Farnsworth v. Com.
Decision Date | 27 July 2004 |
Docket Number | Record No. 2384-02-4. |
Citation | 43 Va.App. 490,599 S.E.2d 482 |
Parties | Samuel L. FARNSWORTH v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Robert G. Hyman, Stafford, for appellant.
Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: FITZPATRICK, C.J., and BENTON and CLEMENTS, JJ.
Samuel L. Farnsworth was convicted in a bench trial of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in concluding that his prior felony conviction in the state of West Virginia for armed robbery constituted a predicate felony conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2, because his civil rights, including his right to possess a firearm, had been previously restored by the state of West Virginia upon his completion of the sentence for that offense. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment and Farnsworth's conviction.
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. On October 5, 2001, Farnsworth was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. Prior to trial, Farnsworth moved to have the charge dismissed, arguing the Commonwealth could not use his prior felony conviction in West Virginia as the requisite predicate conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2 because that state had earlier restored his civil rights upon his release from prison.
At the May 22, 2002 hearing on that motion, Farnsworth and the Commonwealth stipulated that Farnsworth was convicted on March 19, 1979, of armed robbery in Lewis County, West Virginia and that, following his release from prison in that state, he received an "Official Certificate of Discharge" issued by the West Virginia Department of Corrections, which stated as follows:
This is to certify that Samuel Farnsworth HCC-11183 is hereby discharged by expiration of sentence as of the 1st day of April, 1985. Any and all civil rights heretofore forfeited are restored. Done this 18th day of April, 1985.
The parties further stipulated that Farnsworth possessed a firearm in Stafford County, Virginia on or about April 15, 2001.
Concluding that the restoration of Farnsworth's civil rights in West Virginia did not prohibit his prosecution under the "clear and unambiguous" meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Farnsworth then stipulated that the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to convict him, and the trial court found him guilty as charged.
The trial court subsequently imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of five years in the penitentiary, and this appeal followed.
In this appeal, we are asked to review the trial court's determination that Farnsworth was a convicted felon within the meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2. Because this is a question of law involving the construction and application of Code § 18.2-308.2, we review the trial court's judgment de novo. See Sink v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 655, 658, 507 S.E.2d 670, 671 (1998) ( ).
Relying on United States v. Haynes, 961 F.2d 50 (4th Cir.1992), and United States v. Stump, 784 F.Supp. 326 (N.D.W.Va.1992), Farnsworth asserts, on appeal, that, although he was previously convicted of a felony in West Virginia, he was not prohibited from possessing a firearm in Virginia on or about April 15, 2001, because, after serving his sentence for the felony conviction in West Virginia, he received a certificate of discharge from the West Virginia Department of Corrections in 1985 officially restoring all of the civil rights he had forfeited as a result of his conviction. Thus, he argues, because his civil rights were previously restored by the state of West Virginia and because Virginia law makes no reference to the restoration of a convicted felon's civil rights by another state, his felony conviction in West Virginia may not be used as a predicate felony conviction to prosecute him for possession of a firearm by a felon under Code § 18.2-308.2. He further argues that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Virginia must recognize, in its application of Code § 18.2-308.2, the restoration of his civil rights by the state of West Virginia and his right, under the law of that state, to possess a firearm. Thus, he concludes, he was not properly subject to prosecution under Code § 18.2-308.2 and the trial court erred in ruling to the contrary.
In response, the Commonwealth contends that Farnsworth's reliance on federal court cases is misplaced and that the trial court correctly concluded, in accordance with the clear meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2, that the restoration of Farnsworth's civil rights in West Virginia did not exempt him from prosecution under that statute, because his right to possess a firearm in West Virginia had no bearing on his legal ability to do so in Virginia. The Commonwealth further contends that Farnsworth's argument regarding the "full faith and credit" clause is barred on appeal because he did not raise it in the trial court.
On appeal, as below, the Commonwealth does not challenge Farnsworth's assertion that his civil rights were restored in West Virginia by virtue of the April 18, 1985 certificate of discharge issued by the West Virginia Department of Corrections. Thus, we assume, without deciding, that, for purposes of this appeal, Farnsworth's civil rights were restored by the state of West Virginia upon his discharge from prison after serving the sentence for his March 19, 1979 armed robbery conviction in West Virginia.
The dispositive question before us, then, is whether the restoration of Farnsworth's civil rights after he served the sentence for his armed robbery conviction in West Virginia precludes the use of that conviction as a predicate felony conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2. We conclude that the plain meaning of the language of Code § 18.2-308.2 answers this question in the negative.
In reviewing the language of Code § 18.2-308.2, we adhere to the familiar principle that
Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 (2004) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2003) (citations omitted)). "We must also assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute." Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990). "Moreover, we examine a statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular words or phrases." Chesterfield County v. Stigall, 262 Va. 697, 704, 554 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2001). Furthermore, "[w]hile it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth in criminal cases, `we will not apply "an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute" that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.'" Alger, 267 Va. at 259, 590 S.E.2d at 565 (quoting Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002) (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979))). "The manifest intention of the legislature, clearly disclosed by its language, must be applied." Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944).
The version of Code § 18.2-308.2 in effect on or about April 15, 2001, when Farnsworth admittedly possessed a firearm in Stafford County, provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
As relevant to the issue before us in this appeal, the language of Code § 18.2-308.2(A) is plain and unambiguous and clearly manifests the legislature's intent to prohibit those who have been convicted of a felony under the law of, inter alia, any state in the United States, including West Virginia, from possessing a firearm in Virginia. See generally Alger, 267 Va. at 259,590 S.E.2d at 565 ( ). The statute draws no distinction between those felons previously convicted of a felony in Virginia and those previously convicted of a felony in another state. It is concerned only "with preventing a person, who...
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