Farris v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 7662

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
Writing for the CourtFANNING
Citation393 S.W.2d 684
Decision Date24 August 1965
Docket NumberNo. 7662,7662
PartiesJ. B. FARRIS et al., Appellants, v. NORTEX OIL & GAS CORPORATION, Appellee.

Page 684

393 S.W.2d 684
J. B. FARRIS et al., Appellants,
No. 7662.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.
Aug. 24, 1965.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 1965.

Talbot Rain, Dwight L. Simmons, Jerry L. Buchmeyer, Thompson, Knight, Wright & Simmons, Dallas, for appellants.

Fritz Lyne Erich F. Klein, Jr., Ed M. Brown, Lyne, Blanchette, Smith & Shelton, Dallas, for appellees.

FANNING, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted Nortex Oil & Gas Corporation, appellee herein, in a Bill of Review brought by appellants.

Ebro Oil Company, Inc., sold its properties to appellee in 1961 for $2,920,000. Thereafter Ebro ceased doing business, was dissolved and distributed remaining assets to its stockholders and Ebro has had no tangible assets since dissolution.

Nineteen months after said sale, Nortex sued Ebro in the 134th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, alleging misrepresentation by Ebro with respect to its properties sold and the values thereof, seeking damages of $5,065,582., and also sought to retain the properties purchased from Ebro. Ebro denied the allegations and alleged defenses. In a jury trial, the verdict of the jury on special issues was favorable to Ebro and was against Nortex. Nortex's motion for judgment n. o. v. was overruled and the trial court entered judgment for Ebro that Nortex take nothing. On Jan. 3, 1964, the trial court granted Nortex's motion for new trial.

Page 686

It was further alleged in the Bill of Review to the effect as follows: that thereafter Nortex and Cunningham, a former officer and director of Ebro, made an agreement for disposing of the case by allowing the entry of a judgment for Nortex against Ebro for $3,903,000; that on the afternoon of the day that Ebro's attorney notified Nortex's attorney, by telegram from Longview to Dallas, of the acceptance by Cunningham of the settlement agreement, that Nortex's attorney appeared ex parte before the trial court and presented a stipulation and a form of judgment which had some time prior to that date been signed and delivered to Nortex's attorneys by Ebro's attorney'; that said stipulation recited that the parties had agreed to submit the case to the trial court for decision upon the record of the original trial; that on that date, Feb. 28, 1964, the trial court entered judgment for Nortex against Ebro for $3,903,000.; that on April 24, 1964, Nortex sued many of the former stockholders of Ebro, including the appellants herein, (in the 68th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas) seeking judgment against appellants and other former stockholders of Ebro based upon the Feb. 28, 1964 judgment in question. (Appellants in their brief state to the effect that the theory of appellee before the 68th District Court is that the judgment in its favor constitutes in effect an unpaid debt of Ebro at the time of its liquidation and dissolution and that because of the existence of such unpaid debt the stockholders of Ebro are liable to appellee as an unpaid creditor of Ebro.)

On August 24, 1964, appellants filed their Bill of Review in the 134th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, against Nortex seeking to vacate and set aside the said judgment of the 134th District Court of Feb. 28, 1964, in favor of Nortex and against Ebro, and to have Nortex's claim against Ebro set down for retrial on the merits.

In response to appellant's Bill of Review, Nortex filed its motion for summary judgment 'based upon the pleadings of the parties on file herein'. The record before the trial court consisted of the pleadings, interrogatories and answers, and requests for admissions and answers thereto.

The trial court granted Nortex's motion and entered a summary judgment in favor of Nortex against appellants. Appellants have appealed.

This being a summary judgment case it must be determined by Rule 166-A, T.R.C.P., and authoritative court decisions construing this rule. The recent case of Great American Reserve Insurance Company v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply, Company, Tex.Sup.Ct., 391 S.W.2d 41 (June 1965) clearly states the principles of law applicable to the determination of whether a summary judgment should be granted. We quote from the court's opinion in part as follows:

'This is a summary judgment case; and in answering the above question, we must follow certain rules laid down by this Court. Rule 166-A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that summary judgment shall be rendered if it is shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact are resolved against him. Tigner v. First Nat'l Bank, 153 Tex. 69, 264 S.W.2d 85 (1954); Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929 (1952). In other words, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Valley Stockyards Co. v. Kinsel, 369 S.W.2d 19 (Tex.Sup.1963); Smith v. Bolin, 153 Tex. 486, 271 S.W.2d 93 (1954). If the motion involves the credibility of affiants or deponents, or the weight of the showings or a mere ground of inference, the motion should not be

Page 687

granted. All conflicts in the evidence are disregarded, and the evidence which tends to support the position of the party opposing the motion is accepted as true. Cowden v. Bell, 157 Tex. 44, 300 S.W.2d 286 (1957); Smith v. Bolin, supra; Gulbenkian v. Penn, supra. Evidence which favors the movanths position is not considered unless it is uncontradicted. If such uncontradicted evidence is from an interested witness, it cannot be considered as doing more than raising an issue of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 1240
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
    • March 31, 1978
    ...no writ); M. C. Winters, Inc. v. Lawless,407 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1966, writ dism'd); Farris v. Nortex Oil and Gas Corp., 393 S.W.2d 684, 690 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When the effect of the trial court sustaining of the special exception is to dismis......
  • $27920.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 06-00-00069-CV
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • February 8, 2001
    ...v. Durham, 574 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1978), aff'd, 600 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1980); Farris v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 393 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bynum v. Davis, 327 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1959, no writ) (opinion ......
  • Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 17588
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
    • March 14, 1975
    ...supra; Harold v. Houston Yacht Club, 380 S.W.2d 184 (Houston Tex.Civ.App., 1964, no writ hist.); Farris v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corporation, 393 S.W.2d 684 (Texarkana Tex.Civ.App., 1965, ref., Page 843 Plaintiff, by her points of error Nos. 3, 12 and 13, complains of the trial court sustaining ......
  • McCamey v. Kinnear, 7365
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
    • June 29, 1972
    ...C. Winters, Inc. v. Lawless, 407 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1966, error dism.); and Farris v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corporation, 393 S.W.2d 684, 690 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, error ref. A reasonable time should be allowed a party desiring to amend to conform to the ruling upon ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT