Farris v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 5,5
• Citation: Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 716 A.2d 237 (Md. 1998)
• Parties: Floyd Dale FARRIS, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 24

351 Md. 24

716 A.2d 237

Floyd Dale FARRIS, Jr. v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 5, Sept. Term, 1998.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 26, 1998.

Denise Oakes Shaffer, Asst. Public Defender(Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Annabelle L. Lisic, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ.

RAKER, Judge.

The issue presented in this case is whether the failure to report to the Allegany County Detention Center for weekend service of a prison sentence constitutes the crime of escape as defined by Md.Code(1957, 1996, Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.)Article 27, § 139.¹Petitioner, Floyd Dale Farris, argues that his failure to report for weekend service of his prison sentence does not constitute the crime of escape.Under the circumstances presented herein, we agree and, therefore, shall reverse.

On November 2, 1995, in the District Court of Maryland in Allegany County, Farris was found guilty of possession of a controlled dangerous substance.He was sentenced to ninety days incarceration, all suspended, with two years supervised probation.On April 30, 1996, in the District Court of Maryland in Allegany County, Farris was found in violation of his probation.The court sentenced him to ninety days incarceration, with sixty days suspended, and three years probation commencing November 2, 1995.On the day of sentencing, as evidenced by his signature on an Order for Probation, Farris agreed to abide by the general conditions of probation and as a special condition, he agreed to "abide by ACSD [Allegany County Sheriff's Department] conditions for weekend service of sentence."²The court explained to him that "if you violate those conditions, don't show up on time or anything of that nature, then it is a violation of probation and the additional sixty days will have to be served."The District Court Commitment Record reflects the following:

The total time to be served is 30 days, to run concurrent with any other outstanding or unserved sentence and begin on May 3, 1996.Weekend service of sentence from 11 a.m. Friday till 11 a.m. Sunday for 15 consecutive weekends.

Farris began to serve his sentence on May 3, 1996 and on June 21, 1996, a Friday, he failed to appear at the detention center.³

In a criminal information, the State charged Farris with escape, alleging that on June 21, 1996, Petitioner, under legal confinement to the Allegany County Detention Center, unlawfully and willfully escaped from lawful detention and confinement in violation of Article 27, § 139.At a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, upon an agreed statement of facts, the court found Farris guilty of escape and sentenced him to a consecutive six-month term of imprisonment.

Farris noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed.We granted certiorari to answer the question of whether the failure of a person to report for weekend service of a prison sentence constitutes an escape under Article 27, § 139.

Article 27, § 139(a) provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Escape; sentence therefor; places of confinement.--(1) If any individual who is legally detained in the State penitentiary or a jail, house of correction, reformatory, station house, or other place of confinement in this State or who is committed to the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration for examination or inpatient treatment escapes, the individual is guilty of a felony and on conviction by the circuit court for the county in which the escape takes place, is subject to confinement in the State penitentiary or jail or house of correction for an additional period not exceeding 10 years.

Both parties agree that, under Maryland law, a person may remain in the "constructive" custody of a prison when allowed outside the prison walls, such that a person's departure from constructive custody is the legal equivalent of an escape from the actual place of confinement.They disagree as to whether Petitioner remained within the constructive custody of the detention center during the week.

Our goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1130(1998);State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149(1997).We look first to the specific language of the statute, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, we need go no further.Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 477, 704 A.2d 904, 908(1998);Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678(1994).If the language of a statute is ambiguous, we consider the usual meaning of the words in the context of the setting and the objectives and purposes expressed by the Legislature.Briggs, 348 Md. at 477, 704 A.2d at 908.Statutes relating to the same subject matter or sharing a common purpose should be read together.Gargliano, 334 Md. at 436, 639 A.2d at 679;see2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01 to .03, at 117-172(5th ed.1992).A court may not add words to reflect an intent that is not evident in the statute's original form.Briggs, 348 Md. at 483, 704 A.2d at 911;Marriott Employees v. Motor Vehicles Admin., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 459(1996).Criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant to prevent courts from extending punishment to cases not plainly within the language of the statute.Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 654, 684 A.2d 439, 441(1996);Jones v. State, 304 Md. 216, 220, 498 A.2d 622, 624(1985).

In order to come within the ambit of Article 27, § 139, the escapee must have been legally detained in "the State penitentiary or a jail, house of correction, reformatory, station house, or other place of confinement in this State or ... to the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration for examination or inpatient treatment."The prisoner must then "escape."The statute does not define the term "escape."In the context of § 139, the word "escape" is used in different senses, that is, in regard to the factual occurrence, and also as the name of the crime.SeeROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 559 (3d ed.1982).The physical act of escape is the unauthorized departure from lawful custody.Stewart v. State, 275 Md. 258, 273, 340 A.2d 290, 298(1975).BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 544 (6th ed.1990) defines the word escape as "[l]eaving physical confinement without permission.The departure or deliverance out of custody of a person who was lawfully imprisoned before he is entitled to his liberty by process of the law...."Custody may be actual or constructive.See 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 633, at 440(15th ed.1996)(recognizing the doctrine of constructive custody).A penal institution maintains "constructive" custody when an individual is temporarily permitted to leave while still lawfully committed to that institution.Stewart, 275 Md. at 272, 340 A.2d at 298.

Petitioner argues that his failure to report to the detention center for weekend service did not constitute an escape from lawful detention within the meaning of Article 27, § 139(a) because he was not in custody, either actual or constructive, at the time of the alleged escape.Petitioner argues that his weekend sentence was a commitment by the court to the detention center for fifteen consecutive weekends and, as a result, he was not committed or detained in any place of confinement during the week.He argues, in the alternative, that if we were to find that he was in custody at the time of the alleged escape, that there was "no physical departure" from custody by his failure to report to the detention center.The State argues that Petitioner was in confinement in the detention center for thirty days, and, like work release or furloughs, he remained in the constructive custody of the detention center during the intervening weekdays.

To commit the crime of escape, a person "must depart from legal detention or confinement."Fabian v. State, 3 Md.App. 270, 281, 239 A.2d 100, 108(1968);see alsoStewart, 275 Md. at 273, 340 A.2d at 298(the gravamen of the offense is the physical departure by an inmate from the place of confinement).The physical act of escape includes not only a departure from the actual place of confinement, but also a departure from constructive custody.We"draw[ ] no distinction between an escape from within the prison walls and one effected when the prisoner, while still in legal custody, was physically outside the prison area."Ford v. State, 237 Md. 266, 270, 205 A.2d 809, 812(1965).Our cases have recognized that a person, lawfully sentenced and committed to a jail or other place of confinement, may commit the physical act of escape within the meaning of Article 27, § 139 even though he or she was actually beyond the physical confines of the institution.

We repeatedly have upheld convictions of escape when a prisoner remained within the constructive custody of a penal institution.In Johnson v. Warden, 196 Md. 672, 75 A.2d 843(1950), Johnson, initially sentenced to the House of Correction, had been transferred to the Reformatory for Males.At the Reformatory, Johnson was permitted to work at a private farm during the day.He departed from the farm without permission, and was subsequently charged and convicted of the crime of escape.He challenged the legality of his conviction asserting that he was not subject to the statute because he was not confined in the Reformatory at the time of his escape.Rejecting this contention, Chief Judge Marbury, writing for the Court, stated:

There can be no doubt that the applicant was legally confined in the Reformatory at the time of his escape.The mere fact that he was allowed to work outside on a farm in the daytime does not change the nature of his detention or confinement, and...