Faulkner-King v. BD. OF TR. OF UNIV. OF ILLINOIS, 90-3092.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Michael R. Cornyn, Champaign, Ill., for defendant
• Citation: Faulkner-King v. BD. OF TR. OF UNIV. OF ILLINOIS, 757 F.Supp. 951 (C.D. Ill. 1991)
• Decision Date: 22 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-3092.,90-3092.
• Parties: Vivian FAULKNER-KING, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant.

757 F. Supp. 951

Vivian FAULKNER-KING, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant.

No. 90-3092.

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division.

February 22, 1991.

Robert Kirchner, Champaign, Ill., for plaintiff.

Michael R. Cornyn, Champaign, Ill., for defendant.

OPINION

RICHARD MILLS, District Judge:

Civil rights.

Sex discrimination.

The University filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. The United States Magistrate Judge has recommended that the motion be denied.

Following the filing of objections by the University, this Court has conducted a de novo review of the question presented by the motion.

We conclude that this action is time barred and thus must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

I. Facts

On April 6, 1990, the Plaintiff, Vivian Faulkner-King, filed a one-count complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. alleging that the University of Illinois discriminated against her on the basis of sex when it denied her tenure in its School of Art & Design. Plaintiff also has actions pending before the Illinois Department of Human Rights and in the Circuit Court of Champaign County alleging sex discrimination arising out of the same employment relationship.

Plaintiff originally filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on January 28, 1988. Such a charge must be filed within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The University's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment¹ is premised upon the untimeliness of Plaintiff's filing.²

One of Plaintiff's arguments in opposition to the University's motion is that no discovery has been conducted to date on this question and such a limitation is subject to waiver, estoppel and tolling principles. This argument is disingenuous because, in support of her opposition to the University's motion to dismiss, she has submitted a 252-page appendix containing the relevant correspondence between herself and University administrators. She has apparently obtained this material through discovery in her state court action. Thus, although she may not have conducted discovery in this federal case, she has obtained voluminous materials through her state court action which is based upon the same facts at issue here.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1985

Nov. 12 — Letter to Eugene C. Wicks, Director, from Don Pilcher, Chairman of the Personnel Committee recommending by a vote of 5-0 that Vivian Faulkner-King be rejected for tenure.

Nov. 13 — Letter to Faulkner-King from Wicks advising her of the Committee's recommendation and his concurrence therewith.

Nov. 27 — Letter to Wicks from Faulkner-King indicating that she will be appealing the decision not to recommend her for tenure.

Dec. 17 — Letter to Wicks from Personnel Committee affirming their prior recommendation that tenure be denied.

Dec. 18 — Letter to Faulkner-King from Wicks informing her of the Committee's affirmation of their prior decision to recommend she be denied tenure and his concurrence therewith.

Dec. 18 — Letter to Dean Jack H. McKenzie from Wicks recommending that Faulkner-King be denied tenure and offered a one-year terminal contract.

1986

Feb. 25 — Letter to Wicks from Faulkner-King requesting an additional review of her credentials by Wicks and the Personnel Committee.

Apr. 10 — Letters to McKenzie and Faulkner-King from Wicks indicating that the Committee, upon further review, reaffirms its prior recommendation and advising that Wicks concurs in that recommendation.

Apr. 14 — Letters to Vice-Chancellor Goldwasser and Faulkner-King from McKenzie requesting that a notice of non-reappointment and terminal contract be issued to Faulkner-King.

Apr. 18 — Letter to McKenzie from Goldwasser advising that Goldwasser will request the Board of Trustees to issue a notice of non-reappointment and terminal contract to Faulkner-King for the 1986/87 academic year.

Apr. 28 — Letter to Arthur R. Robinson, Chairman of the Faculty Advisory Committee, from Faulkner-King requesting the Committee to review the decision of the School of Art & Design.

May 8 — Letter to Wicks from McKenzie advising that the Personnel Committee which had reviewed Faulkner-King was unlawfully constituted and requesting that a new committee be appointed to consider the promotion documents of Faulkner-King and a second professor.

May 13 — Letter to Faulkner-King from McKenzie advising her of the new Personnel Committee and its de novo review of her credentials.

May 29 — Letter to Wicks from Pilcher, Chairman of the new Personnel Committee recommending that Faulkner-King be denied tenure and issued a terminal contract.

June 3 — Letter to Faulkner-King from Wicks advising her of the Personnel Committee's recommendation and informing her that Wicks concurs in the recommendation.

July 3 — Letter to Wicks from Faulkner-King advising Wicks of her decision to seek further review of her tenure denial and requesting the information which the Committee reviewed in reaching its decision.

July 17 — Letter to Faulkner-King advising her to submit any additional information to the Committee by August 4, 1986.

Aug. 8 — Letter to Wicks from Pilcher advising that the Committee reaffirmed its prior recommendation that Faulkner-King be denied tenure and issued a terminal contract.

Aug. 11 — Letter to Faulkner-King from Wicks advising her of the Committee's recommendation and that Wicks will request she be issued a notice of non-reappointment and terminal contract for the 1986/87 academic year.

Aug. 11 — Letters from Wicks and McKenzie to Goldwasser informing him of the Personnel Committee's recommendation and requesting that a terminal contract be issued to Faulkner-King.

Aug. 20 — Terminal contract issued to Faulkner-King by the Board of Trustees.

Sep. 1 — Letter to McKenzie from Faulkner-King requesting that he review the decision to deny her tenure.

Sep. 17 — Letter to Faulkner-King from McKenzie reaffirming his prior recommendation to Goldwasser that she be denied tenure and issued a terminal contract.

1987

Aug. 20 — Expiration of Faulkner-King's terminal contract.

The foregoing is a summary of the relevant correspondence between the parties and omits certain letters as well as the subjective characterizations of those letters advanced by Plaintiff in her appendix. Several of the omitted letters involve the Faculty Advisory Committee's concerns regarding the overall promotion process followed by the School of Art & Design.

II. Summary Judgment

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment should be entered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Unquestionably, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence is to be taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Nevertheless, the rule is also well established that the mere existence of some factual dispute will not frustrate an otherwise proper summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, the "preliminary question for the judge is not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. Analysis

In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the Supreme Court considered the identical issue which we now have before us. Columbus Ricks, a black Liberian, joined the faculty of Delaware State College in 1970. In February 1973, the Faculty Committee on Promotions and Tenure recommended that Ricks be denied tenure. The Committee agreed to reconsider its decision the following year.

In February 1974 the Committee reaffirmed its prior decision. The following month the Faculty Senate voted to support the Committee's negative recommendation. On March 13, 1974, the College Board of Trustees voted to deny tenure to Ricks.

Ricks immediately filed a grievance with the Board's Educational Policy Committee which took the matter under advisement. During the pendency of the grievance, the Trustees offered Ricks a one-year terminal contract on June 26, 1974, which expired on June 30, 1975. On September 12, 1974, the Board of Trustees notified Ricks that it had denied his grievance.

Ricks filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC on April 28, 1975. Two years later the EEOC issued Ricks a "right to sue" letter and he promptly commenced suit under Title VII in district court alleging that the tenure denial was discriminatory because it had been based on his national origin.

The district court granted the College's motion to dismiss on the ground that the unlawful employment practice had occurred, at the latest, on June 26, 1974, when the Trustees extended the offer of a terminal contract to Ricks. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that an employee who has been told of the decision to terminate him but who was still working should not be required to file suit. Because the decision to terminate an employee could be reversed, the circuit court held that the time period for filing a charge with the EEOC did not begin to run until the terminal contract expired on June 30, 1975.

The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Ricks's allegations...