Farrington v. City of Mt. Varnon

• Decision Date: 12 March 1901
• Citation: 59 N.E. 826,166 N.Y. 233
• Parties: FARRINGTON v. CITY OF MT. VARNON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

166 N.Y. 233

59 N.E. 826

FARRINGTON

v.CITY OF MT. VARNON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 12, 1901.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Second department.

Action by Charles H. Farrington against the city of Mt. Vernon. From a judgment of the appellate division (64 N. Y. Supp. 863) reversing a judgment entered on the report of a referee in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This controversy concerns North Fourth avenue in the city of Mt. Vernon, which extends north and south, and Primrose avenue, which commences at the east line of North Fourth avenue, and extends east.

Milo J. White, for appellant.

William J. Marshall, for respondent.

MARTIN, J.

The purpose of this action was to vacate an assessment for the improvement of North Fourth avenue in the city of Mt. Vernon. It was based upon the theory: (1) That the plaintiff's assessment was upon property not within the assessment district prescribed and established by a resolution of the defendant's common council; and (2) that the proceeding which resulted in the plaintiff's assessment was a proceeding to change the grade of a street, and the provisions of the defendant's charter relating to such a proceeding were not complied with.

The validity of the first claim depends upon the meaning and effect of certain resolutions defining the extent of the proposed improvement and the district of assessment beyond which no assessment could extend. In those resolutions the improvement and assessment districts were described as on ‘North Fourth avenue, from the north side of Primrose avenue to the northerly city line.’ The learned referee before whom this action was tried was of the opinion that, as Primrose avenue did not extend across North Fourth avenue, the assessment district thus described did not include the abutting property on the west side of North Fourth avenue, but only such as abutted that street on the easterly side. He accordingly held that the plaintiff's property was not within the assessment district as thus described, and that the assessment was consequently void. That question was fully discussed by the learned appellate division, which reached the conclusion that the plain intent and purpose of the resolutions was to indicate the points where the improvement and assessment district should commence and end, that the reference to Primrose avenue was simply to fix the southern limit, and that it was not the purpose or effect of the resolutions to confine the assessment district to property on the easterly side of the street. We fully concur in that conclusion. To attribute to the city any other purpose, or to give to the language employed any other interpretation, would be too narrow and technical, if not too absurd, to be sustained. When these resolutions and the proceedings of the common council are considered, they plainly indicate that the southern boundary of the improvement on North Fourth avenue and of the assessment district was intended to commence at a point on that street where Primrose avenue intersected it, and end at the northerly city line, and were intended to include all the lots upon that street on the westerly as well as the easterly side. If there was any ambiguity of uncertainty as to the meaning of the language, it should be so interpreted as to carry into effect the purpose of the resolutions, to be determined upon a consideration of all the words employed, in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding or accompanying their adoption. When thus considered, it is obvious that the intent and effect of the resolutions were to include in the assessment district the property on both sides of North Fourth avenue between the north side of Primrose avenue and the northerly city line.

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