Farnsworth v. Fraser
| Decision Date | 16 July 1904 |
| Citation | 100 N.W. 400,137 Mich. 296 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | FARNSWORTH v. FRASER. |
Error to Circuit Court, Ingham County; Howard Wiest, Judge.
Proceeding by Asa Farnsworth against William A. Fraser, as administrator of the estate of Lucy M. F. Seely, deceased. From a judgment for claimant, defendant brings error. Affirmed.
William A. Fraser (Black & Reasoner, of counsel) for appellant.
White & Cramton, for appellee.
Claimant presented against the estate of Lucy M. F. Seely a negotiable promissory note purporting to be signed by decedent, dated September 23, 1893, whereby she promised to pay Asa Farnsworth or bearer the sum of $500, with interest, on or before three years from date. It was contended that deceased did not sign this note, and that the note was given without consideration. Both of these issues were submitted to the jury, who rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. We are asked to reverse the judgment for several reasons.
1. It is insisted that the testimony shows that the note was given without consideration, and that, therefore, a verdict should have been directed for the defendant. The testimony respecting the consideration of the note is this: In January 1893, plaintiff was living on his farm in the county of Lapeer. Decedent wrote him: Subsequently claimant visited decedent, and made some arrangements; precisely what, we do not know, as the claimant was not sworn as a witness, his testimony respecting such arrangement being inadmissible (section 10,212, Comp. Laws 1897), and no writing evidencing said arrangement is produced. He then returned to his home in Lapeer, rented his farm for three years, sold his effects at auction, and on the 15th of March, 1893, moved to decedent's farm near Mason, Ingham county. The decedent, Mrs. Seely, resided in plaintiff's family, and matters did not move smoothly. About July 1, 1893, according to the testimony of claimant's wife, claimant said to decedent: "Aunt Lucy, things are not going here to please you,' and she said 'she didn't know as she said anything.' He says, 'You act as though you were dissatisfied, and I am very sorry, for I made a great sacrifice to come here to try and please you, and it is anything but pleasant for us, and it seems to be very unpleasant for you;' and he said 'it is quite a damage to me.' She spoke up and said, 'What is the damage?' May husband [claimant] says, 'I would not have sold my stuff, and rented my farm, and come here, leaving everything.' He says, '$500 would not make me good.' And she says, 'I will pay it.' That was all I heard. * * * We moved back to our farm March 16, 1894. * * * I first saw this note in the spring of 1894. * * * I understood from my husband, when he told me of the note, that it was for what we had lost in moving there by letting our farm.' It may be inferred from this testimony that the note was given in satisfaction of any claim that claimant might have against deceased for compensation for his loss in removing from his farm in Lapeer county to her farm in Ingham county. It is contended that decedent, by the letter heretofore quoted, at most only morally obligated herself to compensate claimant for this loss, and that this moral obligation furnished no consideration for the promise evidenced by her note. It may be that, if it were left to a court to construe the language of said letter, the conclusion might be that decedent had not legally obligated herself to make such compensation. But under the circumstances of this case I do not think that the question depends upon the court's construction of that letter. By executing the note in suit decedent admitted that her promise was supported by a legal consideration. See Rood v. Jones, 1 Doug. 193. I think, too, it may be inferred from the testimony above quoted that both decedent and claimant conceived that the former was under, not merely a moral obligation, but a legal obligation, to compensate the latter for his loss. They may have agreed that the language, 'I will not let you lose if I can help it,' contained in the letter, imposed upon decedent a legal obligation to make such compensation. If they did, thereby agreeing, as they had a right to agree, upon the construction of this language, a court--certainly in a case as doubtful as this--will accept that construction. See District of Columbia v. Gallaher, 124 U.S. 505, 8 S.Ct. 585, 31 L.Ed. 526; Childers v. Jeffersonville First National Bank, 147 Ind. 430, 46 N.E. 825; and numerous other authorities cited 9th Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, p. 589. According to that construction it is clear that the satisfaction of plaintiff's claim was an adequate consideration for the note. See Kennedy v. Shaw, 43 Mich. 359, 5 N.W. 396.
It may also be said that the precise arrangement under which claimant moved from his farm in Lapeer county to decedent's farm in Ingham county is not shown by the testimony, but it was known both to claimant and to decedent. It may be that that arrangement legally obligated decedent to compensate claimant for the loss under consideration. As it may be inferred that decedent, by the execution of the note, admitted that she was under a legal obligation to compensate claimant for that loss, we cannot say that the jury were not warranted in inferring that the terms of this arrangement imposed that obligation upon her.
Neither is it true, as defendant contends, that the claimant was bound to show that the value of his claim was $500. It was sufficient for him to prove that he and decedent agreed that that was its value.
Nor did the trial court err, as defendant contends, in refusing to submit to the jury the question of partial failure...
To continue reading
Request your trial