Farrow v. St. Francis Med. Ctr.

Decision Date27 August 2013
Docket NumberNo. SC 92793.,SC 92793.
Citation407 S.W.3d 579
PartiesMadonna FARROW, Appellant, v. SAINT FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER and Cedric C. Strange, Respondents.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Charles S. Kramer and Joseph D. Schneider, Riezman Berger, PC, St. Louis, for Farrow.

Thomas O. McCarthy and Brian M. O'Neal, McMahon Berger PC, St. Louis, for Saint Francis and Strange.

GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge.

Madonna Farrow (hereinafter, Farrow) appeals from the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Saint Francis Medical Center (hereinafter, Hospital) and Cedric C. Strange (hereinafter, “Doctor” and collectively Defendants) on her eight-count petition that alleged violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act, section 213.010 et seq., RSMo 2000 (hereinafter, “the MHRA”),1 and other common law claims related to the termination of her employment. The circuit court's judgment is affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The case is remanded.2

Factual and Procedural History

Viewed in the light most favorable to Farrow, the facts are as follows: Hospital, a not-for-profit-corporation, hired Farrow in 1991 as a staff nurse to perform duties on Hospital's progressive cardiac floor. Farrow's compensation consisted of a base salary while working on the cardiac floor, with additional income earned by working overtime and “floating” to other floors or departments as needed. In August 1999, Farrow transferred to Hospital's radiology department and worked there primarily as a nurse. Farrow continued to float to other departments and accrue overtime.

In 2004, Farrow developed and oversaw Hospital's implementation of a peripherally inserted central catheter (“PICC”) line procedure program. Implementation of this PICC line procedure eliminated Hospital's need to outsource this procedure to outside nurses and enabled Farrow to train other Hospital nurses on the process. In addition to developing and overseeing this program, Farrow continued to work in the radiology department without incident until December 2005.

In December 2005, Doctor approached Farrow and propositioned her about having an affair. Farrow rejected his proposition and attempted to laugh off the comments, which angered Doctor. Farrow told Doctor she thought he was kidding, his comments were inappropriate, and his anger made her uncomfortable, so she left the room. Farrow attempted to avoid working or speaking with Doctor after this incident and reported it to Hospital's human resources department.

In February 2006, Farrow maintained Doctor made another inappropriate sexual comment to her. Farrow was asked to work on an emergency procedure with Doctor. During that procedure, Farrow was paged by another doctor who needed her assistance on a procedure. Farrow answered the page with Doctor's permission. After finishing the discussion, Doctor whispered in Farrow's ear, “I understand now. You like the black stuff better than the white,” referring to the ethnicity of the doctor Farrow had spoken to on the telephone. Farrow again rebuffed Doctor's comments and asked him to leave her alone. She left the room, and another nurse took over the nursing duties for the procedure. Farrow reported both incidents to the director of imaging services. Farrow was told the director would look into it, but the director did not respond to her.

After these two incidents, Farrow maintains she was subjected to retaliatory actions by Defendants. Specifically, Farrow was prohibited from performing PICC line procedures in the radiology department, and she stopped teaching other nurses how to perform the procedures because Defendants implemented a policy that prohibited any nurse from performing these procedures. Defendants directed that Farrow train a physician's assistant from Doctor's practice to perform the PICC line procedures. Farrow objected to this change in protocol because she believed a physician assistant was not authorized by law to administer PICC lines. Farrow complained to her supervisor about the policy change and sought the program's reinstatement, to no avail.

Farrow also contends Doctor made defamatory statements about the quality of her work. Farrow maintains Doctor berated, intimidated, harassed, and yelled at her in front of other Hospital employees. Farrow alleges Hospital acquiesced in these actions by allowing them to happen and by disciplining Farrow for various actions that she maintains did not warrant discipline.

In October 2006, Farrow placed documentation into her personnel file regarding Defendants' actions after she learned they were planning to terminate her. As a result, Farrow requested a transfer from the radiology department back to the progressive cardiac floor, which would result in a decrease in her hourly salary. Farrow's request was granted; however, her new supervisor told Farrow she had been informed of the “problems in radiology,” that she should not make any more complaints, and advised Farrow to keep her head down and do her job.

Despite transferring back to the progressive cardiac floor, Farrow suffered from anxiety, nervousness, insomnia, and concerns about keeping her job. In January 2007, Farrow placed additional documentation in her personnel file regarding the prior acts of Defendants. Hospital's president approached Farrow a few weeks later and inquired whether her transfer “worked out her problems.” Farrow described her physical issues as a result of Defendants' actions, requested that the matter be investigated, and indicated she documented the events in her personnel file. Hospital's president indicated he would review the matter and her personnel file. Farrow and Hospital's president had a similar conversation in April 2007, but Hospital's president still had yet to review her personnel file or investigate her allegations from January 2007.

In May 2008, Farrow was written up for unprofessional conduct related to her negative attitude. Farrow maintains her supervisor advised her she should not review or be so concerned with the contents of her personnel file. After hearing this, Farrow went to the human resources department to review her file and discovered all of her documented complaints were missing. Later, Farrow encountered Doctor in a hallway. Doctor told Farrow he was “still going to get her out.” Farrow reported this incident to the human resources department, but no action was taken. Thereafter, Farrow alleges Hospital continued to retaliate against her by changing her compensation agreement, stripping her of hours, prohibiting her from working any overtime or floating to other departments, and scheduling her for less than forty hours a week.

Farrow was terminated on December 10, 2008. The notice of termination stated it was based upon her failure to meet customer service expectations. Farrow alleges her supervisor told her that, notwithstanding what the notice stated, her termination was based upon the “problems in radiology and her continuing bad attitude.” Farrow filed a grievance challenging her termination pursuant to Hospital's internal grievance procedure on December 15, 2008. The internal grievance procedure moved through five levels of review before Farrow received a final response from Hospital's president that her grievance was denied on March 2, 2009.

On July 27, 2009, Farrow filed a complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter, “the Commission”). Ten days later, she also filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter, “the EEOC”). The Commission issued Farrow a notice of the right to sue letter on December 19, 2009, indicating it was issuing it in conjunction with the EEOC's right to sue letter from November 16, 2009.3 The right to sue letter indicated Farrow could bring a civil action based upon the allegations in her complaint against Defendants within ninety days of the issuance of the notice, and all proceedings with the Commissionbased upon her complaint were being terminated.

Farrow filed her initial petition against Defendants on March 18, 2010. Farrow filed a first amended petition on August 31, 2010, raising eight counts against Defendants. Count I alleged a violation of the MHRA for sexual harassment against both Defendants. Count II alleged a violation of the MHRA for retaliatory discrimination against both Defendants. Count III raised an additional claim of retaliatory discharge against Hospital only. Count IV asserted a claim for retaliatory discharge regarding Hospital's internal grievance procedure. Count V alleged a claim for common law wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against both Defendants. Counts VI, VII, and VIII raised claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business expectancy, respectively, and were brought against Doctor only.

Defendants did not file an answer, but filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, motions for summary judgment on all claims raised in Farrow's first amended petition.4 After hearing the argument on the motions, reviewing the documents submitted and the legal memoranda, the circuit court sustained Defendants' motions, finding there were no genuine issues as to any material fact, and Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Farrow appeals.

Standard of Review

The parties cite two separate standards of review for this appeal. Farrow alleges Defendants only raised summary judgment challenges to Counts I through IV of her first amended petition. With respect to Counts V through VIII, Farrow claims Defendants simply challenged the adequacy of the pleadings pursuant to their motions to dismiss. Defendants cite both standards of review and used them interchangeably throughout their brief. The circuit court's judgment stated, [T]here is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendants ... are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” It is clear from the record and the circuit court's judgment that ...

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