Faulconbridge v. State
| Decision Date | 22 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-592.,04-592. |
| Citation | 2006 MT 198,142 P.3d 777,333 Mont. 186 |
| Parties | Alan Ray FAULCONBRIDGE, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Elisha Kay Faulconbridge and Bernice Kay Faulconbridge, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of Montana, Defendant and Respondent and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellants: Monte D. Beck, Beck Richardson & Amsden, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana; Morgan M. Modine, Modine Law Firm, Missoula, Montana; Teresa M. Thompson, Missoula, Montana.
For Respondent: Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Kelly M. O'Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Shelton C. Williams, Williams & Ranney, P.C., Missoula, Montana.
¶ 1 Elisha Kay Faulconbridge (Elisha) died on August 8, 1992, as a result of injuries she received as a passenger in a motorcycle accident that occurred on Juniper Drive in Missoula County, Montana. Elisha's parents, Alan Ray Faulconbridge and Bernice Kay Faulconbridge (the Faulconbridges), individually and on behalf of Elisha's estate, filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the State of Montana (State), Missoula County (County), and Montana Rail Link (MRL) in September 1994. The Faulconbridges proceeded to trial in January and February 2004, against the State only. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the State following a ten-day trial. The Faulconbridges appeal. The State cross-appeals in the event this Court grants a new trial. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial.
¶ 2 We rephrase and address the following issues the Faulconbridges raise on appeal:
¶ 3 1) Is the issue of whether the District Court erred in granting the State's motion to quash discovery related to prior incidents at the accident site moot, in light of the State's inadvertent disclosure of this information to the Faulconbridges?
¶ 4 2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to admit evidence of a prior accident that occurred at the same location as Elisha's accident?
¶ 5 3) Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Ken Kailey to testify as an expert for Plaintiffs, due to the lack of a Rule 26(b)(4), M.R.Civ.P., disclosure when Kailey was not retained in preparation for litigation?
¶ 6 4) Did the District Court commit error when it permitted retired State employee James Weaver to serve as the State's representative and testify during trial?
¶ 7 a) May a party's designated trial representative testify as a fact witness after the court has granted a motion to exclude all witnesses pursuant to Rule 615, M.R.Evid.?
¶ 8 b) Is a former employee a proper representative for purposes of Rule 615, M.R.Evid.?
¶ 9 c) Did the District Court err when it declined to grant the Faulconbridges a new trial based on James Weaver's presence and testimony?
¶ 10 5) Did the District Court err when it determined that a violation of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) did not constitute negligence per se and, on that basis, refused the Faulconbridges' proposed jury instructions and denied their motion for a directed verdict?
¶ 11 The State cross-appeals and raises the following issues:
¶ 12 6) Did the District Court err when it denied the State's motion for summary judgment?
¶ 13 7) Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it prevented the State from introducing evidence of Jason Weaver's conduct?
¶ 14 8) Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to admit evidence of Elisha's alleged comparative negligence?
¶ 15 Fifteen year-old Elisha Faulconbridge rode as a passenger on Jason Weaver's (Jason) motorcycle following her baptism in the Blackfoot River on August 7, 1992. On their way to the Milltown Dam recreation area east of Missoula, the motorcycle failed to negotiate a 90-degree turn to pass under an MRL railroad trestle on Juniper Drive. The motorcycle impacted a cement abutment under the trestle. Elisha was thrown into the cement abutment and died of her injuries the next morning.
¶ 16 Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the State, MRL and the County in 1994. Plaintiffs did not sue Jason, but settled with him in February 1996. However, MRL brought a third-party action against Jason, and Jason in turn brought counterclaims against MRL and cross-claims against the State and the County. The State brought a cross-complaint against Jason for contribution and indemnity.
¶ 17 The Faulconbridges settled with the County and MRL. MRL then dismissed its third-party complaint against Jason. Jason in turn dismissed his counterclaim against MRL and his cross-claim against the County. Jason moved to dismiss the State's claim against him on two occasions. Following our Opinion in Cusenbary v. Mortensen, 1999 MT 221, 296 Mont. 25, 987 P.2d 351, the State eventually dismissed Jason from the action.1 Consequently, when the trial began in February 2004, the State remained as the sole Defendant.
¶ 18 The Faulconbridges alleged in their initial complaint that Juniper Drive's dangerous condition caused the accident. They claimed that the road lacked proper signing to warn motorists of the accumulated gravel and the approaching sharp curve.
¶ 19 In light of the fact that the Faulconbridges had released three parties from liability preceding the trial, the inordinate delay of ten years from the time the Faulconbridges filed suit until trial, and miscellaneous other factors, the trial proved quite complicated. The District Court was faced frequently with issues relative to apportioning liability to third parties not present at trial, as addressed in Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court, Missoula County (1996), 279 Mont. 363, 927 P.2d 1011.
¶ 20 There was disputed evidence that Jason consumed alcohol the day of the accident. The State also alleged that Jason was speeding and that his motorcycle had a misaimed headlight. Over the State's objection, the District Court granted the Faulconbridges' motion in limine to prevent the State from introducing evidence of Jason's conduct on the day of the accident. The State sought supervisory control, but we denied the application.
¶ 21 We will address the remaining factual and legal arguments as they arise in the discussion of the issues below.
¶ 22 We review a district court's evidentiary rulings to determine whether the court abused its discretion. State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 48, 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 48, 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 48. We also review a district court's refusal to give proffered jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Hartle v. Nelson, 2000 MT 356, ¶ 12, 303 Mont. 264, ¶ 12, 15 P.3d 484, ¶ 12. A district court abuses its discretion only if it acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason. Howard v. St. James Community Hosp., 2006 MT 23, ¶ 16, 331 Mont. 60, ¶ 16, 129 P.3d 126, ¶ 16.
¶ 23 This Court reviews a district court's decision to deny a new trial for a manifest abuse of discretion. A manifest abuse of discretion is one that is obvious, evident or unmistakable. McDermott v. Carie, LLC, 2005 MT 293, ¶ 11, 329 Mont. 295, ¶ 11, 124 P.3d 168, ¶ 11.
¶ 24 Finally, we review a district court's statutory interpretation as a matter of law to determine whether it is correct. Reier Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Kramer, 2003 MT 165, ¶ 9, 316 Mont. 301, ¶ 9, 72 P.3d 944, ¶ 9.
¶ 25 Is the issue of whether the District Court erred in granting the State's motion to quash discovery related to prior incidents at the accident site moot, in light of the State's inadvertent disclosure of this information to the Faulconbridges?
¶ 26 The Faulconbridges claim that Rule 26(b)(1), M.R.Civ.P., entitles them to discover other similar accidents that occurred at the same location as Elisha's accident. They maintain the District Court committed reversible error when it granted the State's motion for protective order that protected this information. The State claims the issue is moot because although the District Court granted the State's motion for protective order, the Faulconbridges nevertheless received the requested information regarding prior accidents when the State's record keeper answered interrogatories that requested this information.
¶ 27 This Court considers a matter moot when, due to an event or happening, the issue has ceased to exist and no longer presents an actual controversy. Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 1999 MT 21, ¶ 19, 293 Mont. 188, ¶ 19, 974 P.2d 1150, ¶ 19. The State inadvertently provided the Plaintiffs with the precise information the District Court's order would have precluded them from receiving. The Faulconbridges received all pertinent information regarding a 1986 accident that occurred at the same place as Elisha's accident. Consequently, because a controversy no longer exists, we will not consider this issue on appeal. Lewistown Propane Co. v. Moncur, 2002 MT 349, ¶ 14, 313 Mont. 368, ¶ 14, 61 P.3d 780, ¶ 14.
¶ 28 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to admit evidence of a prior accident that occurred at the same location as Elisha's accident?
¶ 29 The Faulconbridges claim the District Court abused its discretion when it prevented them from calling a driver and passenger to testify about an accident they had in 1986 at the same location as Elisha's accident. The Faulconbridges assert that the 1986 accident was sufficiently similar to the accident at issue so as to demonstrate notice of the alleged defect on the part of the State, as well as causation and the dangerous and defective nature of the road. The State maintains that the District Court properly denied the evidence because the "substantially...
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