Fatir v. Phelps

• Decision Date: 17 May 2019
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 18-933-CFC
• Parties: AMIR FATIR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMISSIONER PERRY PHELPS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

AMIR FATIR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMISSIONER PERRY PHELPS, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 18-933-CFC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

May 17, 2019

Amir Fatir, Daniel Rivera, Ramazan Sahin, Brenton Smith, Jacquell Coverdale, Kenneth Yarborough, Donald Clark, Jermaine D. Laster, Deronta Person, and Robert W. Johnson, Jr., James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware; Malachai DeBruce, New Castle, Delaware; Antonio R. Bailey, Howard R. Young Correctional Center, Wilmington, Delaware; Colin Simms, Smyrna, Delaware; and Arthur Stratton, Magnolia, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

May 17, 2019

Wilmington, Delaware

CONNOLLY, U.S. District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs were convicted and sentenced inmates housed at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware,¹ when they filed the Complaint as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983² and a qui tam False Claims Act action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 286-287 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.³ (D.I. 1) Plaintiffs appear pro se and have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.⁴ (D.I. 50) The Court proceeds to review and screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A(a).

II. BACKGROUND

On March 1, 2018, at 10:25 a.m., VCC correctional officers raided the VCC B-Annex Unit, Dorms 2 and 3, and ordered the inmates to dress and leave the dorms. (D.I. 1 at 6, ¶ V.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Chick ("Chick"),⁵ correctional officersEnck ("Enck")⁶ and Jester ("Jester"), and female officers Lieutenant Tilghman ("Tilghman") and Sergeant Everett ("Everett") ushered the inmates into the hall and ordered them to form a single file line against one of the walls. (Id. at 7, ¶ V.) Plaintiffs allege that Tilghman and Everett went to a desk at the end of the hall and began monitoring a computer screen; Enck and Jester went to a room at the opposite end of the hall, Enck entered the room; and Jester stood at the door's entrance while Chick remained in the hall and stood between Tilghman and Everett and Enck and Jester. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Tilghman was the superior officer of Enck and Jester and the person who controlled the strip search operation. (Id. at ¶ V.6)

Plaintiffs allege they were called into the room, one at a time. (Id. ¶ V.1.) There, Enck "caused each [P]Iaintiff to strip and expose their genitals and buttocks while handing [] Jester articles of [] [P]laintiff's clothing for inspection." (Id. at ¶ V.2.) When Plaintiffs entered the room they told Enck and Jester there was a live camera feed that made it possible for viewing by other Department of Correction ("DOC") staff. (Id. at ¶ V.3.) Defendants acknowledged the camera and ordered Plaintiffs to continue stripping. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that "[w]hile 50 men were stripped naked before live camera feeds, which were also recorded," Defendants James P. Satterfield ("Satterfield")⁷ and Lt. Barlow ("Barlow"), both male, watched the men on computer screens in Satterfield's office and secondary control where Barlow worked. (Id. at ¶ 4 atIII) Plaintiffs alleges the entire strip search lasted approximately two hours for both dorms. (Id. at ¶¶ III; V.3.)

After the search, Plaintiffs were allowed to dress and were ushered to the common dining area located across the hall from the area where Plaintiffs had been searched. (Id. at ¶ V.5.) Plaintiffs spoke to Tilghman regarding the strip search, asked why she had ordered it and allowed them to be stripped naked in front of a camera, and told her they wished to exercise their rights to call the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA")⁸ hotline and report they were victims of sexual abuse. (Id. at ¶¶ V.6., 7., 9.) Tilghman responded that they did not have to because the information had already been reported and all that would happen is that Plaintiffs would be sent to mental health. (Id. at ¶ V.10.) Tilghman told Plaintiffs it was their right to speak to an outside PREA advocate, she left the area, and returned to tell Plaintiffs she had contacted Shift Commander Satterfield. (Id. at ¶ V.13.) Tilghman instructed Plaintiffs "not to contact the PREA hotline because 'the matter is already being handled.'" (Id.)

Plaintiffs contacted the PREA hotline and "believed they were contacting an 'outside PREA advocate' unassociated with the DOC." (Id. at ¶ V.16.) Plaintiffs allege they encountered Defendant Guard No. 1 Jane Doe ("Doe"), a hostile DOC employee, who initially ordered Plaintiffs to call individually and, after two calls, advised Plaintiffs if they continued to call she would not be able to write any reports because she needed at least 15 minutes to write each report. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Doe refused to provide her name and would not state whether she was affiliated with the DOC as an employee.(Id. at ¶ V.17.) After Plaintiffs made their PREA reports, they were taken to the medical unit for a two minute interview with nurses and a mental health staff member employed by Connections ("Connections"), the DOC medical contract provider. (Id. at ¶ V.18.) Plaintiffs allege a Connections' mental health staff member confirmed that Doe is a DOC employee. (Id. at ¶ V.20.) Plaintiffs filed grievances regarding the matter and allege the DOC ignored them. (Id. at ¶ V.21.)

Plaintiffs allege that PREA, 34 U.S.C. § 30302(8), "calls for federal expenditures via grants provided to the states and dispensed through the State Attorneys Generals" and requires that Defendants meet "specific protocols and standards," found at 28 C.F.R. Part 115, and audits conducted "to assure the monies allocated are spent according to the terms of the Act." (Id. at 4 at ¶ III.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "systematically and deliberately syphoned off [] PREA funding, failed to enact PREA's protocols, falsified documents and stole [] federal funds to use them for personal or other intended use." (Id.)

All Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 19-20 at ¶ VII.) Plaintiffs Amir Fatir ("Fatir") and DeBruce seek 25 percent of the qui tam action or settlement of the False Claims Act civil claim. (Id. at 20 at ¶ VII.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiffs proceed pro se, their pleading is liberally construed and their Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims forfailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though "detailed factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 10.

A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than...