Fasano v. Meliso

• Decision Date: 03 June 1959
• Citation: 146 Conn. 496,152 A.2d 512
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Alfonse C. FASANO, Administrator d.b.n. (Estate of Umberto Maresca), v. Maria A. MELISO et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 512

152 A.2d 512

146 Conn. 496

Alfonse C. FASANO, Administrator d.b.n. (Estate of Umberto Maresca), v. Maria A. MELISO et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 3, 1959.

Alfonse C. Fasano, New Haven, and Alfred E. DeCapua, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert C. Zampano, East Haven, with whom was Joseph J. Mager, East Haven, for the appellees (defendants).

Before BALDWIN, KING, MURPHY and MELLITZ, JJ., and SHEA, Superior Court Judge, concurring.

KING, Associate Justice.

Umberto Maresca, the plaintiff's decedent, on March 1, 1945, opened an account, hereinafter referred to as account A, in the Connecticut Savings Bank in his name as 'Trustee for Ralph U. Meliso,' a defendant herein and a minor son of the named defendant, the decedent's sister, Maria A. Meliso. On opening the account, the decedent deposited $18.80 and filled out and signed a trustee signature card, supplied by the bank, which included information concerning the beneficiary, such as his name, residence and birthplace. It further stated: 'The principal and interest of this account are the property of, and to be drawn by, the Trustee during the Trustee's life. At the death of the Trustee, the principal and interest of said account are to be paid to the Beneficiary.' When the decedent returned to the home of his sister Maria, where he lived, he handed the passbook to her and stated that he had started a trust fund for Ralph. On December 31, 1945, he asked his sister to go to the same bank and to obtain for him a trustee signature card so that he could start a trust fund for Cary, a younger son of Maria and also a defendant. This she did, and during his lunch hour the decedent signed a signature card and opened an account, hereinafter referred to as account B, for Cary. It was identical in its terms with account A, and an initial deposit of $140 was made. After the first few deposits, like deposits were made in each account, and at the decedent's death the amount on deposit in each account was $3670.76 except for an interest credit of $7.83 in account B. The deposits were made over a period of six years and ranged from $5 to $50 in amount. No withdrawals were made from these accounts.

The plaintiff instituted this action to recover, as the property of Maresca's estate, the balance on deposit in each account at his death. Recovery is also sought of the amount then on deposit in a third account, hereinafter referred to as account C, but the facts surrounding this account differ markedly from those surrounding accounts A and B, and consequently the claim as to account C will be separately discussed later. The fact that accounts A and B were opened and stood on the books of the bank in the name of the decedent as trustee for the respective beneficiaries is not, alone, conclusive of the ownership, either at the decedent's death or at any time prior thereto, of the money deposited. Indeed, it is not conclusive of whether any trust at all was established. 1 Scott, Trusts (2d Ed.) p. 477; Stamford Savings Bank v. Everett, 132 Conn. 92, 94, 42 A.2d 662. It is perhaps true that a savings account standing in the name of a donor as trustee for a named beneficiary is to some extent sui generis in the law of trusts. But it is settled law that even in such forms of trust, unless some interest in the fund was transferred to the beneficiary during the decedent's lifetime, there can be no valid trust of any kind, since there would be nothing more than an attempted testamentary disposition of the trustee's own property in a manner forbidden by the Statute of Wills, Gen.St.1958, § 45-160 et seq. Bowen v. Morgillo, 127 Conn. 161, 166, 14 A.2d 724; Bachmann v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 667, 88 A.2d 391; 1 Scott, op. cit., pp. 422, 423, 441, 476; Restatement, 1 Trusts (2d Ed.) § 56.

Under the provisions of the statute (now Rev.1958, § 36-110; formerly Cum.Sup.1939, § 1216e), a savings bank is prohibited from accepting a deposit made by one person in trust for another 'unless the same is accompanied by a statement signed by the depositor giving the name and residence of the beneficiary and setting forth to whom the principal and interest of such deposit belong.' Pursuant to the mandate of this statute, the bank had available for depositors who wished to open a savings account, in the name of one person as trustee for another, two forms of signature card. One was the signature card used by the decedent, already quoted. The other was substantially the same except that it stated that '[t]he principal and interest of said deposit account (including all deposits hereafter made by the undersigned to the credit of said account) belong to said beneficiary, but the undersigned during his lifetime reserves the right to withdraw the same in whole or in part at any time.' Of course the plaintiff was unable to prove that as a fact this second form of statement of ownership was actually brought to the attention of the decedent and rejected by him. In the absence of proof to the contrary, however, a person is presumed to know and understand the contents of a simple instrument which he signs. Dinini v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 228, 82 A. 580.

It follows that as of the time each of the accounts, A and B, was opened, the decedent's intention must have been as contained in the statement of ownership, that is, that the money on deposit was wholly his and should remain wholly his during his lifetime and that what, if anything, remained on deposit at his death should then, and not before, belong and be paid to the named beneficiary. As of the dates the accounts were opened, there was no evidence whatsoever of any intention that title to them or any interest in them should leave the decedent prior to his death. His intention clearly was to dispose of whatever might be in the accounts at his death in a manner forbidden by the Statute of Wills. Main's Appeal, 73 Conn. 638, 644, 48 A. 965. That such a scheme was wholly testamentary and wholly invalid is settled law. Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 32, 147 A. 139, 73 A.L.R. 201; 1 Scott, op. cit., pp. 483, 484. To paraphrase the language of Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 523, 65 A. 1058, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 310, '[t]he only intention that can be gathered from the language of * * * [the decedent in the statement of ownership] is an intent to dispose of * * * [his] property [at his death] in a manner forbidden by the statute of wills.' The Statute of Wills was enacted with the basic purpose of making certain that a testator's intentions as to the disposition of his property would be carried out after his death. Indeed, this very case is an illustration of the danger of permitting the devolution of property to depend upon oral testimony, especially where, as here, that oral testimony largely comes from the lips of those having a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. The defendants' claim that each account, when opened, constituted a valid revocable trust is unsound....