Farneman v. Farneman

• Citation: 46 Ind.App. 453,90 N.E. 775
• Decision Date: 03 February 1910
• Docket Number: No. 6,795.,6,795.
• Parties: FARNEMAN v. FARNEMAN.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

46 Ind.App. 453

90 N.E. 775

FARNEMAN

v.FARNEMAN.¹

No. 6,795.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Feb. 3, 1910.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Joseph County; W. A. Funk, Judge.

Action by Mary E. Farneman against Lucy Farneman. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

F. H. Dunnahoo and George Ford, for appellant. Fred J. L. Meyer and Chas. P. Drummond, for appellee.

HADLEY, J.

Action by appellee against appellant for damages. It is averred in the complaint that appellee was married to Herbert Farneman, son of appellant, on April 11, 1900; that they lived together on a farm owned by appellant until July 14, 1901, when appellee and her husband separated and since that time have lived apart; that during their separation appellee's husband has made no provision for her support or manifested any affection for her, nor made any effort to live with her or see her, but, on the contrary, has deprived her of his society, comfort, and support, and has compelled her to support herself; that this condition of affairs was brought about by appellant, who maliciously, and with intent to alienate the affections of her said husband, persistently made disparaging remarks concerning her, held her up to scorn and ridicule, and urged her said husband to neglect her, to remain away from home at night, and caused him to become intoxicated, all for the purpose of alienating her said husband and causing a separation between them. There were various other acts charged to have been maliciously done and performed by appellant for the purpose of alienating said husband from his said wife. It was also averred that by reason of the dominance and influence over her said son and husband of appellee, her continuous malicious conduct resulted in the separation of appellee and her husband on July 14, 1901, and that said separation was continued and maintained by said malicious acts of said appellant until the bringing of this action.

To this complaint appellant demurred, which demurrer was overruled, and appellant answered in two paragraphs: First, by general denial; second, by averring that “plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue within two years before the bringing of this action.” On the issues thus made, trial was had and verdict rendered in favor of appellee. With the general verdict the jury returned answers to interrogatories. Appellant moved for judgment on the answers to interrogatories, which motion was overruled. Appellant then moved for a new trial, which motion was overruled. The rulings on these motions are assigned as errors. Two of the specifications for a new trial were that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict and the verdict was contrary to law. Appellant insists that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict and is contrary to law; the basis of this contention being that the evidence shows without dispute or contradiction that all the acts of appellant to the effect and from which it might be inferred that appellant was seeking to alienate the affections of appellee's husband were done and performed before the separation in July, 1901, and more than two years before the bringing of this action. The undisputed evidence shows the following facts: Appellee and her husband separated on July 14, 1901; she going to her home, and he to his mother's home. At the time of the separation, her husband said to her, in substance: That it had come to the place when she would have to go to her home; that he was not going to stay any longer; that his mother wanted him to go home, and he was going to stay with her as long as she lived, and whatever she asked him to do he was going to do; that his love for her had faded; that all he had married her for was to keep some one else from getting her. And, upon appellee's saying to him: “You don't intend to do what you say. You will not think the way you are thinking now”-he replied, in substance: That he would not think differently; that he would stay with his mother as long as she lived. A few days after, appellee went to appellant's home to see about getting some of her effects she had left there, and at that time had another talk with her husband, at which time she asked him if he did not think it was best for them to not act that way and for them to go away together and do as they ought to. To which he replied, no, he was there at home, and there he was going to stay, that was his home. After this conversation, she never spoke to him or wrote to him, or had any communication with him whatever; neither did he ever speak to her, write to her, or have any communication with her whatever. He lived at the home of appellant, his mother, continuously up to the time of the commencement of this suit.

On February 8, 1904, appellee's husband instituted a suit for divorce. This suit was instituted December 7, 1904. After the time of the separation, the only evidence of any act on the part of appellant with relation to the matters in controversy was to the effect...