Faucher v. R.C.F. Developers

• Decision Date: 11 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-3069,88-3069
• Citation: 569 So.2d 794
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D2543 Claude J. FAUCHER, Appellant, v. R.C.F. DEVELOPERS d/b/a Madhatter Mufflers & Brakes and Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 794

569 So.2d 794

15 Fla. L. Weekly D2543

Claude J. FAUCHER, Appellant, v. R.C.F. DEVELOPERS d/b/a Madhatter Mufflers & Brakes and Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees.

No. 88-3069.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Oct. 11, 1990.

James M. Callan, Jr., Clearwater, for appellant.

Cleve A. Wilson of Butler and Burnette, Tampa, for appellees.

ZEHMER, Judge.

We review by appeal a workers' compensation order denying the claim of Claude J. Faucher for temporary total or partial disability benefits and medical benefits on the ground that he did not suffer an injury in the course of his employment with appellee, R.C.F. Developers d/b/a Madhatter Mufflers & Brakes. Concluding that the record lacks competent, substantial evidence to sustain the findings upon which the judge of compensation claims based his ruling, and finding error in the admission in evidence of the deposition testimony of a witness, Beth Champagne, on purely collateral matters relating to claimant's credibility not shown to be relevant to the issues being tried, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Claimant contends that he injured himself on March 2, 1988, while lifting a bucket of heavy steel rollers as he was cleaning an area of his employer's shop. The filled bucket weighed at least 185 pounds, and claimant testified that he alone attempted to lift it but could not, so his foreman, Richard Stackhouse, helped him move it several feet to another location. Claimant insists that when he stood up after moving the bucket, he felt pain in his lower back and made a comment about it to Stackhouse. Stackhouse denies that claimant made such a complaint at the time, and states that he did not learn of the complaint until several days or weeks later (his testimony is indefinite about the time periods). Claimant also insists that within a few days after the incident he told his employer, Richard Fisher, about hurting himself when lifting the bucket of rollers; Fisher disputes this.

Eventually, a claim for benefits was filed and controverted by the employer and carrier on several grounds. Extensive discovery was taken and the matter came on for hearing before the judge. The record, totaling some 885 pages of evidence, consists of the transcript of the hearing, which includes the live testimony of the claimant, Stackhouse, Fisher, and Jeanine Fisher, who is Fisher's wife and the accountant for the employer. Numerous depositions and medical records were also received in evidence and made part of the record.

The order denying the claim recited the following pertinent findings of fact based on the evidence:

3. This claimant has a history of at least two (2) prior accidents in which he had low back complaints similar to those here presented. In 1974 he suffered extensive orthopedic injuries when a truck body fell on him, apparently causing a fractured hip and other injuries. Approximately June 24, 1986, he injured his right ankle when he was helping push an automobile and stepped in a hole. His medical records from the Matthew-Thornton Health Plan, a Massachusetts health provider, revealed that on March 7, 1986, the claimant had complaints of pain in the right ankle and spasm of the thoraco-lumbar muscle. On June 13, 1986 he was seen for back pain. Following his ankle injury of June 25, 1986 he continued to be seen for back pain, with diagnosis as having a L5-S1 spondylolisthesis with a "pinched nerve" with radiation of pain into both legs and pain on movement in the hips. The claimant received treatment for this condition, which was apparently severe enough to require a trial of a TENS unit. This treatment and complaint continued until the claimant left New Hampshire to come to Florida, in December 1986. The records reveal that the claimant denied any benefit from the use of the TENS unit.

4. After arriving in Florida, this claimant worked for awhile as a dry wall hanger, and then started his employment with the employer herein in October 1987, installing mufflers and doing light mechanical work. He alleges that on March 2, 1988, he was helping to lift and move a bucket of rollers, and that he injured his back doing this. The claimant alleges that his back progressively got worse until he went for medical care around March 10, 1988. He ultimately came under the care of Dr. John P. Turi, D.C., on April 14, 1988, and Dr. Turi treated the claimant through the date of his deposition (September 22, 1988), and opinioned [sic] that the claimant would reach maximum medical improvement for another thirty to sixty days. Dr. Turi, based on the history given by the claimant, related his disability to the accident in question. It is important to note, however, that the only history the claimant gave to Dr. Turi was of his 1974 accident and the claimant specifically denied to Dr. Turi that he had had any similar back pain in the last four (4) years and denied that he had ever had any associated leg pain prior to this alleged accident. The employer/carrier had the claimant evaluated by Dr. R.W. Springstead, and the same history given Dr. Turi was given to Dr. Springstead. Predicated on that history, Dr. Springstead felt that as of September 9, 1988, the claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement and was in need of further conservative treatment.

5. The employer/carrier defends this claim on several grounds, the principal ones being falsification of employment application (Martin v. Carpenter defense): that the claimant did not in fact suffer an accident in the course of his employment with the employer and did not furnish notice of this accident; and that any disability and need for medical care is the result of his prior injuries in the state of New York [sic] [Hampshire]. As to the notice defense, I find that the claimant did put the employer on notice of his allegation that he had injured himself within thirty (30) days. That defense is denied. As to the Martin v. Carpenter defense, I find that the employer was well aware of the claimant's prior accident and that the claimant had pre-existing back impairment, because the claimant had been complaining with back and leg discomfort prior to the alleged accident herein, as testified to by all three witnesses produced by the employer/carrier. This defense is denied.

6. It is self evident that this claimant's credibility is severly [sic] in issue. He knowingly mis-lead [sic] his treating physician and the IME physician with denials of "previous back pain of this nature or of leg pain," which claimant obviously knew was untrue, and the claimant did not tell either physician that he was, in fact, under treatment for that very condition when he left Massachutes ¹ [sic] to come to Florida in December 1986. After alleging this accident of March 2, 1988, this claimant continued to work until difficulties arose over the reporting of his complaints as compensable to the carrier and payment of medical bills incurred, after which he was no longer able to be employed.

7. I accept the testimony of the three (3) witnesses who appeared for the employer and [sic] that this claimant had continued complaints with his back and legs prior to the alleged accident of March 2, 1988, and that he did not, at first, relate his difficulties to this incident. I find that the cause of this claimant's disability and need for medical care is the continuation of the condition that he suffered in Massachusetts when he was under care there for the same problems and is the same condition that was causing this claimant to have complaints of pain in his back and legs prior to this alleged accident. In making this finding, I specifically find that the claimant did not suffer an accident by injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment on March 2, 1988.

8. In making this finding, I am well aware that the opinions of the treating physicians and the IME were that this claimant's complaints were related to the alleged accident. Their opinions, however, were predicated on a fraudulent history provided to them by the claimant and are, therefore, not binding on me.

R. 888-91 (emphasis added). The order thus denied and dismissed the claim.

On this appeal, claimant specifies five points:

1) The judge of compensation claims erred as a matter of law when he found specifically that the claimant did not suffer an accident by injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment on March 2, 1988 2) The judge erred in finding that the claimant's need for medical treatment after March 2, 1988, was a continuation of the condition that he suffered in Massachusetts (should be New Hampshire) when he was under care for the same problems and for the same condition.

3) The judge erred as a matter of law when he dismissed the employee's claim notwithstanding the testimony of Dr. Turi and Dr. Springstead because he found that their opinions were predicated on a fraudulent history provided to them by the claimant and therefore are not binding on the judge.

4) The judge erred as a matter of law when he substituted his opinion for that of the testimony of the treating physicians of the claimant's doctors, Dr. Turi and Dr. Ganuza, and the independent medical evaluator, Dr. Springstead.

5) The judge erred in admitting into evidence the deposition testimony of Beth Champagne taken on October 7, 1988, in New Hampshire without ruling on the timely objections of the attorney for claimant.

The first four stated points are interrelated and will be discussed together. The last point will then be addressed.

After carefully reviewing the entire record and correlating the numerous medical records with the testimony of the various witnesses, we agree with the claimant that the judge erred in rejecting the testimony of the physicians relating claimant's present condition to the March 2 incident when he lifted the bucket of rollers. The record simply does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the...