job application process differently:
(1) Before an employer makes a job offer, he or she may not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries as to the job applicant's disability status. The employer is allowed, though, to inquire into the applicant's ability to...
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