Farrington v. King, 12256.

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: SANBORN, THOMAS, and RIDDICK, Circuit
• Citation: Farrington v. King, 128 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1942)
• Decision Date: 26 June 1942
• Docket Number: No. 12256.,12256.
• Parties: FARRINGTON v. KING, Warden.

128 F.2d 785 (1942)

FARRINGTON v. KING, Warden.

No. 12256.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 26, 1942.

Charles M. Farrington, of Springfield, Mo., appellant, pro se.

Maurice M. Milligan, U. S. Atty., and Otto Schmid, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.

Before SANBORN, THOMAS, and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.

The appellant (hereafter referred to as petitioner) is in the custody of the appellee (hereafter referred to as respondent) by virtue of a judgment and sentence of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The petitioner filed in that court on December 19, 1941, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his detention was unlawful and praying that he be discharged from custody. Thereupon the court ordered the respondent to bring the petitioner before it on December 27, 1941, so that he might be heard, and to produce the judgment, commitment and other papers pursuant to which he was held in custody. On December 27, 1941, the court afforded the petitioner a full hearing, and, after considering the evidence and the files and records in the case, concluded that petitioner was not entitled to be released from custody, denied his prayer that he be released, and entered an order accordingly. The petitioner then took this appeal.

The essential facts are not in dispute. The record shows that the petitioner is a lawyer of good family, who has been addicted to drink; that in July, 1940, he and others were charged under two counts of an indictment with the crimes of having received and concealed United States postage stamps, knowing them to have been stolen and with intent to convert them; that on April 7, 1941, petitioner, who was represented by his father, a prominent lawyer of Springfield, Missouri, and by a former United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri, appeared before Judge Albert L. Reeves to answer the charges contained in the indictment; that petitioner tendered a plea of nolo contendere to the first count of the indictment; that his plea was accepted; that the second count of the indictment was dismissed by the Government; that a judgment of conviction under the first count was entered; that the imposition of sentence was suspended and petitioner was placed on probation for a period of five years; that one of the conditions of his probation was that he "abstain from all intoxicating beverages or narcotic drugs, unless specifically prescribed by a reputable physician;" that he did not abstain, but became drunk on several occasions, and on July 2 or 3, 1941, he was taken into custody of the Sheriff at Springfield, Missouri; that the Chief United States Probation Officer for the District was notified of petitioner's violation of probation; that the court ordered the issuance of a bench warrant, and the United States Marshal, at the court's direction, brought the petitioner before the court on July 5, 1941, to show cause why his probation should not be revoked and why he should not be sentenced and committed; that petitioner was accompanied by his brother, who is also a lawyer; that petitioner admitted that he had violated the terms of the order placing him on probation; that the court revoked his probation and imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment at an institution of the reformatory type, and recommended hospitalization; that petitioner was first sent to the Federal Reformatory at El Reno, Oklahoma, arriving there July 7, 1941; and that in November, 1941, he was transferred to the custody of respondent, on a finding that because of petitioner's mental condition he was a suitable subject for confinement in the United States Hospital for Defective Delinquents.

Petitioner in his application for habeas corpus charged, in substance, that at the time he entered his plea of nolo contendere he advised Judge Reeves that he was innocent of the crime of which he was accused; that the Judge found that petitioner was not guilty; that a judgment of conviction and order for probation was entered; that on July 5, 1941, at the time petitioner's probation was revoked, he was under the influence of drugs administered at the direction or with the consent of the Chief United States Probation Officer, and was therefore unable to exercise his legal rights; that the Judge ordered petitioner committed for medical treatment, but that petitioner was not aware that he had received a prison sentence; that the Judge later wrote petitioner that he would be discharged when mentally and physically fit; that the Judge refused to call petitioner before the court to argue a motion to vacate his plea and for a trial, and prevented the petitioner from...