Farra v. Braman
| Citation | 86 N.E. 843,171 Ind. 529 |
| Decision Date | 08 January 1909 |
| Docket Number | 21,386 |
| Parties | Farra v. Braman |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
From Superior Court of Allen County; John M. Morris, Judge pro tem.
Action by Ada A. Farra against Eva J. Braman and another. From a judgment against plaintiff, she appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court under § 1394 Burns 1908, cl. 2, Acts 1901, p. 565, § 10.
Affirmed.
W & E. Leonard, for appellant.
Heaton & Yaple and Vesey & Vesey, for appellee.
The record in this case discloses, among other things, that appellant and appellee each claimed the right to receive $ 500 as a death benefit from the Voluntary Relief Department of the Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh, on account of insurance on the life of John F. Ried, deceased. Appellant was the surviving widow of the latter, but since his death she has intermarried with Frank Farra. Appellee was the divorced wife of said Ried, but since her divorce she has married one Braman. The Pennsylvania Company declined to pay either of said claimants, and thereupon appellant filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Allen County, making that company and appellee parties defendant. It is shown that the company appeared in court and filed an answer, admitting that it owed $ 500 to whoever was authorized to accept it, and requested to be permitted to pay the money into court and be discharged from further liability. This it was permitted to do, and the controversy in regard to the right to receive the money proceeded between appellant and appellee.
The original complaint upon which appellant based her right of action consisted of two paragraphs, the first of which was dismissed. Subsequently she filed a third paragraph. Appellee, a nonresident of the state, having been notified by publication of the pendency of the action, appeared in court by counsel and filed an answer of general denial to appellant's complaint, and also filed a cross-complaint demanding affirmative relief. She subsequently withdrew her answer and demurred for insufficiency of facts to the second and third paragraphs of appellant's complaint. The court sustained this demurrer to each of these paragraphs, to which ruling appellant excepted. Appellant also demurred for insufficiency of facts to the cross-complaint of appellee. This demurrer was overruled, to which she also excepted. She then elected to stand upon the second and third paragraphs of her complaint and abide by the ruling of the court on the demurrers thereto, and upon her refusal further to plead the court rendered its judgment in favor of appellee, awarding her the insurance money paid into court by the Pennsylvania Company, and ordered the clerk to pay this money over to appellee. From this judgment, appellant prosecutes this appeal.
Errors are assigned upon the ruling of the court on the demurrer to the second and third paragraphs of complaint and upon the overruling of appellant's demurrer to appellee's cross-complaint.
By the second paragraph of the complaint it is alleged that the Pennsylvania Company, in operating various lines of railroad throughout the United States, has, in connection with its said business, what is known as a Voluntary Relief Department of the Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh. This department is conducted upon the line of a mutual benefit society, and extends over and embraces a large number of railroads, one of which is known as the Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago railroad, which road runs from Pittsburg, through the city of Ft. Wayne, Indiana, to the city of Chicago, Illinois. The object of said relief department is the establishment and management of a fund, known as the "relief fund," for the payment of definite amounts to employes who contribute thereto, and who, under its regulations, are entitled thereto when they are disabled by accident or sickness, and in the event of their death, payable to the relatives or those dependent upon the insured, or the beneficiaries specified in the application of the member. Such funds from which the benefits are to be paid are accumulated by the voluntary contributions of employes who are members, etc. The Pennsylvania Company has general charge of the fund, guarantees the performance of the obligations assumed by it in conformity with the rules and regulations from time to time made. Members admitted are known as members of the relief fund. Membership is effected by an application, filed with said company, on forms and blanks furnished by the company, to be approved by the superintendent of said department. In the application so made for membership the applicant may designate the name of the beneficiary to whom such fund shall be paid on the death of the insured. Said fund and the members thereof are divided into five classes, according to the amount of wages received by each member per month. Those of the first class are insured to the amount of $ 250, those of the second class to the amount of $ 500, in the third class to the amount of $ 750, in the fourth class $ 1,000, and the fifth class $ 1,250. Upon the approval of an application made for membership, a certificate is issued to such applicant, which certificate indicates the class to which he belongs. In pursuance of the rules and regulations of said defendant company, which rules and regulations are attached to and made a part of the pleading, and marked exhibit C, John F. Ried applied to the company for membership in the second class, and duly filed his application for admission in said association, which application is made a part of the pleading and marked exhibit B. This application was duly approved by the superintendent, and on June 1, 1899, a certificate in said association, duly numbered, etc., was executed and issued to said John F. Ried as evidencing the fact that he was a member in good standing of the second class of said association, which certificate, together with the book of rules attached thereto, is made a part of the pleading and marked exhibit A. At the time Ried applied for membership in said association he was the husband of the appellee herein, and in said application he named her as his beneficiary, to receive at his death the sum of $ 500. Said Ried so named Eva J. Ried as beneficiary in said certificate on account of the fact that she was his wife and therefore dependent upon him. The object of said voluntary relief department is the establishment of a fund for the payment of definite amounts to employes contributing thereto, and from this fund, in the event of the death of the insured, a certain amount is to be paid to relatives or other dependents upon the insured. On October 17, 1899, as averred, said John F. Ried procured a divorce from his wife, Eva J. Ried. By said divorce said Eva J. Ried was deprived of any right to participate in said fund as beneficiary or otherwise, for the reason that she no longer sustained the relation to said insured as was required by the rules and regulations of said association, and on account of which said Eva J. Ried ceased to be, and never since has been, the legal beneficiary of said John F. Ried. Thereafter, on October 17, 1901, said John F. Ried intermarried with the appellant herein. Subsequently to the marriage of said Ried to the appellant, he, in accord with the rules and regulations of said association, requested the local agent of said association to change the name of the beneficiary, Eva J. Ried, named in his application, and to substitute therein the name of his then wife, Ada A. Ried, the appellant herein, and that said Ried at said time "did and performed all things that he could do and perform in an effort to have the name of this appellant substituted in lieu and instead of the beneficiary first named in this application, but, owing to the neglect and failure of said agent of said association, the name of Ada A. Ried was not actually substituted as the beneficiary in place of the name of Eva J. Ried, but said John F. Ried did all that was in his power to consummate the same." On October 15, 1902, said John F. Ried, while in the employ of the railroad company, was accidentally killed, his death occurring before there was an actual substitution of the name of the appellant herein, as his beneficiary in said association, instead of the appellee, Eva J. Ried, which was not caused by and was not the result of any failure on the part of said Ried to do and perform all things necessary for him to do and perform in order that said substitution might actually be made and effected. There are other averments as to proof of death, etc., alleged in this paragraph, and it is further alleged that Eva J. Ried claims to have and hold some interest in or right to said fund, or a portion thereof, which claim is wholly unfounded, etc. The prayer is that the court decree the equitable substitution of the beneficiary, and that this appellant be declared the real beneficiary in said contract of insurance instead of appellee, Eva J. Ried, that appellant have judgment against said railroad company in the sum of $ 500, and that said Eva J. Ried be required to set up any claim or right which she may have to said fund, etc.
In the main the facts set up in the third paragraph of the complaint are substantially the same as in the second, except that there are no averments of any effort upon the part of Ried to substitute appellant for appellee as the beneficiary in the certificate of insurance. The appellant in this paragraph apparently relies wholly upon the assignment by Ried of the certificate of insurance to her, who at that time was his wife. It is therein alleged that on October 17, 1901, immediately after Ried's marriage to the appellant, he assigned to her all of his right, title and interest in and to the certificate of...
To continue reading
Request your trial