Faught v. State, 1--872A41

• Decision Date: 19 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 1--872A41,1--872A41
• Citation: 35 Ind.Dec. 500,155 Ind.App. 520,293 N.E.2d 506
• Parties: , 73 A.L.R.3d 1 Thomas M. FAUGHT, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 506

293 N.E.2d 506

155 Ind.App. 520, 73 A.L.R.3d 1

Thomas M. FAUGHT, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 1--872A41.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

March 19, 1973.

Donald R. Ewers, Evansville, of Bates, Ewers & Noffsinger, Evansville, of counsel, for appellant.

Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

LYBROOK, Judge.

Defendant-appellant (Faught) was convicted by jury of Armed Robbery and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

Prior to trial, Faught confessed (and later stipulated) that on November 9, 1971, he and three others perpetrated an armed robbery at Wayne's Pharmacy in Evansville. Faught and one Robert Pease covered their faces with women's hosiery and entered the store. Both displayed pistols and demanded 'Dilaudids', morphine and cocaine. When the proprietor said he had none of these drugs, they demanded and received codeine and methadone, and $435.00 in cash.

Faught first filed a 'Petition to be Declared a Drug Abuser Under the Provisions of the Indiana Drug Act of 1971', which was denied.

He then filed a special plea of insanity pursuant to statute. Since Faught stipulated that he in fact committed robbery, the evidence at trial and the issues on appeal are limited to the question of his sanity.

The primary issue is whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Faught's expert medical witnesses, concerning his sanity.

Prior to trial, the court appointed Drs. Alfred J. Niedermayer and C. H. Crudden to determine Faught's sanity at the time of the offense. Both doctors filed reports stating that Faught was able to understand the charges against him and aid in his defense. Neither report, however, offered an opinion as to whether Faught was sane at the time of the crime. The Crudden specifically stated that it was not possible for him to so determine with any degree of certainty.

At trial, Dr. Niedermayer testified that Faught did not suffer from any 'mental disease or defect causing him to lack the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' He further testified, however, that Faught was a drug addict, that 'addiction is a psychiactric disorder', and that Faught was 'under a compulsion to require the drug or he becomes sick and he will go to any length to require the drug.' He further stated that 'A drug addict is not in contact with reality unless he is under the influence of the drug at that time.'

On cross-examination, Dr. Niedermayer testified that he was able to determine, in a 30 to 45 minute examination, that Faught 'was alway sane his entire life', and that 'a person doesn't become sane and insane back and forth.' He also stated that 'Drug addiction is a compulsion'.

Dr. Crudden did not testify at the trial.

Defendant's witness, Dr. Roger E. Newton, testified that at the time of the crime, Faught was physically and psychologically dependent upon heroin and that he had a 'tremendous compulsion or compulsive need to have the drug at this time.' He stated that a person addicted to drugs 'will do almost anything to obtain them'. He compared Faught's desire to get the drugs to a person's desire to breathe if someone places a plastic bag over his head. He stated that Faught was neither able to conform nor to control his behavior '(b)ecause of his compulsive need for a particular drug.'

Dr. Newton further testified that Faught did not 'have a mental capacity at that time (the time of the robbery) to formulate an intent to steal or rob,' but 'was driven by the compulsion to obtain drugs,' and that drug addiction is a disease which can cause mental defects. He finally stated that Faught was not 'able to conform to the requirements of law.'

Defendant's witness, Dr. Wm. D. Snively, Jr., testified that Faught did not 'have the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law', that drug addiction is a mental disease and was the reason 'that Thomas Michael Faught could not conform his conduct to the requirements of law on November 9, 1971.'

The trial court ordered the entire testimony of Dr. Snively stricken and admonished the jury 'not to consider the testimony of Dr. Snively concerning the mental condition of the defendant, Faught.' The court also sustained the State's motion to strike Dr. Newton's testimony, stating that the question was simply 'Whether or not drug addiction is a defense to the commission of a crime.'

In view of the grave implications raised by this case, it is important to note what we do and do not decide here. We are confronted with the question of whether or not a criminal defendant, who has pleaded insanity, is entitled to have qualified medical experts testify as to his sanity, when their opinions are based upon his compulsion, caused by drug addiction.

We do not hold that drug addiction is a defense to a crime. Nor do we hold that a criminal defendant, under the influence of voluntarily self-administered drugs, is entitled to raise his own culpable acts to the level of a defense to his crime.

Faught was not under the influence of heroin when he robbed the drug store. Rather, his defense is based upon his allegation that he was insane because of a compublsion caused by his complete lack of heroin, to which he was addicted.

We turn now to the major question presented by this appeal, whether or not the trial court erred in striking expert medical testimony concerning Faught's sanity. In Hill v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429, our Supreme Court approved the following insanity test for Indiana:

"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.' (our emphasis). American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (final draft) (1962).'

The court stated the above rule was superior to the M'Naghten and Irresistible Impulse rules and observed:

'The M'Naghten test places emphasis on the defendant's cognitive faculty, in that the sole question is whether the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act, and if so, did he know that such act was wrong. Such an inquiry inhibits the type of testimony sought from experts in the field of psychiatry by restricting the nature of testimony to the defendant's ability to differentiate between right and wrong. As a result, testimony is usually lacking in regard to the actor's composite personality or complete mental state at the time of the act.

"The true vice of M'Naghten is not, therefore, that psychiatrists will feel constricted in artifically structuring their testimony but rather that the ultimate deciders--the judge or the jury--will be deprived of information vital to their final...