Farrell v. State
| Decision Date | 21 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 585S217,585S217 |
| Citation | 495 N.E.2d 530 |
| Parties | Robert FARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Hope Fey, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard C. Webster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
On July 20, 1979, Defendant-Appellant Robert Farrell was charged in the Tippecanoe Superior Court, No. I with the crime of murder. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty on August 30, 1979. On January 17, 1980, a few days before trial was to begin, Appellant Farrell filed a written motion with the court to withdraw his not guilty plea and enter a guilty plea to murder. This motion was in writing and signed by Appellant in the presence of his counsel in open court. On that same date he entered his plea of guilty to murder. The motion he filed set out that he had entered into plea negotiations with the State which culminated in his decision to plead guilty as charged in exchange for the State's promise to argue for no more than a thirty-five (35) year sentence. It was further understood that Appellant would request that he be given the minimum sentence for murder which was thirty (30) years. In Paragraph 8(c) of his motion, Appellant represented to the court that he understood that the Constitution guaranteed, him "... the right to the presumption of innocence and to force the State to prove the charge against me beyond a reasonable doubt." Appellant subsequently was sentenced to a term of thirty (30) years by the court.
On September 23, 1983, Appellant filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On October 3, 1983, the State Public Defender appeared on Appellant's behalf. After an evidentiary hearing on April 9, 1984, the trial court denied the petition for post-conviction relief on April 30, 1984. Appellant's motion to correct error was denied and this appeal follows. Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. failure of the trial court meaningfully to advise Appellant of the State's burden of proof; and
2. acceptance by the trial court of Appellant's plea of guilty to murder without fully advising him of the true nature of that offense.
In reviewing the denial of post-conviction relief we do not reweigh evidence nor do we judge the credibility of witnesses. The denial of relief would be reversed only where the judge was presented with uncontradicted evidence leading to but one conclusion and the trial court arrived at an opposite conclusion. Gibson v. State (1983), Ind., 456 N.E.2d 1006, 1007; Davis v. State (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1317, 1320; Brown v. State (1983), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 316, 319. At the post-conviction relief hearing the petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that he was entitled to relief. Gibson, Ind., 456 N.E.2d at 1007; Davis, Ind., 446 N.E.2d at 1319; Turman v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 332, 338, 392 N.E.2d 483, 487; Ind. P.C.R. 1 Sec. 5.
Appellant does not deny that the trial court thoroughly advised him of all his rights and his waiver of those rights in entering a guilty plea pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3. This statute has since been repealed and replaced with Ind.Code Sec. 35-35-1-2. The only question raised by Appellant about those advices is in regard to Sec. 35-4.1-1-3(c). The court advised the Appellant: "At the trial of this cause the State of Indiana must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed the offense charged before you can be convicted of the offense charged." (sic). Appellant claims this statement was not meaningful in that it so erroneously stated the law that he might have inferred that he bore the burden of proof at trial. Appellant does not state that he was misled but only that he might have been misled. An examination of the record, however, indicates that the trial judge's statement was not so misleading, and, more importantly, did not mislead this appellant. In paragraph 8(c) of Appellant's motion, he represented to the court that he understood the right to the presumption of innocence and to force the state to prove the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt. This presents a strong inference that Appellant was familiar with the State's burden of proving the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 543, 546; Ford v. State, (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1307, 1309; Creager v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 47, 48. Further, the statement made by the court, although not precisely in the language of the statute, was sufficient to inform the appellant of the State's burden. When asked whether he understood the rights as explained to him, including the statement in paragraph 8(c) of his motion, Appellant indicated he did understand. Furthermore, Appellant stated, at the post-conviction relief hearing, that he was aware at the guilty plea hearing of the State's burden to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is clear that Appellant knew of the State's burden of proof with respect to the charge against him. Accordingly, no error is presented on this issue.
Appellant next argues that the trial court failed to advise him of the true nature of the crime of murder. In supporting the factual basis for the guilty plea pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-4, the trial court heard evidence from Appellant and other witnesses regarding the facts surrounding the commission of the crime. The trial court read to Appellant the charging information and the statute defining murder. Appellant stated he understood both of these and also stated he was aware that by...
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Hinkle v. State
...not for any lesser included offenses. Gibson v. State (1983), Ind., 456 N.E.2d 1006, 1008 (emphasis added). Accord: Farrell v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 530, 532. Here, the record of the guilty plea hearing (admitted into evidence at the post conviction hearing) reveals that the trial ......