Farnsworth v. Meadowland Ranches, Inc.
| Docket Number | A175091 |
| Decision Date | 21 September 2022 |
| Citation | 321 Or.App. 814,519 P.3d 153 |
| Parties | Allen FARNSWORTH and Stephanie Farnsworth, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MEADOWLAND RANCHES, INC., an Oregon Corporation et al., Defendants, and Patrick O. McPurdy and Rose Marie McPurdy, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Dominic M. Carollo argued the cause for appellants. Also on the briefs was Carollo Law Group.
Shawn E. Logan argued the cause and filed the answering brief for respondents. Also on the supplemental brief was Logan & Copple, P.C.
Before James, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Joyce, Judge.
This case involves a dispute between neighboring landowners regarding who may use a gravel road located on plaintiffs’ property (the Road). Plaintiffs Allen and Stephanie Farnsworth and defendants Patrick and Rose McPurdy own neighboring properties. Both properties were once owned by Meadowland Ranches, Inc. (Meadowland). In the original deeds conveying them, Meadowland reserved "an easement of forty feet (40 feet) along all boundaries for public highway use in common with others, with power to dedicate." Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to their property, asserting an exclusive right to use the Road. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that defendants "enjoy a valid easement" over the Road.1 After a bench trial, the trial court found in plaintiffs’ favor. Defendants appeal the resulting judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
"In reviewing a trial court's determinations following a bench trial, we review the trial court's explicit and implicit findings of fact for any evidence in the record to support them, and the legal consequences of those facts for legal error." Pistol Resources, LLC v. McNeely , 312 Or App 627, 629, 496 P.3d 28 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We state the facts, briefly, in accordance with that standard.2
In the early 1960s, Meadowland purchased a large plot of land outside Burns and planned to develop it. Meadowland partitioned the property and sold over 1,400 parcels before its administrative dissolution in 1982. Each deed contained the following reservation:
"Reserving therefrom an easement of forty feet (40 feet) along all boundaries for public highway use in common with others, with power to dedicate , and, excepting therefrom all petroleum, oil, minerals, and products derived therefrom, within or underlying said land or that may be produced therefrom and all rights thereto; and further reserving a right of way, with right of entry upon, over, under, along, across, and through the said land for the purpose of erecting, constructing, operating, repairing and maintaining pole lines with cross arms for the transmission of electrical energy, and for telephone lines, and/or for laying, repairing, operating and renewing, any pipe line or lines for water, gas or sewerage, and any conduits for electric or telephone wires, and/or a right-of-way along, across, and through said land for the purpose of constructing irrigation and drainage ditches or other facilities, and reserving to the Seller the sole right to convey the rights hereby reserved."
(Emphases added.)
Despite its plans, Meadowland never recorded a plat with the county, and the deeds do not reference any map or plat. A 1963 map titled "Meadowland Ranches Road Map" was found in Meadowland's file on the county's website and admitted at trial; that map shows a combination of existing and proposed paved, gravel, and other roads running through the planned development, some of which exist today. However, beyond whatever the deeds themselves accomplish, Meadowland never conveyed any easement rights to anyone, nor did it formally dedicate any roads. Consequently, as the trial court put it, "The Meadowland Ranches venture has left a legacy of confusion, frustration, uncertainty, and in this instance litigation."3
The dispute that gave rise to this litigation arose more than 50 years after Meadowland embarked on its development. In 2007, defendants purchased Tax Lot 300 (originally deeded in 1978), and, in 2009, plaintiffs purchased Tax Lot 1000 (originally deeded in 1971). The properties are located outside Burns, in an area south of Highway 20 E, and both are large parcels (20 or 40 acres). The original deeds for both properties contain Meadowland's standard reservation provision quoted above. It is undisputed that both parties took title to their respective properties subject to that deed reservation.
The parties have not pointed us to any useful map in the trial court record, nor have we found one, so we must try to convey the lay of the land in words, based on the trial testimony. Both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ properties are located to the south of Highway 20 E. There is a "four-wheel drive quality" gravel road that turns south off Highway 20 E, which first runs down a property line shared by the Gosnells (to the west) and Actin Ranch (to the east); then runs through the eastern edge of plaintiffs’ property (within 40 feet inside plaintiffs’ eastern property line); then runs through property owned by the Tylers; then runs through property owned by the Hulls; then enters into tribal land that is located directly west of defendants’ property. There is a driveway on defendants’ property that connects to the gravel road.
The aforementioned road has existed since "as early as the 1980s, and perhaps sooner." The local Native American tribe and others have used it, including as recognized access to the tribal land mentioned above. However, the county does not recognize it as a road, and the county's road historian testified that no road has ever been identified there on historical surveys. Defendants claim to have used this road since 2007 to travel between Highway 20 E and their property, although there was conflicting evidence at trial, and the court did not make specific findings on that point. Defendants have alternative access to their property via better maintained roads, but they testified that the alternative routes are longer and less convenient than this road.
In 2019, plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to their property and to enjoin defendants from using the portion of the aforementioned road that runs through their property, i.e. , the Road, which is the only portion of the aforementioned road that is at issue in this case. Defendants counterclaimed for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that they have an easement to use the Road. At trial, plaintiffs argued that, because Meadowland never conveyed any easement that it reserved, or exercised its right to dedicate a public road, defendants have no right to use the Road to drive across plaintiffs’ property. In response, defendants relied primarily on the original 1971 deed for plaintiffs’ property, in which Meadowland reserved "an easement of forty feet (40 feet) along all boundaries for public highway use in common with others," to argue that the general public has a right to use the Road, which includes defendants. Alternatively, defendants asserted a third-party beneficiary theory, argued for an implied public easement, and argued that Meadowland implicitly dedicated the Road for public use.4
After trial, the court found in plaintiffs’ favor. It declared them to be the owners in fee simple of the property, free and clear of any claim or interest of defendants; precluded defendants from asserting any claim or interest in the property, "including without limitation a claim of easement, right-of-way, public way, or public road"; quieted title in plaintiffs’ favor; and denied defendants’ counterclaims. Defendants appeal.
In their first assignment of error, defendants challenge the denial of their motion for summary judgment. We do not address the merits of that claim of error because a trial court's denial of summary judgment is generally unreviewable on appeal, with limited exceptions not applicable here.
Defendants contend that the exception for a motion that rests on "purely legal contentions" applies—see York v. Bailey , 159 Or App 341, 345, 976 P.2d 1181, rev. den. , 329 Or. 287, 994 P.2d 122 (1999) ()—because their motion was based on "the text and context of deed reservations" and other "undisputed facts." That argument conflates the summary judgment standard with the reviewability standard.
As explained in York , a motion rests on "purely legal contentions" when "the facts are not merely undisputed but immaterial, such as a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute." Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). "In other words, the legal theory underlying the motion must be that the moving party has a right to prevail on any set of facts and that the facts, in effect, do not matter." Id. at 345-46, 976 P.2d 1181. Here, as in York , defendants’ motion did not rest on purely legal contentions, but rather "turned on the significance of adjudicative facts (albeit facts that defendant asserted to be undisputed)." Id . at 346, 976 P.2d 1181. "[T]he denial of a motion for summary judgment that is based on facts, even undisputed facts, is not reviewable." Staten v. Steel , 222 Or App 17, 26, 191 P.3d 778 (2008), rev. den. , 345 Or. 618, 201 P.3d 909 (2009). The trial court's denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion is therefore unreviewable.
In their second assignment of error, defendants claim that the trial court erred by quieting title in plaintiffs’ favor after trial. Before turning to the merits, we pause to address the procedural posture of this case, as relevant to preservation. See Harrison v. Hall , 211 Or App 697, 701, 156 P.3d 141, rev. den. , 343 Or. 159, 164 P.3d 1160 (2007) (...
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