Farrior v. Zoning Board of Black Point Beach

• Decision Date: 28 May 2002
• Docket Number: 21358
• Parties: ROBERT I. FARRIOR ET AL. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE BLACK POINT BEACH CLUB ASSOCIATION21358 THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

ROBERT I. FARRIOR ET AL. v ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE BLACK POINT BEACH CLUB ASSOCIATION

No. AC 21358

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued March 18

May 28, 2002

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Hon. Joseph J. Purtill, judge trial referee.)

Theodore A. Harris, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Edward B. O'Connell, with whom, on the brief, was Elisa Valentin, for the appellees (defendant).

Lavery, C. J., and Foti and Mihalakos, Js.

Lavery, C. J.

Opinion

The plaintiffs, Robert I. Farrior and Carol F. Farrior, appeal from the judgment of the trial court upholding the decision of the defendant, Black Point Beach Club Association zoning board of appeals (board), that sustained the action of the association's zoning official in issuing the plaintiffs a cease and desist order. The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the court improperly concluded that the board did not abuse its discretion when it interpreted the association regulation that defined ''mobile home'' as including ''motor homes,'' such as that owned by the plaintiffs and stored on their property. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court. ¹

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the issue on appeal. Black Point Beach Club Association is a shoreline community located in East Lyme. Pursuant to the authority conferred by the General Statutes ^{2 and a special act (FN3} of the legislature, it has zoning regulations and authorities distinct from those of the municipality. Those regulations disallow the presence of ''mobile homes'' on residential lots within the community.

At the August 1, 1998 meeting of the association's zoning commission, its zoning official ''advised the commission of an issue concerning the storage of motor homes on lots in the residence district.'' According to its minutes, ''[t]he commission reviewed the definition in the regulations concerning 'mobile homes' and determined that motor homes meet the same definition and are, therefore, not permitted under the regulations.''

On August 21, 1998, the zoning official issued a cease and desist order to the plaintiffs regarding the motor home they had recently purchased and were storing on their property. On September 18, 1998, the plaintiffs appealed from the official's action to the board. On September 24, 1998, the association sought the advice of counsel regarding the meaning of the applicable regulation. On October 29, 1998, counsel, while acknowledging that the meaning of the regulation was arguable, opined that the regulatory definition of ''mobile homes'' encompassed motor homes also. On October 31, 1998, the board held a public hearing on the plaintiffs' appeal.

At the appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the item in question was a motor home or recreational vehicle, rather than a mobile home, and that storing such an item was not disallowed by the regulations. They claimed that the item in question did not meet the definition of ''mobile home'' in the zoning regulations, nor did it qualify under definitions provided in the General Statutes, dictionaries or encyclopedias. They argued that mobile homes and motor homes were entirely different and distinct items of property, and that if the association wanted to ban both from residential areas, it needed to amend the regulations so as to make that rule clear to residents. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board voted to sustain the zoning official's action.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed from the board's decision to the Superior Court. After concluding that the board's action was not arbitrary, illegal or in abuse of its discretion, the court denied the plaintiffs' appeal. This appeal followed.

We first set forth our standard of review. ''Generally, it is the function of a zoning board . . . to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of [its] legal discretion, whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply. The trial court had to decide whether the board correctly interpreted the section [of the regulations] and applied it with reasonable discretion to the facts. . . . In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the board is endowed with . . . liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review . . . only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 258 Conn. 691, 697, 784 A.2d 354 (2001).

''A local board or commission is in the most advantageous position to interpret its own regulations and apply them to the situations before it. . . . Although the position of the municipal land use agency is entitled to some deference . . . the interpretation of provisions in the ordinance is nevertheless a question of law for the court. . . . The court is not bound by the legal interpretation of the ordinance by the [board].'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyen v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 67 Conn. App. 597, 603, 789 A.2d 478, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 901, A.2d (2002).

''The regulation is a local legislative enactment, and in its interpretation we seek to discern the intent of the legislative body as manifested in the words of the regulation. . . . Since zoning regulations are in derogation of common law property rights, however, the regulation cannot be construed beyond the fair import of its language to include or exclude by implication that which is not clearly within its express terms. . . . The words employed by the local legislative body are to be interpreted in accordance with their natural and usual meaning . . . .'' (Citations omitted.) Spero v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 217 Conn. 435, 441, 586 A.2d 590 (1991). ''[W]here more than one interpretation of langauge is permissible, restrictions upon the use of lands are not to be extended by implication . . . [D]oubtful language will be construed against rather than in favor of a [restriction] . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 17 Conn. App. 53, 66, 549 A.2d 1076 (1988), quoting Bassett v. Pepe, 94 Conn. 631, 637, 110 A. 56 (1920).

Black Point Beach Club Association zoning regulation § IV, part two, describes generally the types of structures allowed on residential lots and provides in relevant part that ''[m]obile homes will not be permitted on any lot.'' ⁴ ''Mobile Home'' is described in § 1, the definitional section of the regulations, as ''[a] one-family dwelling of vehicular, portable design, built on a chassis and designed to be moved from one site to another and to be used without permanent foundation.'' ''Dwelling, One Family'' is defined as ''[a] detached building designed for or occupied by one (1) family.'' ''Building'' is defined in relevant part as a ''structure with walls and a roof securely affixed to the land.'' ''Motor homes'' are not mentioned or defined in the regulations.

From a reading of the plain language of those provisions, it is unclear whether they are intended to apply to items such as the plaintiffs' motor home. Particularly, although the motor home is unquestionably of ''vehicular, portable design [and] built on a chassis,'' it is not a ''dwelling,'' as that term explicitly is defined as a type of ''building,'' which in turn contemplates attachment to the land. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the description ''to be used without permanent foundation'' (emphasis added) implies that a defining feature of a ''mobile home'' is a temporary foundation or, rather, no foundation at all. Last, the passive phrase, ''to be moved,'' arguably does not apply to an item that has its own power supply and thus moves of its own accord. Because the provision at issue is ambiguous, ⁵ we must look elsewhere for interpretive guidance to determine the natural and usual meaning of the term ''mobile home.''

Several of our sister courts have recognized a distinction between mobile homes and motor homes. In Snider v. Grodetz, 442 So. 2d 344 (Fla. App. 1983), the District Court of Appeal of Florida held that a restrictive covenant ⁶ disallowing ''mobile homes'' from a subdivision did not encompass a ''motor home,'' which was used as a recreational vehicle and not as a permanent dwelling. Id., 346. The court noted that although the two items shared common manufacturing roots, the motor home and house trailer industries had come to be ''considered separate markets and the terminology relating to these separate industries has gradually become more distinct and precise.

''A mobile home is commonly defined as a factory built dwelling unit that is transported to a homesite where it is placed on concrete strips or foundations. A mobile home is not self-propelled and is designed for use as a permanent dwelling. By contrast a house trailer is considered a recreational vehicle and is designed for more temporary use and to be regularly pulled or towed by an automobile or other self-propelled vehicle. However, there are two main types of recreational vehicles, the ones that are towed, e.g., house trailers, soft top campers, and travel trailers, and the ones that are selfpropelled. The motor home falls into the latter category.'' Id., 345.

The court further stated that by 1973, the different meanings of the terms ''mobile home'' and ''motor home'' were commonly known throughout the country, and that the distinction between the two was articulated both in a common dictionary and in Florida's statutes. Id. Giving the term ''mobile home'' its ''ordinary, obvious meaning as commonly understood''; id., 346; the court concluded that the covenant disallowing ''mobile homes'' was not intended to apply to ''self-propelled recreational vehicles known generically as motor homes.'' Id.

Other courts have reached similar conclusions in varying contexts. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Trail, 902 P.2d 304, 307 (Alaska 1995) (in...