Farrall v. District of Columbia Amateur Ath. Union

• Decision Date: 25 February 1946
• Docket Number: No. 9084.,9084.
• Parties: FARRALL et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

80 US App. DC 396, 153 F.2d 647 (1946)

FARRALL et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION et al.

No. 9084.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.

Argued January 16, 1946.

Decided February 25, 1946.

Messrs. George E. C. Hayes and William H. Hastie, both of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Leon A. Ransom, of Columbus, Ohio, was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Leo A. Rover, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before CLARK, WILBUR K. MILLER, and PRETTYMAN, Associate Justices.

PRETTYMAN, Associate Justice.

Appellants are Negro members of the District of Columbia Amateur Athletic Union. As plaintiffs in the District Court, they brought civil action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, praying for injunction and declaratory judgment. Defendants were the Union and the members of its Registration Committee. The controversy centers about a provision inserted by the defendant Committee in "sanctions" issued by it for amateur athletic events in the District of Columbia, stating that the Committee does not sanction mixed racial competition or exhibitions in any sport under its jurisdiction. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and supported the motion with an affidavit of the president of the Union. The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the application for declaratory judgment.

Appellees first contend that the controversy is moot by reason of the reference in the complaint to a boxing competition conducted by the Washington Post in January and February, 1945, before the complaint was filed in March, 1945. The point is without merit, as the complaint avers a consistent and continuing debarment of plaintiffs from all District and open championship amateur athletic competition. Plaintiffs seek permanent relief from the "sanction" which accomplishes this debarment.

Appellees next contend that the complaint, when read in conjunction with the motion to dismiss and the affidavit in support thereof, states no claim against defendants upon which relief can be granted. Appellees rely upon assertions of fact in the affidavit. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, makes clear the purpose for which affidavits in support of a motion for summary judgment may be used and, likewise, the extent of their effect. The judgment sought is to be rendered if the pleadings and the affidavits taken together show that (except as to the amount of damages) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. An affidavit filed in support of a motion to dismiss has no greater purpose or effect. Such an affidavit cannot be treated, for purposes of the motion, as proof contradictory to well-pleaded facts in the complaint. There is a great difference between discovering whether there be an issue of fact and deciding such an issue. The affidavit can be used for the former purpose but not for the latter. Thus, if a fact be averred in the complaint and contradicted in the affidavit, the latter version cannot be accepted by the court for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. On the other hand, of course, if the averment in the complaint is a mere conclusion or a vague generality without specification, and the affidavit asserts facts which are undisputed, and it thus appears that there is in truth no genuine issue of fact, the court may act upon that premise. Cases cited by appellees are not to the contrary.¹ A comparative analysis of the complaint and the affidavit in the light of the claim for relief is necessary in order to determine whether there are genuine issues as to any material fact.

The affidavit contradicts the complaint only in part. The complaint avers that the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States exercises plenary power over all amateur athletics in the United States; that it is the only recognized governing body in the United States for that purpose, and that American participation in International Olympic Games is controlled exclusively by it; that the defendant District of Columbia Union is an active constituent member of the national Union and exercises all the latter's powers in and around the District of Columbia. It further avers that the defendant Union "sanctions" amateur athletic events; that championships won and records achieved in amateur athletic competition are not recognized by the public, the press, or amateur competitors in this country or abroad unless achieved in events thus "sanctioned," and that any athlete who competes in an "unsanctioned" event is subject to debarment from all organized amateur athletic competition, local, national and international. Plaintiffs aver that they, in common with all other amateur athletes in the United States, are required to pay an annual registration fee to the local Union exercising jurisdiction over the region in which they reside; that by virtue of this registration, they acquired and possess the right and privilege of competing in events sanctioned by the Union, subject only to such restrictions as may be authorized by the constitution and by-laws of the Union. They aver that neither the constitution, by-laws, special legislation, nor practice or custom of the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States authorizes, condones or permits the restriction of participation in sanctioned events upon the basis of the participants' race or color; that in violation of the rights and privileges of the plaintiffs and in violation of the constitution, by-laws and regulations of both the national and the local Unions, the defendants deprive the plaintiffs of the privilege and right of...