Fauquier Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway

Decision Date06 December 2011
Docket Number2550–10–4.,Record Nos. 2490–10–4
Citation717 S.E.2d 811,59 Va.App. 185
PartiesFAUQUIER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. Bethanee RIDGEWAY.Bethanee Ridgeway v. Fauquier County Department of Social Services.
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert F. Beard, Culpeper; Arthur von Keller IV, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, for Fauquier County Department of Social Services.

Jennifer R. Moore (Fallon Myers & Marshall, LLP, Warrenton, on briefs), for Bethanee Ridgeway.

Present: PETTY and ALSTON, JJ., and COLEMAN, Senior Judge.

COLEMAN, Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, Fauquier County Department of Social Services (the Department) appeals the trial court's refusal to terminate the parental rights of Bethanee Ridgeway (mother) to C.R., and mother appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to A.R.1 Mother argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she failed within a reasonable period of time to substantially remedy the conditions which brought A.R. into foster care and that termination of parental rights was in A.R.'s best interests because the trial court had insufficient evidence to make that determination. The Department argues that the trial court erred by (1) ruling that the Department failed to prove that pursuant to Code § 16.1–283(C)(2) mother had been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed twelve months, to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of C.R.'s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of the Department; (2) failing to find that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of C.R.; (3) failing to find that C.R. was under the age of fourteen or otherwise not of the age of discretion; (4) denying the petition for the termination of parental rights to C.R.; and (5) ordering the return of custody of C.R. to mother.2 We find no error, and affirm the decisions of the trial court to terminate mother's parental rights to A.R. and the refusal to terminate her parental rights as to C.R.

BACKGROUND

Mother has four children, A.R., H.R., C.R., and D.R. The Department initially became involved with the family in 2007, and on July 3, 2008, the Department removed the children and placed them in foster care. At the time of removal, A.R. was seven years old, H.R. was five years old, C.R. was two years old, and D.R. was one year old.

On August 7, 2008, mother signed a Service Plan Goal Agreement, which established fifteen goals for mother to accomplish in order for her to resume custody of her children. The Department established a foster care plan with the goals of mother obtaining safe and suitable housing, obtaining stable employment, maintaining regular contact with the social worker, participating in random drug screens, abstaining from the use of illegal substances, completing substance abuse, psychological, and parent-child evaluations, following the evaluator's recommendations, participating in visitations with her children in an approved setting, and demonstrating appropriate parenting skills.

Mother was able to complete and comply with some, but not all, of the requirements. She completed the substance abuse, psychological, and parent-child evaluations. She participated in counseling and parenting classes. Initially, she missed several visitations and left early from other visitations; however, her consistency with the visitations improved after the children had been in foster care for several months. In August 2008 she tested positive for cocaine and then refused five other drug screens until April 2009. In April 2009, she began attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and stopped using drugs and alcohol. At the time of trial, mother lived with her mother in a three-bedroom townhouse and relied on her mother for her financial needs. Although mother had sporadic employment after the children had entered foster care, she was unemployed at the time of trial. She testified that she hoped to obtain her GED and attend nursing school.

The children, especially the two eldest, have special needs. All the children had witnessed their father's physical and emotional abuse against their mother. As a result, A.R. demonstrated rude and disrespectful behavior toward her. The evidence also showed that A.R. had been sexually abused, as a result of which he exhibited and frequently engaged in explicit sexualized behavior.3 As to C.R., the evidence showed he was exposed to some sexual attention from his brothers.

Counselors witnessed mother's interactions and visitations with the children. Several of them testified as to mother's inability to adequately supervise and control her children, especially the older ones.

After three days of testimony and argument, the trial court terminated mother's parental rights to A.R. and H.R., but not to C.R. and D.R.4 Mother appeals the trial court's ruling terminating her parental rights to A.R., and the Department appeals the trial court's denial of the termination of parental rights for C.R.

ANALYSIS

When considering termination of parental rights, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests.” Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va.App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).

“Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 3 Va.App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted).

The Department sought termination of mother's parental rights based on Code § 16.1–283(C)(2), which states that a court may terminate parental rights if:

The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child's foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end.

Termination of parental rights of A.R.

Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to A.R. We disagree.

Although mother met many of the Department's requirements, she failed to meet the housing requirement, the employment requirement, and the requirement that she demonstrate the ability to effectively parent her children and keep them safe and secure. The trial court did not place much weight on the housing requirement. At the time of the trial, mother lived with her mother and relied on her mother for her financial needs. The trial court found that the house was “adequate for the needs of not only Ms. Ridgeway and Mrs. Quatmann (her mother), but for at least one or two of the children, if custody were returned to mother.”

The trial court also did not place much weight on mother's employment status. The trial court found that mother had had three jobs prior to trial, but was currently unemployed. Although the trial court stated that mother “needs to make further efforts to remedy” her employment situation, the trial court “acknowledges the current economic recession and high unemployment rates” and mother's “limited” skills.

In terminating mother's parental rights to her eldest son, the trial court placed the greatest weight on A.R.'s special needs and mother's inability to parent him. A.R. was nine years old at the time of the hearing. He had been sexually abused, and “exhibits sexually aggressive behavior and inappropriate sexual knowledge for a child of his age.” While in foster care, A.R. went to counseling for his sexually aggressive behavior and generalized aggressive behavior. His counselor testified that he needs structure and consistency and that mother was unable to meet A.R.'s needs.

The trial court found that A.R.'s “needs are highly specialized and far beyond the capacity of Ms. Ridgeway or her mother to address.” The counselors testified about mother's inability to control and discipline A.R. and manage his aggressive behavior.

Mother argues that the Department arranged visitation between the mother and all four children, and treated the children as a unit, as opposed to individuals. In so doing, mother contends the Department invited “chaos” and did not allow mother to demonstrate her parenting skills. However, there was testimony that despite mother's participation in counseling and parenting classes, she did not improve her parenting skills toward A.R. After the visitations, mother's counselor would discuss her concerns about the visit with mother, and together they would develop a plan for the next visitation. Mother, however, was unable to progress, and the same problems would recur.

“It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va.App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).

The trial court found that mother “is totally unable to address the needs of [A.R.].” The trial court noted that the visitations occurred in “an artificial environment,” but emphasized that A.R. “will require continued therapeutic intervention and parenting abilities beyond the capability of Ms. Ridgeway.” Substantial evidence exists on this record to support the trial court's finding of mother's inability to meet A.R.'s needs and that it was in the child's best interests that mother's parental rights be terminated.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating mother's parental rights to A.R.

Denial of termination of parental rights of C.R.5

The Department argues that the trial court erred by not terminating mother's parental rights to C.R. We disagree.

In considering the matter before ...

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