Farris v. Yellow Cab Co.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1949
• Citation: 222 S.W.2d 187,189 Tenn. 46
• Parties: FARRIS v. YELLOW CAB CO. et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

222 S.W.2d 187

189 Tenn. 46

FARRIS v. YELLOW CAB CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 9, 1949

Error to Circuit Court, Knox County; John M. Kelly, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Ruby Farris claimant, opposed by the Yellow Cab Company, employer, and others to recover compensation for the death of claimant's husband. The trial judge sustained a demurrer and claimant appeals in error.

Judgment sustained, and demurrer affirmed.

Fred J. Moses, Jr., and Jerome Templeton Knoxville, for plaintiff in error.

E Bruce Foster, Knoxville, Frantz, McConnell & Seymour, Knoxville, of counsel, for defendants in error.

NEIL Chief Justice.

This is a case in which the petitioner sues to recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Tennessee, Code, § 6851 et seq., as a dependent. Her husband was employed by the Yellow Cab Company of Knoxville and was killed by some unknown person while sitting in his cab at a regular cab stand. The case is here on demurrer to the petition, the trial judge having sustained it upon the ground that it stated no fact or circumstance from which it could be reasonably inferred that the killing was an accident which arose out of and in the course of the cab driver's employment.

The petition alleges the following facts pertinent to the issues before us:

'The petitioner further alleges that on said date the deceased suffered injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as follows, to wit:

'Your petitioner avers and would further show to the Court that prior to said date the deceased was an able-bodied, strong, and healthy physical being and he was a capable, industrious, and hard-working man. That on said date and at or about the hour of one (1:00) in the morning and while on duty under the steering wheel and driving one of defendant's cabs at or near the L & N Depot at Knoxville, Tennessee, and while located at a cab stand and while working within the scope of his employment with the defendant the deceased sustained accidental injuries which were fatal to him. She avers that while in the employ of the defendant, and while in the discharge of his duties as such employee, which consisted of driving and operating a taxi cab, he was injured and killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The nature and cause of which accident is not known save that it was a gun shot wound and that the deceased was found mortally injured at his post of duty under the steering wheel of said taxi cab which he was operating immediately before his fatal injury; that the deceased's death occurred in the course of deceased's employment and that death occurred out of and in the course of his employment.'

The defendants demurred upon the following grounds:

'(1) Said petition wholly fails to state a cause of action against defendants.

'(2) Said petition does not allege facts sufficient to show liability against defendants under the Workmen's Compensation Statute of Tennessee, in that said petition does not set forth any facts from which the Court could conclude that the death of the deceased was accidental, or that his death was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by defendants. On the other hand, said petition sets forth only the conclusions of petitioner that the death of the deceased was caused by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment, and admits that petitioner has no knowledge of any facts surrounding the death of the deceased from which the Court could conclude that the death resulted from an accident which arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased with the defendants.'

We think it is reasonable to conclude that the petitioner could allege no additional facts which would tend to clear up the mysterious death of her husband so as to meet the objections of the demurrer, inasmuch as this could have been done by an amendment to the petition. The demurrer admits the truth of the facts as stated in the petition and all reasonable conclusions to be drawn therefrom.

The petitioner appealed from the action of the trial judge sustaining the demurrer and assigns errors all of which go to a single question as to the sufficiency of the petition as a pleading. Able counsel for petitioner state the issue to be decided as follows:

* * * 'the case will be treated in this brief as if all the known facts surrounding this accident were before the Court.

'The only certain facts to be gathered from the allegations of the petitioner are that the deceased, while at his post of duty under the steering wheel of his cab, in a cab stand on the streets of the city of Knoxville in front of the L & N Depot at one o'clock in the morning met his death by reason of a gunshot wound. Under these circumstances, nothing more appearing, it is insisted, the petitioners are entitled to recover.'

Counsel for both the petitioner and the defendants have at the outset argued the question as to which of the parties carries the burden of proof in compensation cases, and more especially in the instant case. The cases cited will not be discussed for the reason that the issue is not directly before the Court. The demurrer having admitted the facts as pleaded the only question is whether or not the petitioner would be entitled to compensation on the facts stated in the absence of any countervailing evidence. We are furthermore aware of the mandate of the statute which requires a liberal construction of its provisions in favor of injured employees. But such liberality does not impose upon the courts the duty of reaching definite conclusions as to what the facts show. No one knows who killed the deceased, or why, whether it was in defense of a robbery, or by some one who was a personal enemy, or resulting from a quarrel between taxi cab employees, or some other person. In reaching a conclusion based upon the facts alleged we are not permitted to surmise that the defendants are in possession of any facts other than as set forth in the petition.

The petitioner's counsel say that, conceding the facts to be true as alleged, it becomes the duty of the defendants to clear up the mystery of their...