Fash v. Gordon

• Decision Date: 17 November 1947
• Docket Number: No. 29997.,29997.
• Citation: 75 N.E.2d 294,398 Ill. 210
• Parties: FASH et al. v. GORDON, Director of Labor, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

398 Ill. 210

75 N.E.2d 294

FASH et al.

v.GORDON, Director of Labor, et al.

No. 29997.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 18, 1947.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 17, 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Harry Fisher, Judge.

Proceeding under the Unemployment Compensation Act by Sophia Sally Fash and others, employees, against Robert L. Gordon, Director of Labor, and others. A determination by the Director of Labor that the employees involved were ineligible for benefits under the act was reversed by the circuit court on certiorari, and the Director of Labor appeals; and Montgomery Ward & Company, employer, files a separate appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (Albert E. Hallett, of Chicago, of counsel), for original appellants.

Stuart S. Ball and John A. Barr, both of Chicago, for separate appellant.

Francis Heisler, Julius Lucius Echeles, and Esther J. Mohr, all of Chicago, for appellees.

GUNN, Justice.

Appellee, Sophia Sally Fash, and others, filed application for unemployment compensation with the Director of Labor, for loss of time from employment from April 12 to April 24, 1944. They were all employees of Montgomery Ward & Co. The claims deputy of the Illinois Department of Labor, who made the initial investigation, found the stoppage of work was due to a labor dispute, and therefore the claimants were not eligible to compensation. An appeal was taken from this determination to an agent for the Director of Labor. He held hearings, and after a consideration of the evidence recommended the decision of the claims deputy be affirmed and the claimants be held ineligible for the benefits during the time of the strike. On December 21, 1944, the Director of Labor confirmed the report of his representatives, and decided claimants ineligible for benefits under section 7(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 48, par. 223.

Up to December 8, 1943, Montgomery Ward & Co. had a contract with the United Mail Order, Warehouse and Retail Employees of America, hereinafter called the Union, concerning labor relations between the company and the members of the union. The National Labor Relations Board had divided the employees into seven different units for bargaining purposes. Prior to the termination of the contract there was a labor controversy between the company and the union. The questions of grievance procedure, wage increases, seniority, union shop and check-off are some of those involved. The company claimed the union no longer represented two of the units because a majority of each were not members of the union. The company was willing to renew the contract, and to negotiate as to five of the units, but refused to bargain with or to renew the contract as to the two units, in which it is claimed they did not have a majority of union members. The union submitted the question to the War Labor Board, which recommended that the companyextend the contract with the union temporarily, and that the union petition the National Relations Board to hold an election to determine whether it represented a majority of company employees.

The company did not comply with this determination, and on April 12, 1944, the union called a strike. Picket lines were established, and signs and placards carried, indicating a strike was in progress. Members of the union testified that a strike was in progress. A little over half of the employees ceased work and served in the picket line, or in other capacities, aiding the strike. The business of the company fell off from forty-five to seventy-five per cent in different departments. On certiorari to the circuit court it was held that the evidence showed the unemployment was due to the stoppage of work, and that a labor dispute existed at the place where the plaintiffs were last employed, but that plaintiffs left such employment because of the company's refusal to obey the directive of the War Labor Board, and hence were not ineligible for benefits under the provisions of section 7(d) of the act. The Director of Labor appeals to this court under the provisions of section 14 of the act.

The appellees contend that a labor dispute did not exist, and the basis of their claim seems to be that a labor dispute ceases to be such after a decision concerning its merits has been determined by a board or government agency, and the employer refuses to abide by such determination. When that event occurs it is claimed the decision or determination of the board or agency may be enforced by a strike, without creating the ineligibility to receive benefits resulting from such stoppage of work existing because of the labor dispute. Appellants contend there was a strike caused by a labor dispute, with consequent ineligibility to employee's benefits for those participating therein.

One of the main purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act was to relieve hardship caused by involuntary unemployment. Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 48, par. 217; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin, 380 Ill. 11, 42 N.E.2d 541;Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N.E.2d 390;Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506, 56 N.E.2d 832;Beth Weber, Inc. v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 60,59 N.E.2d 913;Panther Creek Mines, Inc. v. Murphy, 390 Ill. 23, 60 N.E.2d 217;Local Union No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N.E.2d 637. Section 7(d) of the act, so far as it pertains to this case, is as follows: ‘An individual shall be ineligible for benefits * * * (d) For any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, * * *.’ Section 1 of the act is expressly enacted as a guide to the interpretation and application of the statute and the public policy of the State on unemployment. This section emphasizes the menace to society of ‘involuntary unemployment,’ and recites ‘involuntary unemployment * * * requires appropriate (legislative) action.’ Section 7 was enacted to require the observance of the public policy that there should be no benefits for voluntary unemployment, except under special circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, benefits where an employee voluntarily quits work, without cause, may not be allowed for a period of four weeks, and may not exceed a total period of four weeks. Sec. 7(a). And the same provision is made with respect to the employee who has been discharged for misconduct, sec. 7(b); and, also, where he causes himself to be ineligible for work, with intent to avoid any of the disqualifications imposed by the act, sec. 7(h).

It is true that these grounds of ineligibility are qualified by the allowance of partial benefits after a certain lapse of time, but they all manifest an intention to limit the allowance to partial benefits for unemployment caused by individual voluntary action, and but for a slight portion of the full amount. Section 7(d), however, contains no provision allowing any partial benefits, and in fact, provides that for ‘total or partial unemployment * * * because of a labor dispute’ employees are ineligible to receive benefits. So, the critical point for decision in this case is whether involuntary unemployment can arise out of a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute.

The dictionary meaning of the word ‘involuntary’ is: ‘not proceeding from choice; unwillingly, or under compulsion.’ No one disputes that the action of the appellees was voluntary, proceeded from choice, and not unwillingly or under compulsion, so do the circumstances here render the employer liable to be properly charged with creating a work stoppage, or did the stoppage occur for other reasons than because of the labor dispute? The statute does not differentiate between the stoppage of work caused by the employer and one brought about by the employees, provided the stoppage is caused by a labor dispute. While it is probable that most stoppages of work caused by a labor dispute arise from a strike of the employees, yet it may occur from the employer's inability to operate because of matters arising out of the...