Farris v. County of Riverside
| Decision Date | 20 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 05-6166 AG (CTx). |
| Citation | 667 F.Supp.2d 1151 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Ronald FARRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Defendant. |
Jon Y. Vanderpool, Angela Mee Jae, Tosdal Smith Steiner and Wax, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Brian P. Walter, Connie M. Chuang, Elizabeth Tom Arce, Laura Kalty, Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER CONCERNING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case involves certain deputies' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Plaintiffs are sworn and un-sworn deputies ("Plaintiffs") that work for Defendant County of Riverside ("Defendant") and believe Defendant has deprived them of compensation due under the FLSA. More specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant wrongfully denied them overtime compensation, or at least regular compensation, for work-related activities done before and after their shifts.
Defendant has filed four motions for partial summary judgment. Each motion addresses a discrete issue and requests that the Court rule in Defendant's favor on that issue. Defendant filed: (1) a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: 29 U.S.C. Section 207(k) Exemption ("Exemption Motion"); (2) a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Application of 29 U.S.C. Section 207(h)(2) Offsets ("Offsets Motion"); (3) a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: De Minimis Doctrine ("De Minimis Motion"); and (4) a Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Briefing Start Times ("Briefing Motion").
The Court has reviewed the thorough filings of the parties. The Exemption Motion is GRANTED. The Offsets Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The De Minimis Motion is GRANTED. And the Briefing Motion is DENIED.
Most working people dress for work and undress after. This process assumes increased importance for the deputies involved in this case. In a prior Order, the Court recognized that their "distinctive dark uniform projects an aura of authority which directly contributes to a deputy's duties." (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant County of Riverside's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, January 28, 2008, 7:23-24.) And a jury, in an earlier phase of this case, found that Plaintiffs' "donning" and "doffing" of their uniform and equipment is "integral and indispensable to [their] principal law enforcement activities." (Phase One Special Verdict Questions 1-2.)
Plaintiffs' donning and doffing their uniform and equipment before and after they start their shifts, together with their preparation of patrol cars before shifts (collectively "pre/postshift readiness activities"), are the core of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs believe that they are not compensated for the time spent doing these pre/post-shift readiness activities, which they claim violates the FLSA. They seek overtime pay and regular pay to remedy this perceived injustice.
An explanation of this case's procedural background will help provide a full understanding of the pending motions. Trial of this case was bifurcated into two phases, with Phase One to be decided by a jury and Phase Two to be decided by the Court. In Phase One, the jury determined the critical facts relevant to liability. It found that Defendant willfully violated the FLSA concerning Plaintiffs' donning and doffing of uniforms, donning and doffing of equipment, and vehicle preparations. (Phase One Special Verdict Question 11.)
The jury also determined the specific amount of time that different categories of Plaintiffs spent doing these activities. Plaintiffs include deputies with five different job classifications: patrol, sworn corrections, non-sworn corrections, court services, and corrections transportation. The jury found that patrol deputies spent 9 minutes donning and doffing their uniforms, 11 minutes donning and doffing their equipment, and 13 minutes preparing their patrol cars. (Phase One Special Verdict Questions 3, 6.) It also found that court services and corrections transportation deputies spent 9 minutes donning and doffing their uniforms and 11 minutes donning and doffing their equipment. (Phase One Special Verdict Question 3.) Sworn corrections deputies spent 9 minutes with uniforms and 6 minutes with equipment. And non-sworn corrections deputies spent 9 minutes with uniforms and 2 with equipment.
Phase Two of the trial was designed to, among other things, allow Defendant's affirmative defenses to be tried by the Court based on the jury's factual findings in Phase One. Specifically, the Court authorized Defendant to present its "Second Affirmative Defense, Exemption from Overtime Requirements; Eighth Affirmative Defense, De Minimis Doctrine; and Fourteenth Affirmative Defense, Offset." (Phase One Final Pretrial Conference Order 3:11-15.) Defendant now brings three motions for summary judgment addressing three affirmative defenses.
Defendant also filed a fourth motion for summary judgment ("Briefing Motion") asserting that "in many instances briefing commenced 10 minutes after the start of Plaintiffs' shifts, and therefore "Plaintiffs have already been compensated for 10 minutes of pre-briefing activities . . . ." (Briefing Motion 1:9-12.) Based on this assertion, Defendant asks the Court for summary judgment concerning whether "10 minutes must be subtracted from the damages calculations for Plaintiffs because they were given 10 minutes of [compensated] time to prepare for their shift on duty." (Briefing Motion 1:12-15.)
Each motion involves facts specific to that particular motion. Though many facts are undisputed, some disputed facts remain. The Court must look at these facts in the context of relevant law and decide whether Plaintiffs can defeat Defendant's motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court will provide relevant facts in more detail in its analysis of the parties' arguments.
To support its motions, Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of four documents: (1) October 8, 2004 Letter Ruling from United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, LFSA 2004-14; (2) Nolan/Alaniz/Mata, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, related Case Nos. CV 03-02190, 04-08592, 07-06782, Order & Memorandum Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (C.D.Cal. December 1, 2008); (3) Abbe v. City of San Diego, Case No. 05cv1629, Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (S.D.Cal. August 19, 2008); and (4) May 31, 2006 Wage and Hour Advisory Memorandum, United States Department of Labor, No. 2006-2.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a judicially noticed fact must be one "not subject to reasonable dispute" because it is either generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R.Evid. 201(b). The documents in Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice meet the requirements of Rule 201(b). Thus, the Court GRANTS the Request for Judicial Notice.
The parties also make evidentiary objections concerning the motions. The Court did not rely on most of the evidence under objection. Where this Order indicates that such evidence was relied upon, the applicable objections are OVERRULED.
Summary judgment is appropriate only where the record, read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, indicates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Material facts are those necessary to the proof or defense of a claim, as determined by reference to substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual issue is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The burden initially is on the moving party to demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If, and only if, the moving party meets its burden, then the non-moving party must produce enough evidence to rebut the moving party's claim and create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the non-moving party meets this burden, then the motion will be denied. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).
"If summary judgment is not rendered on the whole action, the court should, to the extent practicable, determine what material facts are not genuinely at issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)(1). The court Id.
Defendant believes the summary judgment standard should be relaxed at this point in this case. It asserts that, "to the extent this Court finds any dispute of fact, the Court is nonetheless in a position to resolve such disputes," because the issues in Phase Two will be tried by the Court and not a jury. (Exemption Motion Reply 4: n. 2; see Briefing Start Times Motion 15:2-5.) While the Court does not wholeheartedly adopt Defendant's position, Ninth Circuit precedent does permit courts to decide factual issues in summary judgment motions in certain situations.
[W]here the ultimate fact in dispute is destined for decision by the court rather than by a jury, there is no reason why ...
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