Farris v. Stepp

• Decision Date: 09 November 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-cv-02346-DDD-NYW
• Parties: ALLEN FARRIS, Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY STEPP, in his individual capacity, SERGEANT MARTINEZ, in his individual capacity, LIEUTENANT ELBE, in his individual capacity, CAPTAIN M. TURNER, in his individual capacity, SHERIFF STEVE REAMS, in his individual and official capacities, and WELD COUNTY TRAINING OFFICER DEPUTY DIAZ, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

ALLEN FARRIS, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY STEPP, in his individual capacity, SERGEANT MARTINEZ, in his individual capacity, LIEUTENANT ELBE, in his individual capacity, CAPTAIN M. TURNER, in his individual capacity, SHERIFF STEVE REAMS, in his individual and official capacities, and WELD COUNTY TRAINING OFFICER DEPUTY DIAZ, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-02346-DDD-NYW

United States District Court, D. Colorado

November 9, 2021

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND ORDER

Nina Y. Wang, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter comes before the court on two Motions:

(1) The Motion for Dismissal of Claims in Plaintiff's Complaint [ECF 1] Against Sheriff Steve Reams for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(B)(6) From Sheriff Steve Reams (the “Motion to Dismiss”) [Doc. 78 filed May 10, 2021]; and

(2) Plaintiff Farris['s] Pro Se Motion to Compel[] Defendants to Produce Relevant Requested Discovery Documents (the “Motion to Compel”) [Doc. 97, filed August 18, 2021]

The undersigned considers the Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case dated September 29, 2020 [Doc. 33], and the Orders Referring Motion dated May 11, 2021 [Doc.

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79] and August 19, 2021 [Doc. 99]. Having carefully reviewed the Motions and associated briefing, the case docket, and the applicable law, this court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. Further, the court ORDERS that the Motion to Compel is DENIED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Allen Farris (“Mr. Farris” or “Plaintiff”) initiated this action by filing his pro se Prisoner Complaint on August 6, 2020, alleging violations of his statutory and constitutional rights. See [Doc. 1]. In his Prisoner Complaint (the “Complaint”), Mr. Farris claims that, while he was a pretrial detainee at the Weld County Jail, he was the victim of a racially motivated assault and subsequent cover-up. See generally [id.]. Mr. Farris named Deputy Stepp, Sergeant Martinez, Lieutenant Elbe, Captain M. Turner, Weld County Training Officer Deputy Diaz, and “Sheriff John Doe, Sheriff Weld County Jail” as Defendants. [Doc. 1 at 1, 3-4]. The Honorable Gordon P. Gallagher granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, [Doc. 4], and ordered that the case be drawn to a presiding judge without further amendment. [Doc. 5]. Upon his assignment, the presiding judge, the Honorable Daniel D. Domenico, referred this action to the undersigned. [Doc. 33].

On October 13, 2020, the then-named Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal, [Doc. 34], seeking partial dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim. On April 26, 2021, this court issued a Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge (the “April Recommendation”) in which the undersigned recommended that the Motion for Partial Dismissal be granted. [Doc. 68 at 31].^[1] In addition, this court took judicial notice of the fact that

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the Weld County Sheriff is Sheriff Steve Reams (“Sheriff Reams”), see [id. at 30], and ordered Defendants to show cause why the case caption should not be amended to substitute Sheriff Reams for Sheriff John Doe. [Id. at 33]. On April 30, 2021, Defendants responded without objection to substituting Sheriff Reams for John Doe. [Doc. 71 at 3]. This court subsequently discharged the Order to Show Cause, directed the Clerk of Court to amend the case caption to reflect the naming of Sheriff Reams as a Defendant, and ordered Sheriff Reams to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint on or before May 10, 2021. [Doc. 73]. Sheriff Reams then filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of all claims against him. [Doc. 78 at 1-2].

In addition, in the April Recommendation, this court lifted the then-pending stay of discovery and pretrial scheduling. [Doc. 68 at 33]. On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel. [Doc. 97]. Plaintiff seeks a court order directing Defendants to produce numerous materials requested by Plaintiff in the course of discovery, as set out below. See [id. at 1-6]. Defendants responded in opposition on September 13, 2021, first arguing that the Motion to Compel should be denied on procedural grounds, as the present stage of this litigation renders Plaintiff's discovery request inefficient and untenable, [Doc. 105 at 1-2], and further arguing that the Motion to Compel should be denied on the merits because Plaintiff is not entitled to the documents he seeks. [Id. at 3-14].

II. Factual Background

This court set forth the factual background of this case in the April Recommendation, see [Doc. 68 at 4-5], but because Sheriff Reams newly challenges the sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims, the court will do so again here as relevant to the Motion to Dismiss. The court draws these facts from the Complaint and presumes them to be true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss. Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).

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At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was detained at the Weld County Jail awaiting trial on criminal charges. [Doc. 1 at 6]. At approximately 5:30 a.m. on the morning of November 20, 2019, Defendant Stepp approached Mr. Farris as the detainee was collecting his breakfast food tray. [Id.]. Defendant Stepp stated, “‘Farris let me see your I.D.'” as he approached Plaintiff. [Id.]. Mr. Farris's identification was clipped to the front of his shirt, and he showed it to Defendant Stepp before picking up his breakfast food tray. [Id.]. Defendant Stepp then repeated, “‘Farris let me see your I.D.'” [Id.]. In response, Mr. Farris asked to first put his food tray down because his hands were full. [Id.]. Defendant Stepp then “swung his hand, ” striking Plaintiff's wrist, “knocking the trays from [Plaintiff's] hand, ” and injuring Plaintiff's wrist. [Id.]. Defendant Stepp's training officer, Defendant Diaz, was present during the incident “in the course of training and monitoring” Defendant Stepp, which was “in accordance with the [Weld County Jail] policies & procedures promulgated and issued by” Sheriff Reams. [Id.]. At some indeterminate time after the incident, Defendant Diaz explained to Plaintiff that Defendant Stepp has “‘anger issues that he is working on.'” [Id.].

According to Mr. Farris, who is Mexican, the November 20 incident was motivated by Defendant Stepp's “known” racial animus for “‘Mexicans from California.'” [Id.]. Mr. Farris filed administrative grievances related to the November 20 incident, asserting that Defendant Stepp's actions violated Plaintiff's constitutional and statutory rights. [Id.]. In response to Mr. Farris's grievances, Defendants admitted that Defendant Stepp's conduct was inappropriate and asserted that corrective action with Defendant Stepp was initiated after the incident but denied that his actions violated the law or Plaintiff's legal rights. [Id.].

Mr. Farris alleges that Sheriff Reams “failed to properly train his [subordinates] under the law to ensure that they do not violate [detainees'] rights guaranteed under the laws” and “failed in

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his mandated duties to promulgate policy & procedure to guide his [subordinates] in fulfilling their duties as employees of the Weld County Sheriffs Office [sic], and County Jail.” [Id. at 7]. Mr. Farris ties such alleged failures to Defendant Stepp's alleged assault and racial animus against Plaintiff. [Id.]. Plaintiff filed this action on August 6, 2020, raising claims against Sheriff Reams in his individual and official capacities. See [id. at 4]. He asserts generally that Sheriff Reams violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and his statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985, and 1986; and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See generally [id.].^[2]Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, but not injunctive relief. [Id. at 9].

In his Motion to Dismiss, Sheriff Reams argues that all of Plaintiff's claims against him should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 78]. On May 27, 2021, Mr. Farris responded to the Motion to Dismiss, wherein he moved the court “to incorporate all [of] his previous alleged claims and case law citations stated in [his] Objections to the Magistrates [sic] Report and Recommendation.” [Doc. 84 at 1 (emphasis omitted)]; see also [Doc. 82 (the “Objections”)].^[3] Sheriff Reams replied on June 7, 2021. [Doc.

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89]. Because the Motions are ripe for consideration, I address the Motions and the Parties' related arguments below.

ANALYSIS

MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that even pro se litigants cannot rely on conclusory, unsubstantiated allegations to survive a 12(b)(6) motion). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that plausibility refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint, ” and that the allegations must be sufficient to nudge a plaintiff's claim(s)...