Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
| Citation | 17 F.3d 171 |
| Decision Date | 23 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2394,92-2394 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH (P) 17711A Janet L. FAUCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Ronald L. Faucher, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Frederick C. Bishop (argued & briefed), Barton, Benedetto & Bishop, Jackson, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Donna Morros Weinstein, Chief Counsel, Gary A. Sultz (argued & briefed), John L. Martin, Eric Emil Schnaufer, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Region V, Chicago, IL, Francis L. Zebot, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Atty., Detroit, MI, for defendant-appellant.
Before: KENNEDY and NELSON, Circuit Judges; and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services, defendant-appellant, appeals the decision of the district court granting plaintiff Ronald L. Faucher's 1 motion for summary judgment, reversing the decision of the Secretary that plaintiff is not disabled, and ordering an award of social security disability insurance benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff Faucher filed successive applications for social security disability insurance benefits, alleging disability due to knee and wrist problems, numbness in the fingers of his right hand, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, cancer surgery, and depression. On April 19, 1989, plaintiff filed his third application for social security disability benefits, which is the subject of this appeal. The application for benefits was denied initially and upon reconsideration. On August 9, 1990, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. After the appeals council denied Faucher's request for review on April 24, 1991, this became the final decision of the Secretary.
The ALJ concluded that Faucher had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform "at least light work with a sit/stand option," and that his disability was not compromised by either his emotional condition or his weight which was 273 pounds. A vocational expert identified 21,000 light jobs and 28,000 sedentary jobs that an individual with Faucher's RFC and vocational characteristics could perform. Based on this testimony, the ALJ found that Faucher, who was 29 years old and had completed one year of college, could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy and was not disabled.
Faucher appealed this decision of the Secretary to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g). The case was assigned to a magistrate judge who found that the ALJ had presented an inadequate hypothetical question to the vocational expert because the hypothetical question did not adequately incorporate Faucher's emotional impairments and obesity and the combined effect of his physical and emotional impairments had to be reconsidered. The magistrate judge concluded that because the hypothetical question had been inadequate, the vocational expert's response could not be used to satisfy the Secretary's burden of identifying a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Faucher could perform in order to conclude that he was not disabled.
Rather than remanding the case to the Secretary for further consideration, the magistrate decided that he was unable to remand under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) because the remand would require the taking of new and additional evidence, and that pursuant to sentence six of section 405(g), a remand for additional evidence may be granted only if the failure to include the evidence in the prior administrative record was for good cause. The magistrate found that there was no good cause for the Secretary's failure to correctly assess the combined effect of plaintiff's physical and emotional impairments and to include adequate vocational evidence initially and therefore Faucher must be awarded benefits. The magistrate stated that if the Secretary could subsequently demonstrate that plaintiff is capable of a limited range of employment given his combined physical and emotional impairments and the award of benefits was thus erroneous, the Secretary could seek to terminate benefits under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(f). The Secretary filed objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation, alleging that the magistrate had misunderstood the district court's remand authority under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), sentence four. Without discussion, the district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation. Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5), the district court granted the Secretary's motion for an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal, which the Secretary filed on October 30, 1992.
We must first decide whether the district court erred in deciding that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), the case could not be remanded to the Secretary and plaintiff was entitled to an award of benefits because the ALJ had posed an inadequate hypothetical to the vocational expert, and, therefore, there was not sufficient evidence to support a denial of benefits.
The Secretary does not challenge the district court's conclusion that substantial evidence does not exist to support the ALJ's determination of non-disability, because when the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled as there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy which he could perform, the ALJ erred in relying on the vocational expert's response to an inadequate hypothetical, which did not adequately incorporate Faucher's emotional impairments and obesity. Thus, the government concedes that the Secretary's denial of disability benefits should be reversed because there is not substantial evidence to support this conclusion. The issue in the present case is what a district court should do once a determination is made that an ALJ erroneously applied the regulations and the Secretary's denial of benefits therefore must be reversed.
The Secretary contends that the district court erred in holding that under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), the case could not be remanded to the Secretary for the taking of additional evidence (in this case, the additional evidence would be the testimony of a vocational expert in response to an adequate hypothetical question incorporating plaintiff's emotional impairments and obesity), because adequate vocational testimony could have been presented initially. The Secretary argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the present case could be remanded for consideration of additional vocational evidence "only upon a showing that the evidence is new and material, [and] that good cause exists for having failed to include the evidence in the administrative record initially." The Secretary argues that the district court erroneously treated the present case as if it were a sentence six remand case when, in fact, it involves a remand under sentence four of Sec. 405(g). The Secretary argues that although the district court accurately described the criteria necessary for a remand under sentence six of Sec. 405(g), and correctly recognized that those criteria were not satisfied in the present case, the court overlooked sentence four of Sec. 405(g), which provides for remand after a final decision of the district court reversing a denial of benefits, and which does not require good cause for failing to present the evidence initially.
We agree. The fourth and sixth sentences of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) delineate the district court's authority to review a final decision of the Secretary. Sentence four states that the district court has the power "to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Sentence six of Sec. 405(g) states:
[t]he court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding....
Section 405(g), thus, plainly authorizes two types of remand: (1) a post-judgment remand in conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary (a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the Secretary (a sentence-six remand).
The Supreme Court has confirmed this distinction between a remand pursuant to sentence four of Sec. 405(g) and a remand pursuant to sentence six of Sec. 405(g). In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that in a sentence-six remand, the court does not rule in any way on the correctness of the administrative decision, neither affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2163, and that the remand criterion of sentence six (that there be good cause for failing to present the evidence initially) was "not intended to limit a District Court's ability to order remands under sentence four," which occurs after a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the Secretary. Id. at ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2164-65.
Melkonyan thus indicates that the present case does not involve a sentence-six remand situation because here the district court ruled on the correctness of the ALJ's administrative decision and issued a final judgment reversing the Secretary's decision to deny benefits on the grounds that an inadequate hypothetical had been posed to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gordon v. Berryhill, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18 CV-00055-HBB
...were reliable in light of the economy as it existed at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. See Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1994) (sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) authorizes a post judgment remand).ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final de......
-
Lawson v. Astrue
...been resolved, and that the record adequately establishes a claimant's entitlement to those benefits. Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court agrees with both the Magistrate Judge and the Plaintiff that a remand is not necessary, becaus......
-
Picklesimer v. Colvin, 3:13-1457
...factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits. Faucher v. Secretary, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (1994). Plaintiff's assertions of error are addressed as follows:1. The ALJ pr......
-
Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.
...essential factual issues have been resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate. See, e.g., Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1994).5 Third, if we conclude that no outstanding issues remain and further proceedings would not be useful, we ma......
-
Table of Cases
...8th-03, § 1301.2 Fast v. Barnhart , 397 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 2005), 7th-05, § 1803.1 Faucher v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1994), §§ 605.1, 605.2, 607.1, 607.2, 607.5 Fazio v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 541, 543 (6th Cir. 1984), § 606.3 FDL Techs., Inc. v. Unit......
-
Synopses of Briefs
...the contrary is lacking.” Felisky [ v. Bowen , 35 F.3d 1027, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994)]; accord, Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs ., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). This comports with the principle that “where remand would be an idle and useless formality, courts are not required to ......
-
Synopses of Briefs
...the contrary is lacking.” Felisky [ v. Bowen , 35 F.3d 1027, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994)]; accord, Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs ., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). This comports with the principle that “where remand would be an idle and useless formality, courts are not required to ......
-
Standards of Review and Federal Court Remedies
...circuits will remand for determination of benefits only in narrow circumstances. See , e.g. , Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 17 F.3d 171, 176 (7th Cir. 1994) (“If a court determines that substantial evidence does not support the Secretary’s decision, the court can reverse the d......