Faroudja Laboratories, Inc. v. Dwin Electronics

Decision Date08 November 1999
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 97-20010 SW.,CIV. 97-20010 SW.
Citation76 F.Supp.2d 999
PartiesFAROUDJA LABORATORIES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. DWIN ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant. Dwin Electronics, Inc., Counterclaim Plaintiff, v. Faroudja Laboratories, Inc., et al., Counterclaim Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Scott D. Baker, Adaline J. Hilgard, Crosby Heafey Roach & May, SA Francisco, CA, for General Instrument Corp.

Joseph F. Jennings, Stephen C. Jensen, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Faroudja Laboratories, Inc.

James J. Elacqua, Daniel R. Hansen, Brobeck Phleger & Harrison, Palo Alto, CA, Edward R. Schwartz, Wesley W. Monroe, Christie Parker & Hale LLP, Irvine, Todd B. Serota, Brian W. Kasell, Troop Steuber Pasich Reddick & Tobey LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Dwin Electronics, Inc.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Faroudja Laboratories, Inc. and General Instrument Corporation (collectively "Faroudja") initiated this action for patent infringement against Defendant Dwin Electronics, Inc. ("Dwin"). Faroudja alleges that Dwin is infringing five claims contained in U.S. Patent No. 4,998,287 (hereafter the "'287 patent" or "'287"). The '287 patent is an apparatus that detects whether a video signal was derived from film and creates a progressive-scan display from the video signal to increase resolution. Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are at issue in this litigation.

On September 13, 1999, the Court conducted a claims construction hearing for the patent claims at issue. During the hearing, the parties presented tutorials and made arguments for the purpose of aiding the Court in construing the disputed claims. Because the parties reached agreement on the interpretation of several claim elements after claim construction briefing and the hearing, the Court asked the parties to submit a revised claim construction chart indicating their final positions on the remaining disputed claim elements. The Court received a Final Joint Disputed Claim Element Chart on October 20, 1999 ("Final Chart") and now issues this Order.

II. BACKGROUND ON THE PATENTED TECHNOLOGY

Many video signal sources are derived from commercial motion picture film, which is filmed at 24 frames per second. The transfer of this information from 24 frames per second film to 60 fields per second video is accomplished in the United States most commonly using a method referred to as the "3:2 pull down method" whereby a single film frame is scanned to create a resulting signal comprised of two or three video fields. (For instance, when film frame 1 is scanned using the 3:2 pull down method, three video fields are created: fields 1 and 3 will represent the "even" lines of film frame 1, whereas field 2 will represent the "odd" lines. When film frame 2 is scanned, only two video fields are created: field 4 will represent the "odd" lines of film frame 2, while field 5 will represent the "even" lines.)

The 3:2 pull down method does not result in an even distribution of film frames to video field odd/even pairs. For conventional viewing, this does not matter because the even and odd video fields are displayed on a standard television screen in alternating even/odd/ format (known as "interlacing"). However, when interlacing is removed and all (odd and even) lines are displayed sequentially in a "progressive-scan" format using a line doubler, the resulting scene can contain "motion artifacts" because video lines from different film frames may end up displayed together.

The '287 patent discloses storing alternating odd and even video fields and recombining them into a single sequential (progressive-scan) video scene containing both the odd and even lines to eliminate the interlacing. To increase picture resolution, the '287 patent describes a means of comparing the video fields to determine if certain fields are "identical" (a term whose meaning is disputed by the parties). For video signals that were derived from film, a predetermined sequence of the fields will be deemed "identical." By comparing the results with this predetermined sequence, a determination of whether the video signal was derived from a film source can be made. The '287 patent also discloses a system that synchronizes these video fields to the film source frames. For a video source that was derived from film, the patented invention triggers a switching circuit that recombines odd and even video fields in an improved manner into a single sequential (progressive-scan) video. The patented system continues to compare and recombine video fields until the device no longer detects that the video signal was derived from a film source. The system then reverts into video mode until film is again detected.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Adjudication of an infringement claim entails two steps: "First, the claim must be properly construed to determine its scope and meaning. Second, the claim as properly construed must be compared to the accused device or process." Nike Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 646 (Fed.Cir.1994)(quoting Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1993)). Claim construction is a matter of law to be determined by a court. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). The comparison between the properly construed claims and the device accused of infringing is a question of fact. See General Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 981 (Fed.Cir.1997).

A. Evidence

In construing the meaning of claims, courts first consider a patent's intrinsic evidence, which includes the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. In addition to intrinsic evidence, the parties may offer extrinsic evidence which includes expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises. See id. at 980. Although a court may consider extrinsic evidence, it should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). In most situations, analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. Id. at 1583.

To interpret the disputed language, a court first looks to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention. See id. Generally, the words in a claim are given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The scope of a particular claim can often be determined on inspection of other claims. See Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed.Cir.1988). "Where some claims are broad and others narrow, the narrow claim limitations cannot be read into the broad whether to avoid invalidity or to escape infringement." Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Fed.Cir.1988) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, "a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the specific definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history." Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Thus, the specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication. See id. (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). A court may not resort to statements in the specification to construe a claim unless there is a claim term with which to draw in those statements. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1998).

Extraneous limitations appearing in the specifications should not be read into a claim. See Enercon GmbH v. International Trade Comm'n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed.Cir.1998)(citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867 (Fed.Cir.1985)("Generally, particular limitations or embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims."). "Extraneous" refers to a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petro., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed.Cir.1988). "Where a specification does not require a limitation, that limitation should not be read from the specification into the claims." Specialty Composites, 845 F.2d at 987 (emphasis in original).

"In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence." Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. Only when intrinsic evidence alone is insufficient may the court use extrinsic evidence, and then only to aid the court in "coming to the proper understanding of the claims" and the technology involved. Id. at 1584. Extrinsic evidence may not be used to vary or contradict the claim language. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 981. Expert testimony is to be eschewed and used only as a last resort. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584-85. There is a clear preference for other types of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries and prior art documents. See id. at 1585. The court may freely consult dictionaries and technical treatises at any time to better understand the technology and may rely on dictionary definitions when construing claims, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in the patent documents. See id. at 1584, n. 6.

B. Means-plus-function Claim Elements

As a general principle of claim construction, limitations found in the specification of a patent should not be read into a claim. See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). However, claim elements expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function are...

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