Farrior v. State

• Decision Date: 11 September 1998
• Citation: 728 So.2d 691
• Parties: Rondonaldrick FARRIOR v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

728 So.2d 691

Rondonaldrick FARRIOR v. STATE.

CR-97-0835.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

September 11, 1998.

Rehearing Denied October 23, 1998.

Certiorari Denied February 26, 1999.

Paul R. Cooper, Montgomery, for appellant.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1980182.

BASCHAB, Judge.

The appellant, Rondonaldrick Farrior, was convicted of murder made capital because he committed the murder by or through the use of a deadly weapon while the victim was in a vehicle, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(17), Ala. Code 1975. By a vote of 12-0, the jury recommended that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This appeal followed.

The evidence showed that, on November 1, 1996, school officials at the appellant's high school suspended the appellant for fighting with Ricardo McCombs. The next morning, McCombs was helping Donald Milton move. At some point, McCombs, Milton, and Milton's two young children drove to Trenholm Court. McCombs was driving, Milton was in the passenger seat, and the children were in the backseat. McCombs saw the appellant, who lived in Trenholm Court, and drove away from the appellant into a nearby alley. He pulled up behind a car driven by Nicole Jackson. After Jackson drove out of the alley onto the main road, McCombs began to pull onto the main road. As he turned the car, he saw the appellant and another man running toward the car. The appellant and the other man shot at McCombs' car. One bullet entered the rear driver's side window and struck Milton in the head. Milton died as a result of the gunshot wound.

After leaving the Trenholm Court area, McCombs located Officer Guy Naquin, a Montgomery police officer. McCombs told Naquin that the appellant shot at the automobile. Naquin obtained the appellant's address through police dispatch, drove to Trenholm Court, and took the appellant into custody. After Naquin read the appellant his Miranda rights, the appellant denied any knowledge of the murder. When the appellant arrived at the police station, Detective D. Cunningham questioned him. Cunningham again advised the appellant of his Miranda rights and informed him that he could be charged with capital murder. The appellant waived his Miranda rights and made a statement. At first, he told Cunningham he acted by himself in the shooting, saying he shot at McCombs' car because he thought McCombs was going to run over him. Later, after speaking to his mother, the appellant gave another statement in which he recanted his original statement that he acted alone and stated that another man also shot at McCombs' car.

The testimony indicated that McCombs was driving away from the appellant as the appellant shot at the car. Also, evidence showed that several shots were fired at the car. In addition to McCombs' identification of the appellant as one of the men who shot at his car, another witness identified the appellant as one of the gunmen.

I.

The appellant first argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that the State did not prove he had the intent to commit murder.

"`In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court, we must accept as true the evidence introduced by the state, accord the state all legitimate inferences therefrom, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.'"

Gunter v. State, 665 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Ala.Cr. App.1995), quoting Underwood v. State, 646 So.2d 692, 695 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we must determine "whether there existed legal evidence before the jury, at the time the motion was made, from which the jury by fair inference could have found the appellant guilty." Breckenridge v. State, 628 So.2d 1012, 1018 (Ala.Cr. App.1993). Therefore, in applying this standard, we

"will determine only if legal evidence was presented from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.... A verdict of conviction will not be set aside on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence unless, allowing all reasonable presumptions for its correctness, the preponderance of the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince this court that it was wrong and unjust."

Id.

Section 13A-6-2, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person commits the crime of murder if:

"(1) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of that person or of another person."

Under § 13A-5-40(a)(17), Ala.Code 1975, "[m]urder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon while the victim is in a vehicle" is a capital offense.

"`[T]he element of intent, being a state of mind or mental purpose, is usually incapable of direct proof, [and] it may be inferred from the character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon and other attendant circumstances.' Johnson v. State, 390 So.2d 1160, 1167 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 1168 (Ala.1980)."

Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 569, 574 (Ala.Cr. App.1991); see also Crews v. State, 616 So.2d 392 (Ala.Cr.App.1993)

. Intent is a jury question. Jones, 591 So.2d at 574. Section 13A-1-2(11), Ala.Code 1975, provides that a firearm is a deadly weapon. Finally, if the jury had determined that the appellant intended to kill McCombs, that intent could have properly been transferred to the victim.

"Section 13A-5-40(a)(17), Ala.Code 1975, makes `murder in which the victim is killed while in a motor vehicle by a deadly weapon fired from outside that motor vehicle' a capital offense. It is undisputed that the victim here was not, at any relevant time, the occupant of a motor vehicle. In its order denying Jackson's motion to dismiss the indictment, the trial court first concluded that `the gravamen of [this offense] is that a defendant murder a victim while the victim is in a motor vehicle.' The court went on to hold, however, that the State would be required to prove only `that the Defendant killed someone with intent to cause the death of a person in a vehicle.'

". . . .

"Jackson asserts that because Roberts was not in a vehicle when she was killed, Jackson cannot be prosecuted under § 13A-5-40(a)(17). The State argues, however, that because he intended to kill Prickett, who was in a vehicle, Jackson can be prosecuted for the capital offense of `murder in which the victim is killed while in a motor vehicle by a deadly weapon fired from outside that motor vehicle.' § 13A-5-40(a)(17).

"The State argues that § 13A-5-40(a)(17) should be construed in pari materia with the remainder of the capital murder statute and that when it is so construed Jackson can be convicted of capital murder if the State proves that Jackson killed Roberts with the intent to kill Prickett.

"Section 13A-5-40(b) provides:

"`Except as specifically provided to the contrary in the last part of subdivision (a)(13) of this section, the terms "murder" and "murder by the defendant" as used in this section to define capital offenses mean murder as defined in Section 13A-6-2(a)(1), but not as defined in Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) and (3)....'

"Section 13A-6-2(a)(1) provides that a person commits murder if `[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of that person or of another person.'

"The State argues that, pursuant to § 13A-5-40(b), a person commits capital murder if, with the intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of that person or someone else and he does so pursuant to one of the aggravating factors set out in § 13A-5-40(a). By its language, § 13A-6-2(a)(1) clearly invokes the doctrine of transferred intent in defining the crime of murder. For example, if Defendant fires a gun with the intent to kill Smith but instead kills Jones, then Defendant is guilty of the intentional murder of Jones. The same analysis, however, does not apply to the factual circumstances that elevate the crime of murder (§ 13A-6-2(a)(1)) to capital murder (§ 13A-5-40).

"Under the facts alleged in the indictment, Jackson's intent to kill Prickett can certainly be `transferred' to the conduct that actually resulted in the death of Roberts. However, Prickett's location (in a motor vehicle) cannot be `transferred' to Roberts so as to elevate the crime to capital murder.

"First, the clear statutory language of § 13A-5-40(a)(17), considered together with § 13A-5-40(b) and § 13A-6-2(a)(1), does not yield that result. Section 13A-5-40(b) refers to § 13A-6-2(a)(1) for the definition of `murder'; and § 13A-6-2(a)(1) codifies the doctrine of transferred intent in that definition. However, § 13A-5-40(a)(17) makes a `murder' capital only when `the victim is killed while in a motor vehicle.' That is, that section defines a factual circumstance rather than merely a state of mind; and that factual circumstance is not present in this case. Prickett was not `killed' and Roberts was not `in a motor vehicle.'"

Ex parte Jackson, 614 So.2d 405, 406-07 (Ala.1993). Thus, because the victim was in a vehicle when he was shot, the doctrine of transferred intent could have properly applied in this case.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found the appellant guilty of capital murder. "When there is legal evidence from which the jury could, by fair inference, find the defendant guilty, the trial court should submit it to the jury, and, in such a case, this court will not disturb the trial court's decision." Ward v. State, 557 So.2d 848, 850 (Ala.Cr.App.1990).

The appellant argues that his videotaped statement, which the State offered into evidence during its case-in-chief, showed...